

*Landmine Monitor Report 2001:  
Toward a Mine-Free World*

**Executive Summary**



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Human Rights Watch • Handicap  
International (Belgium) • Kenya  
Coalition Against Landmines • Mines  
Action Canada • Norwegian People's Aid

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## **ABOUT LANDMINE MONITOR**

This is the executive summary of the third annual report of the Landmine Monitor, an unprecedented initiative by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) to monitor implementation of and compliance with the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally to assess the efforts of the international community to resolve the landmines crisis. Landmine Monitor marks the first time that non-governmental organizations are coming together in a coordinated, systematic and sustained way to monitor a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to regularly document progress and problems.

The main elements of the Landmine Monitor system are a global reporting network, a central database, and an annual report. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001: Toward a Mine-Free World* is the third such annual report. The first report was released in May 1999 at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique while the second report was released in September 2000 at the Second Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, Switzerland. To prepare this third report, Landmine Monitor had 122 researchers from 95 countries gathering information. The report is largely based on in-country research, collected by in-country researchers. Landmine Monitor has utilized the ICBL campaigning network, but has also drawn in other elements of civil society to help monitor and report, including journalists, academics and research institutions.

Landmine Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an effort by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations that they have taken on with regard to antipersonnel mines; this is done through extensive collection, analysis and distribution of information that is publicly available. Though in some cases it does entail investigative missions, Landmine Monitor is not designed to send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Landmine Monitor is meant to complement the States Parties reporting required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty. It was created in the spirit of Article 7 and reflects the shared view that transparency and cooperation are essential elements to the successful elimination of antipersonnel mines. But it is also a recognition that there is a need for independent reporting and evaluation.

Landmine Monitor and its annual report aim to promote and facilitate discussion on mine-related issues, and to seek clarifications, in order to help reach the goal of a mine-free world. Landmine Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole. It seeks to be critical but constructive in its analysis.

*Landmine Monitor Report 2001* contains information on every country of the world with respect to landmine ban policy, use, production, transfer, stockpiling, mine clearance, mine awareness, and survivor assistance. Thus, the Monitor does not only report on States Parties and their treaty obligations, it also looks at signatory states and non-signatories as well. All countries - as well as information on key players in mine action and victim assistance in the mine-affected countries - are included in this report in the belief it will provide an important means to gauge global effectiveness on mine action and banning the weapon.

As was the case in previous years, Landmine Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report has its shortcomings. It is to be viewed as a work in progress, a system that will be continuously updated, corrected and improved. We welcome comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others, in the spirit of dialogue and in the search for accurate and reliable information on a difficult subject.

### **Landmine Monitor 2001 Process**

In June 1998, the ICBL formally agreed to create Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. A Core Group was established to develop and coordinate the Landmine Monitor

system. The Core Group consists of Human Rights Watch, Handicap International (Belgium), Kenya Coalition Against Landmines, Mines Action Canada, and Norwegian People's Aid. Overall responsibility for, and decision-making on, the Landmine Monitor system rests with the Core Group. Additional organizations and individuals provided research coordination for this third report.

Research grants for *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* were awarded in September 2000. The global research network met in ten regional meetings between October 2000 and January 2001 to discuss initial findings, exchange information, assess what research and data gathering had already taken place, identify gaps, and ensure common research methods and reporting mechanisms for the Monitor. In January and February 2001 draft research reports were submitted to the Landmine Monitor research coordinators for review and comment. On 8-9 March 2001 the members of the research network met a second time in Washington, D.C. to present their final reports, discuss their main findings through a peer review process and evaluate the initiative to date.

Throughout May, June and July the Landmine Monitor's team of regional and thematic coordinators verified sources and edited country reports, with a team at Human Rights Watch taking responsibility for final fact-checking, editing and assembly of the entire report. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* also includes appendices with reports from major actors in the mine ban movement, such as UN agencies and the ICRC. The report and its executive summary were printed during August and presented to the Third Meeting of States Parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty in Managua, Nicaragua in September 2001.

Landmine Monitor thanks the donors to the initiative and this third annual report. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* reflects the ICBL's views and Landmine Monitor's donors are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in the report. It was only possible to carry out this work with the aid of grants from:

- Government of Australia
- Government of Austria
- Government of Belgium
- Government of Canada
- Government of Denmark
- Government of France
- Government of Germany
- Government of The Netherlands
- Government of Norway
- Government of Sweden
- Government of Switzerland
- Government of United Kingdom
- European Commission
- Open Society Institute Landmines Project

## **BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES**

*The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction* ("Mine Ban Treaty")<sup>1</sup> was opened for signature on 3 December 1997. It entered into force on 1 March 1999.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) considers the Mine Ban Treaty the only viable comprehensive framework for achieving a mine-free world. The ICBL believes

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<sup>1</sup>The ICBL generally uses the short title, Mine Ban Treaty, although other short titles are common as well, including Ottawa Convention and Ottawa Treaty.

that the only real measure of the Mine Ban Treaty's success will be the concrete impact that it has on the global mine problem. This *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* provides a means of measuring that impact.<sup>2</sup> It is evident that the treaty, and the ban movement more generally, are making a significant difference. A growing number of governments are joining the Mine Ban Treaty, and as detailed below, there is decreased use of antipersonnel mines, a dramatic drop in production, an almost complete halt to trade, rapid destruction of stockpiled mines, fewer mine victims in key affected countries, and more land demined.

Despite the progress, the reality is that antipersonnel mines continue to be laid and to take far too many victims. The landmine problem is not solved, and will not be solved without sustained commitment from governments and non-governmental organizations.

### **Universalization**

A total of 140 countries have signed or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty as of 1 August 2001, thereby legally committing themselves to no use of antipersonnel mines. A total of 118 of those countries have ratified or acceded, thereby fully committing to all the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty. After the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify at a later date. Since the publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, three states have acceded: Nauru (7 August 2000), Kiribati (7 September 2000), and Congo-Brazzaville (4 May 2001). Considering the relatively short time that this issue has been before the international community, the number of signatories and accessions – nearly three-quarters of the world's nations -- is exceptional. This is a clear indication of the widespread international rejection of any use or possession of antipersonnel mines.

Every country in the Western Hemisphere has signed except the US and Cuba, every member of the European Union except Finland, every member of NATO except the United States and Turkey, 42 of the 48 countries in Africa, and key Asia-Pacific nations such as Australia, Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia. Several of the most heavily mine-affected countries are States Parties: Cambodia, Mozambique, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia. Several others are signatories: Angola, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Major past producers and exporters are now States Parties, including: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Still, 53 countries have not yet joined the treaty. This includes three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, Russia, and the United States. It includes most of the Middle East, most of the former Soviet republics, and many Asian nations. Major producers such as China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the US are not part of the treaty.

Virtually all of the non-signatories have endorsed the notion of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines at some point in time, and many have already at least partially embraced the Mine Ban Treaty. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/33V calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted in November 2000 by a vote of 143 in favor, none opposed, and 22 abstentions. Twenty non-signatories voted for the resolution, including Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Bhutan, Comoros, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

Some developments during the reporting period are encouraging. The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey announced that they will join the treaty and will deposit their instruments of ratification and accession, respectively, at the same time. Cyprus has announced its intention to ratify soon. FR Yugoslavia has announced its intention to accede to the treaty. Nigeria has decided to accede and initiated the legal process. In several countries where conflict has ended

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<sup>2</sup> The reporting period for *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* is May 2000 to May 2001. Editors have where possible added important information that arrived in June and July 2001.

recently, governments have expressed interest in joining the Mine Ban Treaty, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.

Many States Parties are putting a high priority on promoting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. A Universalization Contact Group has been formed, coordinated by Canada, with participation by a number of States Parties, the ICBL and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In addition to many bilateral efforts to promote adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty, there have been important regional conferences aimed at universalization.

Nevertheless, there has been little or no change in the ban policies of some states in the past year, including the US, Russia and China. Universalization clearly remains the biggest challenge facing ban supporters. The fact that only five countries have acceded to the treaty since its entry-into-force on 1 March 1999 is testament to that.

### **Ratification<sup>3</sup>**

After achieving the required 40 ratifications in September 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. This is believed to be the fastest entry-into-force of any major multilateral treaty ever. For a State that ratifies or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for it on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State deposited its instrument of ratification. That State is then required to make its implementation report to the UN Secretary-General within 180 days, destroy stockpiled mines within four years, and destroy mines in the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.

A total of 118 countries have ratified or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty as of 1 August 2001, including 18 since publication of the *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*. Three nations acceded (Kiribati, Nauru, and Congo-Brazzaville) and 15 ratified in this reporting period: Bangladesh, Cape Verde, Colombia, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Maldives, Malta, Moldova, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Zambia.

There are 22 governments that have signed but not ratified the Mine Ban Treaty. Several have reportedly already completed, or nearly completed, the domestic process necessary for ratification, but have not formally submitted an instrument of ratification to the United Nations: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Cook Islands, and São Tomé e Príncipe, as well as non-signatory DR Congo.

There is concern that the pace of ratifications/accessions has slowed. There were three ratifications in December 1997 at the time of the treaty signing conference, 55 in 1998, 32 in 1999, and 19 in 2000 and nine through 1 August 2001.

### **Implementation – The Intersessional Work Program**

The first two years of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional work program successfully fulfilled their intended purpose in helping to maintain a focus on the landmines crisis, in becoming a meeting place for all key mine action players, and in stimulating momentum to fully implement the Mine Ban Treaty. The four intersessional Standing Committees on Victim Assistance, Mine Clearance, Stockpile Destruction and General Status and Operation of the Convention helped to provide a global picture of priorities, as well as to consolidate and concentrate global mine action efforts. As a result, the role of the Mine Ban Treaty as a comprehensive framework for mine action continued to be highlighted.

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<sup>3</sup> Throughout this report, the term ratification is used as a short-hand for “consent to be bound.” The treaty allows governments to give consent to be bound in a variety of ways, including ratification, acceptance, approval or accession -- all of which give binding legal status beyond signature. Also for the purposes of this report, those countries who have given their consent to be bound, but have not yet completed the six-month waiting period, are included in the “States Parties” sections of the Regional Chapters.

The intersessional process is a collaborative process conducted in the Ottawa Process tradition of inclusivity, partnership (between governments, ICBL, ICRC, and International Organizations), dialogue, openness and practical cooperation. Action points identified from the first year of the intersessional work program were included in the Second Meeting of States Parties President's Action Program and served as the basis for planning for the second year of intersessional work. Implementation of these Action Points was ongoing throughout the year. Compliance with all key Articles of the Convention became an overall focus of the second intersessional year.

The intersessional Standing Committee meetings will become increasingly important in the years leading up to the first Review Conference in 2004, as the Mine Ban Treaty continues to rapidly move toward establishment of the international norm. The ICBL remains deeply committed to full and active participation in this critical intersessional process.

### ***Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)***

The ICBL continued to monitor developments at the CCW and its Amended Protocol II with a minimal presence during the Second Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW in December 2000, and the December 2000 and April 2001 PrepComs for the Second CCW Review Conference, to be held in December 2001. Most NGOs who attended, though ICBL members, were there to further their individual NGO's work on non-ICBL matters, such as cluster munitions. ICBL statements were made at both PrepComs.

Proposals presented and discussed at these meetings included: extension of scope, compliance issues, antivehicle mines, wound ballistics and Explosive Remnants of War. From the ICBL perspective the most important development during these sessions was the discussion surrounding the ICRC proposal regarding Explosive Remnants of War and progress made toward the goal of having the Review Conference approve a mandate for continuing discussions on remnants of war. Most delegations spoke in favor of ongoing consideration and discussion of this important humanitarian issue. The Netherlands plays a leading role in this issue and the ICRC as well as many NGOs, who are ICBL members, continue to work on the issue.

### **Global Use of Antipersonnel Mines**

#### ***Mine Ban Treaty States Parties***

Landmine Monitor has received disturbing reports that indicate a strong possibility of use of antipersonnel mines by Ugandan forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in June 2000. Uganda became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 1999. Landmine Monitor believes that these serious and credible allegations merit the urgent attention of States Parties, who should consult with the Ugandan government and other relevant actors in order to seek clarification, establish the facts, and resolve questions regarding compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty. The Ugandan government has denied that it used antipersonnel mines in the DRC.

#### ***Mine Ban Treaty Signatories***

One Mine Ban Treaty signatory has acknowledged continued use of antipersonnel mines: Angola (against UNITA rebels).

While Landmine Monitor does not have conclusive evidence, there are strong indications that two other signatories used antipersonnel mines: Ethiopia (until the end of its border conflict with Eritrea in June 2000), and Sudan (ongoing use against SPLA and other rebel forces). Both governments deny any use of antipersonnel mines.

There have also been serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Rwandan forces in the DRC in June 2000. Rwanda was a Mine Ban Treaty signatory at the time; it became a State Party on 1 December 2000. Rwanda denies any use of antipersonnel mines.

In Burundi, which is a treaty signatory, antipersonnel mines have continued to be used, and there have been allegations of use by both government and rebel forces, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to establish responsibility for the mine use. The government of Burundi denies any mine use.

#### ***Mine Ban Treaty Non-Signatories***

In this Landmine Monitor reporting period, since May 2000, the following countries which have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty, have acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines: Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Uzbekistan.

Other non-signatories who are credibly reported to have used antipersonnel mines in this time period include: Democratic Republic of Congo, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, and Somalia. The DR Congo and Nepal have denied use.

#### ***Armed Non-State Actors***

Opposition groups are reported to have used antipersonnel mines in at least 19 countries.

Africa: Angola; Burundi; DR Congo; Namibia; Senegal; Somalia; Sudan; Uganda

Americas: Colombia

Asia-Pacific: Afghanistan; Burma (Myanmar); India/Pakistan (Kashmir);

Nepal; Philippines; Sri Lanka

Europe/Central Asia: Georgia (in Abkhazia); FYR Macedonia; Russia (in Chechnya); FR Yugoslavia (in and near Kosovo)

#### ***Developments Since Landmine Monitor Report 2000***

As of mid-2001, it would not appear that antipersonnel mines are being used on a massive scale in any conflict. The most regular use is likely occurring in Russia (Chechnya), Sri Lanka, and Burma. Reports of Uzbekistan continuing to mine its borders were still being received in June 2001.

The kind of widespread use of antipersonnel mines that was witnessed in FR Yugoslavia/Kosovo in 1999 and in Russia/Chechnya at the height of that conflict in 1999 and early 2000 was not evident in this reporting period in any location. It would appear, however, that use of antipersonnel mines increased in a number of countries, notably in Colombia by guerrillas and in Namibia by Angolan rebels (UNITA) and Angolan government troops.

Most instances of use of antipersonnel mines in this reporting period were in ongoing situations of conflict, where the governments and rebel groups were using mines in the previous reporting period as well. However, there were a number of cases of new instances of antipersonnel mine use, or serious allegations of new use. These include:

- Russia: In addition to continued use of antipersonnel mines in the conflict with Chechen rebels (who also use mines), Russian forces have laid antipersonnel mines on the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border, and have laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan on the Tajik-Afghan border.
- Uzbekistan: Uzbekistan has laid antipersonnel mines on its borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Both governments have accused Uzbekistan of emplacing mines across the border in their territory.
- Kyrgyzstan: Kyrgyz forces reportedly mined the border with Tajikistan in mid to late 2000, then subsequently cleared the mines.
- Nepal: There are now serious indicators that government police forces are using antipersonnel mines against the Maoist rebels who are increasingly using homemade mines.

- FYR Macedonia: Since ethnic Albanian insurgents began fighting the government in March 2001, at least six antivehicle mine incidents have been reported and there have been several reported seizures of antipersonnel mines being smuggled into FYR Macedonia from Kosovo.
- FR Yugoslavia: In southern Serbia, bordering Kosovo, irregular ethnic Albanian forces have used antivehicle and antipersonnel mines.

On the other side from these new outbreaks of use of antipersonnel mines, it would appear that, compared to *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, the government of FR Yugoslavia did not use antipersonnel mines in this reporting period, the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia stopped use early in the period, and there was no reported use of antipersonnel mines by non-state actors in northern Iraq.

*In other developments in this reporting period:*

Eritrea for the first time admitted to use of antipersonnel mines during its border conflict with Ethiopia from May 1998 to June 2000.

Israel acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines in South Lebanon prior to its withdrawal from the area in May 2000, and provided minefield maps to the United Nations. It appears that Israel has continued to use antipersonnel mines in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, allegedly without proper fencing and marking as required by CCW Amended Protocol II, which entered into force for Israel on 30 April 2001. When asked about the allegation, Israel replied that it “fulfills its obligations to the fullest extent, and strongly rejects allegations to the contrary.” There have been allegations of mine use by Palestinians as well.

In February 2001 the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo for the first time known to *Landmine Monitor* denied current or past use of antipersonnel mines.

In August 2000, the government of Burundi, for the first time known to *Landmine Monitor*, accused rebel forces of using antipersonnel mines. This came in response to *Landmine Monitor*'s report of serious allegations of use by the Burundi army. The government has subsequently frequently accused rebels of planting mines.

In this *Landmine Monitor* reporting period, since May 2000, there were confirmed new uses of antipersonnel mines, or credible allegations of new use, in the following countries:

**Africa**

Angola: government and rebels (UNITA)

Burundi: unknown (allegations of rebels and government)

Democratic Republic of Congo: unknown (allegations of DRC government, RDC rebels, other rebels, Ugandan government, Rwandan government)

Eritrea: government

Ethiopia: government

Namibia: Angolan government and UNITA

Senegal: rebels (MFDC)

Somalia: various factions

Sudan: government and rebels (SPLA/M)

Uganda: rebels (LRA)

**Americas**

Colombia: rebels (FARC-EP, UC-ELN) and paramilitaries (AUC),

**Asia-Pacific**

Afghanistan: opposition forces (Northern Alliance)

Burma (Myanmar): government and 11 rebel groups

India/Pakistan (Kashmir): militants  
 Nepal: government and rebels (Maoists)  
 Philippines: rebels (Abu Sayaff, MILF, NPA)  
 Sri Lanka: government and rebels (LTTE),

#### **Europe/Central Asia**

Georgia: non-state actors (use in Abkhazia)  
 Kyrgyzstan: government  
 FYR Macedonia: rebels  
 Russia: government and rebels (Chechnya)  
 Tajikistan: Russian government  
 Uzbekistan: government  
 FR Yugoslavia: non-state actors (in and near Kosovo),

#### **Middle East/North Africa**

Israel: government (in Occupied Palestinian Territories)

### **Global Production of Antipersonnel Mines**

In its first two annual reports, Landmine Monitor identified sixteen producers of antipersonnel landmines. This year, Landmine Monitor has decided to remove two of those nations, Turkey and FR Yugoslavia, from the list.

Turkey has, for the first time, provided Landmine Monitor with a written statement indicating that it has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1996, and has said that it does not intend to produce them. Turkey's Foreign Minister announced in April 2001 that Turkey was starting the process of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.

FR Yugoslavia has also provided a written statement saying that it has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1992. While Landmine Monitor has received some contrary information in the past, this statement, combined with the decision of the new government to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty, justifies removal from the list of producers.

#### ***Antipersonnel Mine Producers***

In the Americas: Cuba, United States  
 In Europe: Russia  
 In Middle East: Egypt, Iran, Iraq  
 In Asia: Burma (Myanmar), China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, Vietnam  
*Forty-one nations have ceased production of antipersonnel mines.*

Of the 14 remaining producers, it should be noted that:

- Egyptian officials have stated several times since 1997 that Egypt no longer produces antipersonnel mines. However, this position has not been issued in writing as a formal policy statement, despite numerous requests from Landmine Monitor and the ICBL. Thus, Landmine Monitor continues to count Egypt as a mine producer.

- The United States has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1996, and has no known plans for production. However, it has refused to adopt an official moratorium or ban on production, and thus is still listed as a mine producer.

- South Korea has reported to Landmine Monitor that in the last two years, it has only produced Claymore-type antipersonnel mines. When used in command-detonated mode, these

are permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty. One military official told Landmine Monitor that the ROK has produced no antipersonnel mines since 1997 (presumably except for the Claymores).

Among the other developments in the global situation with respect to antipersonnel mine production since May 2000:

- Landmine Monitor has received new allegations regarding production of antipersonnel mines in Uganda at the government-owned National Enterprise Corporation (NEC) factory at Nakasongora. Four sources, including three Ugandan military personnel, independently told Landmine Monitor that production of antipersonnel mines continues. However, Landmine Monitor is not in a position to confirm or deny these allegations. An independent inspection of the facility has not been made.

- Australia informed Landmine Monitor that it produced antipersonnel mines in the past, but stopped in the early 1980s. Landmine Monitor was previously unaware of this information.

- India has for the first time designed a remotely-delivered mine system (with a self-destruction/self-deactivation mechanism) for trial evaluation and prototype production. It has also designed for production a detectable version of its hand-emplaced, non-metallic M14 mine. Pursuant to its obligations under CCW Amended Protocol II, the government of India has stated that production of non-detectable mines has ceased on 1 January 1997.

- It appears Pakistan is engaged in new production of both hand-emplaced detectable mines and remotely delivered mines that meet CCW Amended Protocol II standards. Pakistan has stated that since 1 January 1997 it has produced only detectable antipersonnel landmines. At a Landmine Monitor meeting, the Pakistani Ambassador said that use and production of fragmentation mines had been abandoned. This statement has not been confirmed.

- Russia stated in December 2000 that it is decommissioning facilities for production of antipersonnel blast mines. Officials have said Russia is increasingly focusing efforts on research and development of landmine alternatives, rather than new antipersonnel mine production.

- Singapore has confirmed that it continues to produce landmines to be used in national defense.

- The South Korean Ministry of Defense reported that 7,000 KM18A1 Claymore-type mines were produced in 2000.

- In the US, decisions are pending on the continued development and production of two key alternatives to antipersonnel mines, RADAM and NSD-A, both of which may be inconsistent with the Mine Ban Treaty.

The 41 nations that have stopped production of antipersonnel mines include a majority of the big producers in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Eight of the twelve biggest producers and exporters over the past thirty years are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and have stopped all production and export: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia), Bulgaria, Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia), France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

### **Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines**

Landmine Monitor research did not find evidence of antipersonnel mine exports or imports by Mine Ban Treaty State Parties or signatories. Indeed, Landmine Monitor did not identify a single significant shipment of antipersonnel mines from one nation to another. It was noted in *Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance 2000-2001* that there has been a "virtual absence of mines--legitimate or otherwise--at arms shows and military equipment exhibitions this year. The

stigmatization process has clearly had a major impact: even the non-signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty seem to feel the need to appear politically correct.”<sup>4</sup>

There remains a concern about the possible transit or trans-shipment of antipersonnel mines through treaty nations. There have been a few reports of seizures of illicit shipments of light weapons that have included some antipersonnel mines. It continues to be the case that antipersonnel mine trade has been reduced to a relatively small amount of illicit trafficking.

Thirty-four countries are known to have exported antipersonnel landmines in the past. Today, all of those nations with the exception of Iraq have at the least made a formal statement that they are no longer exporting. In September 2000, an Iraqi diplomat said to Landmine Monitor, “How can we export landmines? We only export oil for food.”

Twenty-two countries have signed the Mine Ban Treaty and thus stopped exporting, although many had unilateral restrictions in place prior to signing. Among non-signatories, one has an export ban in place (USA), four have a moratorium in place (Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore), and six have made declaratory statements that they no longer export (China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Yugoslavia, Vietnam). Russia’s moratorium and China’s declaratory policy only apply to export of non-detectable and non-self-destruct mines, in keeping with CCW restrictions. However, neither nation is known to have made a significant export since 1995.

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows transfers of antipersonnel mines for research and development of demining technologies and for training as well as for the purpose of destruction. Several states parties have commendably reported these activities in their Article 7 reports, including Canada, Nicaragua and Denmark.

### **Global Stockpiles of Antipersonnel Mines**

Landmine Monitor estimates that there are 230-245 million antipersonnel mines stockpiled by about 100 countries. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties account for an estimated 8-9 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. According to the latest data made available to Landmine Monitor, the biggest stocks among States Parties are: Italy (3 million), Albania (1.6 million), and Japan (762,729). However, these numbers are outdated, as destruction programs are underway in all these countries.

Signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty (countries which have signed but not ratified) also hold an estimated 89 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Ukraine has revised downward its stockpile estimate to 6.35 million. Other Mine Ban Treaty signatories with large stockpiles are likely to be Angola, Ethiopia, Poland and Greece. None of these states will reveal information about their mine stocks.

Treaty non-signatories have an estimated 215-225 million antipersonnel mines in stock. Landmine Monitor estimates that the largest stockpiles belong to: China (110 million), Russia (60-70 million), United States (11.2 million), Pakistan (6 million) India (4-5 million), and Belarus (4.5 million). Other non-signatories believed to have large stockpiles are Egypt, Eritrea, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, Vietnam, and FR Yugoslavia.

In addition to governments, many rebel groups also have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in such places as Angola, Burma, Chechnya, Colombia, DR Congo, Kashmir, FYR Macedonia, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, and FR Yugoslavia (including Kosovo).

### ***Stockpile Developments Since May 2000***

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<sup>4</sup> *Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance 2000-2001*, Fifth Edition, pp. 22-23.

### **Africa**

- Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Togo, and Zambia have stated that they have only small stockpiles of antipersonnel mines for training, but have not provided the exact number of mines in stock.
- Burkina Faso, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Senegal have confirmed that they do not possess antipersonnel mines.
- Burundi revealed that its stockpile numbers less than 15,000 antipersonnel mines, all of Belgian manufacture.
- Cameroon declared a stockpile of 500 antipersonnel mines for training purposes.
- Congo-Brazzaville indicates that its stockpile may number as much as 700,000-900,000 antipersonnel mines.
- Mauritania has destroyed its stockpile and decided to retain 5,918 antipersonnel mines for training purposes; this was previously unknown to Landmine Monitor.
- Mozambique's initial Article 7 report revealed the size of its stockpile for the first time: 37,818.
- Sierra Leone acknowledged a stockpile of approximately 900 antipersonnel mines.
- Tanzania is the only State Party yet to reveal whether or not it maintains any stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

### **Americas**

- Argentina's initial Article 7 report revealed the size of its stockpile for the first time: 89,170.
- Brazil's initial Article 7 report revealed the size of its stockpile for the first time: 34,562.
- For the first time, Colombia provided a precise number for its antipersonnel mine stockpile: 18,294.
- El Salvador has acknowledged that it still has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, numbering 5,657; it had previously reported destruction of its stockpile.
- Guyana confirmed possessing a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but did not reveal its size; Landmine Monitor estimates it at 20,000 antipersonnel mines.
- It is not known whether Suriname maintains an antipersonnel mine stockpile.
- Uruguay confirmed its stockpile amounts to 1,918 antipersonnel mines.
- Venezuelan military sources indicate that there is a "small" number of antipersonnel mines in stock for training purposes.

### **Asia-Pacific**

- Mongolian officials have indicated that Mongolia possesses a very substantial stockpile, though no numbers have been revealed.
- South Korea has confirmed that it has an estimated 2 million antipersonnel mines in stockpile, one of the biggest inventories globally.

### **Europe and Central Asia**

- Belarus for the first time revealed the size of its stockpile of 4.5 million antipersonnel mines.
- Georgia is reportedly conducting an inventory of its antipersonnel mine stockpile.
- According to one newspaper report, Kazakhstan possesses 800,000 to one million antipersonnel mines; this is the only known public estimate of Kazakhstan's antipersonnel mine stockpile.
- Romania for the first time revealed that its stockpile totals 1,076,629 antipersonnel mines.
- Ukraine revised its stockpile disclosure to 6.35 million antipersonnel mines, down from earlier estimates of 10.1 million.

**Middle East North Africa**

- Tunisia declared a stockpile of 17,575 antipersonnel mines.
- Qatar has confirmed that it has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.
- Oman revealed for the first time that it has a “limited” stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes.

***Stockpile Destruction (Article 4)***

Landmine Monitor research shows that approximately 27 million antipersonnel mines have been destroyed in recent years by more than 50 nations, including Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, signatories, and non-signatories. Some 5 million antipersonnel mines have been destroyed in this reporting period.

Forty-eight States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed about 21 million antipersonnel mines. A total of twenty-eight States Parties have completed destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles. Eight have completed destruction in this reporting period, including the Czech Republic in June 2001, Malaysia in January 2001, Bulgaria in December 2000, Honduras, Spain and Zimbabwe in November 2000, Slovak Republic in September 2000, and Mauritania at an unknown date.

Of the twenty-eight, fifteen completed destruction since entry-into-force of the Mine Ban Treaty in March 1999. In addition to the above: Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, France, Hungary, and the United Kingdom. Another fourteen States Parties reported destruction of their stockpiles prior to March 1999: Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Germany, Guatemala, Luxembourg, Mali, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland.

Another nineteen States Parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles: Albania, Argentina, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Moldova, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, and Yemen.

The seventeen States Parties that have not begun the destruction process include: Bangladesh, Brazil, Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, Macedonia FYR, Mozambique, Niger, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Venezuela and Zambia. A number of these have only been States Parties a short time including Bangladesh, Kenya, Romania, Tanzania, and Zambia.

***Stockpile Destruction Developments Since May 2000*****Africa**

- Mauritania reported that it destroyed its stockpile of approximately 5,000 antipersonnel mines over the course of the past three years.
- Zimbabwe completed the destruction of its stockpile in November 2000.

**Americas**

- At a regional meeting in Buenos Aires in November 2000, states announced the “Managua Challenge” which includes the objective of completion of stockpile destruction in the region before the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua in September 2001.
- Argentina began destroying its stockpile on 8 November 2000 by destroying 200 Spanish manufactured P-4-B antipersonnel mines.
- Chile destroyed 2,000 US-manufactured M16 antipersonnel mines on 6 November 2000.
- Honduras destroyed its stockpile of 7,441 antipersonnel mines on 2 November 2000.
- Nicaragua destroyed 40,000 antipersonnel mines since May 2000, and 70,000 total.
- Peru destroyed 117,506 stockpiled antipersonnel mines from March 2000 through July 2001.
- Uruguay has destroyed 242 antipersonnel mines since May 2000.

### **Asia-Pacific**

- Australia destroyed an additional 6,460 antipersonnel mines; these were “inadvertently omitted” from a previous inventory.
- Japan had destroyed 223,508 antipersonnel mines as of the end of February 2001.
- Malaysia destroyed its entire stockpile in January 2001.
- Thailand destroyed an additional 69,346 antipersonnel mines since January 2001.

### **Europe and Central Asia**

- The problems associated with the destruction of PFM-1 and PFM-1S antipersonnel mines has garnered attention and was the subject of an international meeting in Budapest co-hosted by Hungary and Canada. The following countries are thought to stockpile this type of antipersonnel mine: Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and the Ukraine. Bulgaria destroyed 12,000 of these mines in 1999.
- A NATO-sponsored stockpile destruction program is in place in Albania to destroy the stockpile of 1.6 million antipersonnel mines there. A similar NATO program is being created to assist Moldova destroy its stockpile of 12,000 antipersonnel mines.
- Ukraine and Canada signed a framework agreement for destruction of PMN mines, and discussions are underway with NATO on a PMN destruction project.
- Bulgaria completed destruction of its stockpile in December 2000.
- The Czech Republic completed the destruction of its stockpile in June 2001.
- Italy had destroyed 4,086,057 antipersonnel mines as of March 2001, and had 3,034,324 mines left to destroy.
- The Slovak Republic completed destruction of its stockpile in September 2000.
- Slovenia destroyed nearly 20,000 antipersonnel mines as of May 2001; plans call for destruction of the remaining mines by the end of 2001.
- Spain completed destruction of its stockpile in November 2000.
- Sweden, as of April 2001, has destroyed 2,335,069 antipersonnel mines since entry-into-force of the Mine Ban Treaty, and there were 24,200 antipersonnel mines still in stockpile.

### **Middle East North Africa**

- Yemen destroyed an additional 4,286 antipersonnel mines in February 2001.
- Jordan destroyed an additional 16,000 antipersonnel mines.

### ***Mines Retained for Training and Development (Article 3)***

It appears that the majority of States Parties possessing a stockpile of antipersonnel mines are opting to exercise the Article 3 exception. Many intend to keep between 1,000-5,000 mines. Several intend to keep significantly more: Brazil 16,550; Ecuador 16,000; Japan 13,582; Sweden 11,120; and Italy 8,000. Argentina declared in May 2001 that it will increase the number of mines retained from 3,049 to 13,025.

After the ICBL raised this issue repeatedly in the Standing Committee meetings, a number of countries have decided to decrease the number of mines kept: Australia from 10,000 to 7,845; Bulgaria from 10,446 to 4,000; Croatia from 17,500 to 7,000, Denmark from 4,991 to just over 2,106, Peru from 9,526 to 5,578; Slovakia from 7,000 to 1,500; Spain from 10,000 to 4,000; Thailand from 15,600 to 5,000. Slovenia confirms that it will reduce the number of antipersonnel mines retained from 7,000 to 1,500 after 2003.

The ICBL continues to question the need for live mines for training. The ICBL believes that it is important not only to have complete transparency on this through more detailed Article 7 reporting, but also to continue to evaluate the necessity for the exception.

## Special Issues of Concern

### *Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices*

During the Oslo treaty negotiations in 1997, the ICBL identified as “the major weakness in the treaty” the Article 2 Paragraph 1 definition of antipersonnel mine that exempts antivehicle mines equipped with antihandling devices: “Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.” The ICBL expressed its belief that many antivehicle mines (AVMs) with antihandling devices (AHDs) could function as antipersonnel mines and pose similar dangers to civilians.

To address this concern, which was shared by many government delegations, negotiators changed the draft definition of antihandling device (which had been identical to the one in CCW Protocol II) by adding the words “or otherwise intentionally disturb”: “‘Anti-handling device’ means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with *or otherwise intentionally disturb* the mine.” It was emphasized by Norway, which proposed the language, and others, that the word “intentionally” was needed to establish that if an AVM with an AHD explodes from an unintentional act of a person, it is to be considered an antipersonnel mine, and banned under the treaty. This language was eventually accepted by all delegations without dissent.<sup>5</sup>

The ICBL has expressed concern that there has not been adequate recognition by States Parties that AVMs with AHDs that function like antipersonnel mines are in fact prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, nor discussion of the practical implications of this. The ICBL has repeatedly called on States Parties to be more explicit about what types of AVMs and AHDs, and what deployment methods, are permissible and prohibited. The ICRC, Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action (UK), and the German Initiative to Ban Landmines have all produced lists and publications regarding AVMs of concern. Landmine Monitor researchers have identified such mines in their individual country studies contained in this report.

During this Landmine Monitor reporting period, officials of a number of States Parties made policy statements on the issue of AVMs with AHDs in various domestic and international venues or in communications with Landmine Monitor researchers. Highlights of these statements include (see individual country reports for details):

- The Bolivian Defense Minister stated that Bolivia is not using and does not reserve the right to use other munitions which might function like antipersonnel mines and pose danger to civilians, such as antitank mines with antihandling devices.
- In the Belgian Parliament, legislation banning AHD, or interpreting existing law to ban AHD, has been proposed and studied.
- An official from Canada, in a statement made during to Standing Committee meeting in May 2001 noted, “Canada does not accept the argument that all antihandling devices could be activated by unintentional disturbance. Canada is currently undertaking work to better explain what we consider to be antihandling devices that would conceivably be banned by the Convention and those that we would consider not banned by the Convention.”
- The current German government position is that AVM with AHD do not fall within the scope of the Mine Ban Treaty, but Parliamentarians and some Government officials are considering options to ban or regulate use of AVMs.

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<sup>5</sup> For a detailed description of the diplomatic history on this issue, see Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet, “Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices,” January 2000.

- The French Ambassador for Mine Action has asserted that the antivehicle mines currently stockpiled by the Ministry of Defense are not covered by the Mine Ban Treaty, but do comply with the CCW Amended Protocol II.
- Italy, in its recent CCW National Annual Report, noted that its stringent national legislation banning antipersonnel landmines (Law 374/97), “adopts a wide definition of [antipersonnel mines] which does not foresee an exception for anti-vehicle mines equipped with antihandling devices.”
- The Netherlands at a Standing Committee meeting in May 2001 supported the call for the issue of AVM with AHD to be dealt with by “best practices” because, in its view, this has the advantage of being voluntary but allows States to deal with humanitarian concerns while recognizing military needs.
- An official at the Slovakian Ministry of Defense stated in a January 2001 interview, “Slovakia is not obliged to provide information on antivehicle landmines and antihandling devices, since no nation has done so, moreover there is no obligation emanating from the Ottawa Treaty that requires it or any other State to do so. However, Slovakia has interest and unreservedly supports the destruction of antivehicle landmines and antihandling devices on a world-wide basis.”
- The Spanish Foreign Ministry noted that Spain’s Law 33/98 refers to mines designed to explode in the presence, proximity or contact with a person, thus AVM with AHD “will not be treated as antipersonnel landmines.”
- According to Defense officials from the United Kingdom, very sensitive antidisturbance devices are not found among UK stocks. According to Parliamentary statements, “All UK weapons systems have been checked for compliance with the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty. There are no weapons or munitions in the UK inventory which fall under the Ottawa definition of an antipersonnel mine.”

Acting upon recommendations made in Standing Committee meetings in 2000, the ICRC hosted a technical experts meeting on “antivehicle mines with sensitive fuses or with sensitive antihandling devices” on 13-14 March 2001 in Geneva. Governments that sent representatives to this seminar included: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Nicaragua, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. The Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and ICBL also participated.

Discussion at the seminar centered on identifying the specific technical measures that States Parties can adopt to minimize the risk to civilians posed by AVMs with sensitive fuze mechanisms and antihandling devices that might be activated by an unintentional act. Emerging from the seminar was a set of recommendations for best practices regarding the design and use of sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices. Key among them were establishing a minimum pressure threshold of 150 kilograms for AVMs and discontinuing use of AVMs with tripwires and tilt rod fuzes, because they function as antipersonnel mines. Participants in the ICRC seminar had trouble developing recommendations about best practices for sensitive antihandling devices. The experts called upon states to do further research on this matter and to examine the sensitivities of their AHDs with the goal of establishing a minimum level needed to fulfill their function.

### ***Joint Operations***

In the previous editions of the *Landmine Monitor Report*, the ICBL raised concerns about the possible participation of States Parties in joint military operations with non-States Parties that use antipersonnel landmines. There is serious concern about the consistency of such operations with the treaty’s Article 1 obligation for a State Party “never under any circumstance...[t]o assist,

encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Such joint operations at the least would go against the spirit of a treaty aimed at an end to all possession and use of antipersonnel mines.

In particular, the question has been raised as to what “assist” means in the treaty’s Article 1. A number of governments have interpreted this to mean “active” or “direct” assistance in actual laying of mines, and not other types of assistance in joint operations, such as provision of fuel or security. This narrow interpretation of assistance is of concern to the ICBL; in keeping with the spirit of a treaty aimed at total eradication of the weapon, interpretation of assistance should be as broad as possible.

During the meetings of the Standing Committee on General Status of the Convention, the ICBL has emphasized the need for States Parties to reach a common understanding of the term “assist,” especially as it applies to joint military operations, foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, and foreign transit of mines across the territory of a State Party. Full and effective implementation of the treaty will be enhanced if States Parties are clear and consistent with regard to what acts are permitted and what acts are prohibited.

It appears that various States Parties may have significantly different understandings about what acts are permitted. Human Rights Watch prepared and distributed at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2001 a list of questions about joint military operations in order to help determine whether States Parties consider such actions to be prohibited. The ICBL urges States Parties to clarify their views on the legality of joint operations with non-States Parties using mines, as well as foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines.

Though often discussed in terms of potential US use of antipersonnel mines in NATO operations, this is by no means a problem limited to the NATO alliance. Based on research for the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, there are significant questions regarding the position of Tajikistan, a State Party, toward the use of antipersonnel mines by Russian forces stationed in Tajikistan along the Tajik border with Afghanistan. In addition, it appears that a number of States Parties in Africa have engaged in military operations with (or in support of) armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines. This would include Namibia (with Angola against UNITA), as well as Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe with various forces in the DRC.

All of these States Parties should make clear the nature of their support for other armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines, and make clear their views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of their military operations with these armed forces. As parties to the treaty, they should state categorically that they will not participate in joint operations with any force that uses antipersonnel mines.

As reported in the *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, several NATO members have made strong statements rejecting use of antipersonnel mines in NATO operations including France and the Netherlands. A number of countries, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, have adopted legislative provisions or made formal statements with regard to possible participation of their armed forces in joint military operations with a treaty non-signatory that may use antipersonnel mines. In each of these cases, government officials have stated that the intent is to provide legal protections to their military personnel who participate in joint operations with a non-signatory who may utilize antipersonnel mines.

Several governments have provided new or updated information on the issue of joint operations at Standing Committee meetings or during the research process for the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*:

- The Belgian Foreign Ministry stated in June 2000 and again in March 2001, “Any Belgian unit engaged in joint operations outside national territory cannot use

antipersonnel mines, in any circumstances, whatever framework and subordination mode this engagement is undergoing.”<sup>6</sup>

- Canada in May 2001 provided an explicit statement on the issue: “For Canada, this subject is relevant in addressing matters related to interoperability as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With this in mind, in 1998—even before the Convention entered in to force—the Chief of the Defence Staff communicated the following to all Canadian Forces personnel:

*Participation in Combined Operations:* Canada may participate in combined operations with a state that is not Party to the Convention. Canadian contingents may not, however, use anti-personnel mines and the Canadian Forces may not request, even indirectly, the use of anti-personnel mines by others.

*Rules of Engagement:* When participating in combined operations with foreign forces, Canada will not agree to Rules of Engagement which authorize the use by the combined force of anti-personnel mines. This would not, however, prevent States that are not parties to the Convention from using anti-personnel mines for their own national purposes.

*Operational Plans:* When engaged in combined operations with foreign forces, Canada will not agree to operational plans which authorize the use by the combined force of anti-personnel mines. While Canadians may participate in operations planning as members of a multinational staff, they may not participate in planning for the use of anti-personnel mines. This would not prevent a state that is not a Signatory to the Convention from planning for the use of anti-personnel mines by its own forces.

*Command and Control:* The use of anti-personnel mines by the combined force will not be permitted in cases where Canada is in command of a combined Force. Likewise, if Canadian Forces personnel are being commanded by other nationalities, they will not be allowed to participate in the use of, or planning for the use of anti-personnel mines. Were Canadian Forces personnel to engage in such activities they would be liable to criminal prosecution under Canadian law.”<sup>7</sup>

- The Foreign Ministry of the Czech Republic stated “mere participation in the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other military activity” where non-signatories use antipersonnel mines should not render Czech personnel liable to prosecution.<sup>8</sup>
- The Ministry of Defense of Denmark has stated, “in the participation in joint military operations, Denmark does not involve itself in activities that are related to the laying of antipersonnel mines.”<sup>9</sup>
- The Minister of Defense of France already declared in 1998 that France “would unreservedly enforce the Ottawa Treaty. France will prohibit the planned or actual

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<sup>6</sup> Interview with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 15 June 2000; Belgian Response to the Landmine Monitor Questionnaire, March 2001, p. 5.

<sup>7</sup> Canadian delegation, “Intervention on Article 1,” Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 11 May 2001. The intervention was made orally, but the written text was provided to Landmine Monitor.

<sup>8</sup> Letter from Pavol Sepelák, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, 15 February 2001; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 625.

<sup>9</sup> Letter from Ministry of Defence, 15 January 2001 stating “Ved deltagelse i fælles militære operationer involverer Danmark sig ikke i aktiviteter, der relaterer sig til udlægning af personelminer.” Also letter from K.-A. Eliassen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 January 2001.

use of antipersonnel mines in any military operation whatsoever by its military personnel. Furthermore, France will refuse to agree to rules of engagement in any military operation calling for the use of antipersonnel mines.”<sup>10</sup> In October 1999, the Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to directives forbidding French military personnel to use antipersonnel mines, to participate in planning operations employing use of antipersonnel mines, or to give their agreement to any document mentioning possible use.<sup>11</sup>

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary states, “Hungarian soldiers are not allowed to use antipersonnel mines abroad during NATO army exercises, and foreign soldiers are not allowed to use antipersonnel mines in Hungary during NATO army exercises.”<sup>12</sup>
- Representatives of Italy have stated that Italian forces cannot be involved in activities not compatible with the Mine Ban Treaty, and transit is allowed only for destruction.<sup>13</sup>
- Representatives of the Netherlands reiterated in May 2001 that Dutch forces, “will not help in the laying, transporting or in any other way, nor ask for a foreign commander to do so” in joint military operations, and “if asked to do so by a foreign commander, will not do so.” The representative added that this was set out in a parliamentary answer.<sup>14</sup>
- The Ministry of Defense of Norway states that Norwegian forces can participate in joint operations with States which are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, and in such cases may take advantage of cover from already mined areas, but cannot strengthen or renew the mining of these areas.<sup>15</sup>
- According to officials from Portugal, “it may participate in joint operations with armed forces which use antipersonnel mines, but it won’t gain any benefit from such use. A guarantee that Portugal will not benefit, in such case, would be assured at the operational level. The participation in any military operation comes under national sovereignty.”<sup>16</sup> The Ministry of Defense added, “So it belongs to Portugal to decide on this participation, the way it would be processed and to which extent, independent of whether it is an operation with countries that use mines or not.”<sup>17</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared, “Portugal being a State Party to the Ottawa Convention, the Portuguese contingent will not use antipersonnel mines in joint operations.”<sup>18</sup>
- Sweden is awaiting the outcome of the discussions of Joint Operations in the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

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<sup>10</sup> Extract from speech by Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Debate, Official Journal of the French Republic, unabridged report of Parliamentary sessions of Thursday, 25 June 1998, pp. 5402-5403.

<sup>11</sup> Letter to ICBL from Hubert Védrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 October 1999.

<sup>12</sup> Letter from Zoltán Pecze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 12 March 2001, and personal Communication from László Deák, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 29 March 2001.

<sup>13</sup> Oral remarks to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 11 May 2001.

<sup>14</sup> Oral remarks to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 11 May 2001.

<sup>15</sup> Letter from Ministry of Defense, 9 April 2001. Landmine Monitor translation from Norwegian: “The Norwegian forces can, when taking over positions from foreign forces in the frontline, take advantage of the cover that already put out antipersonnel mines give, but do not have the opportunity to strengthen or renew this cover if it is a question about time-limited/restricted period.”

<sup>16</sup> Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001; letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 2001.

<sup>17</sup> Letter from the Ministry of Defense, 4 January 2001.

<sup>18</sup> Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 January 2001.

Sweden is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but does currently participate in joint peacekeeping operations with States that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, such as the US.

- In May 2000 the Ministry of Defense in the United Kingdom stated in a Parliamentary Written Answer, “UK armed forces were involved in 15 joint operations involving the use of anti-personnel landmines over the last three years, primarily involving operations in the Balkans. However, in no instances were UK armed forces responsible for their use.”<sup>19</sup> This was subsequently clarified as referring to mines “not laid at that time by our operation partners or the UK Armed Forces but [mines that] were a remnant of war, or previous actions, in the area of operations. As such the 15 operations did not involve the laying of anti-personnel landmines, but their existence in the areas in which operations took place means that their presence was a factor in those operations.”<sup>20</sup>

The ICBL continues to believe that the legality of State Party participation in joint operations with an armed force that uses antipersonnel mines is an open question, and that participation in such operations is contrary to the spirit of the treaty. The ICBL has called on States Parties to insist that any non-signatories do not use antipersonnel mines in joint operations, and to refuse to take part in joint operations that involve use of antipersonnel mines.

#### ***Stockpiling and Transit of Foreign Antipersonnel Mines***

The ICBL believes that it would violate the spirit of the treaty for States Parties to permit any government or entity to stockpile antipersonnel mines on their territory, and would violate the letter of the treaty if those stocks are under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party.

The United States stores antipersonnel mines on the territory of 12 countries: Norway (123,000), Japan (115,000), Germany (112,000), Saudi Arabia (50,000), Qatar (11,000), United Kingdom at Diego Garcia (10,000), Kuwait (8,900), Oman (6,200), Bahrain (3,200), Greece (1,100), Turkey (1,100), and South Korea. The US stockpiles about 50,000 self-destructing mines in South Korea, and maintains approximately 1.2 million non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines to be used in any future resumption of war in Korea, but it is unclear if the non-self-destructing mines are stockpiled in Korea or elsewhere.

The United States has antipersonnel landmines stored in at least five nations that are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty: Germany, Japan, Norway, Qatar, and United Kingdom at Diego Garcia, as well as treaty signatory Greece. US antipersonnel mine stockpiles have been removed from Italy and Spain. Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom do not consider the US mine stockpiles to be under their jurisdiction or control, and thus not subject to the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty or their national implementation measures. Norway, through a bilateral agreement with the US, has stipulated the mines must be removed by 1 March 2003, which is the deadline for Norway to comply with its Mine Ban Treaty Article 4 obligation for destruction of antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction and control. Qatar has yet to comment on the issue.

Developments in this reporting period highlight that this issue extends beyond US antipersonnel mines. Russian forces stationed in State Party Tajikistan are likely to stockpile antipersonnel mines there, given the recent use by Russian forces on the Tajik-Afghan border. It is not known whether Russian peacekeeping forces possess antipersonnel mines in the Pridnestrovie Moldavian Republic, a breakaway region of State Party Moldova.

On a related issue, the United States has also discussed with a number of treaty States Parties the permissibility of the US transiting mines through their territory. A debate has emerged

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<sup>19</sup> Hansard, 17 May 2000, col 161W.

<sup>20</sup> Letter dated 18 October 2000 from John Spellar MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, to Dr. Jenny Tonge MP.

over whether the treaty's prohibition on "transfer" of antipersonnel mines also applies to "transit," with some States Parties maintaining that it does not. This would mean that US (or other nations) aircraft, ships, or vehicles carrying antipersonnel mines could pass through (and presumably depart from, refuel in, restock in) a State Party on their way to a conflict in which those mines would be used. The ICBL believes that if a State Party willfully permits transit of antipersonnel mines which are destined for use in combat, that government is certainly violating the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, is likely violating the Article 1 ban on assistance to an act prohibited by the treaty, and possibly violating the Article 1 prohibition on transfer. The ICRC has also expressed its view that the treaty prohibits transiting of mines.

Research published in previous editions of *Landmine Monitor* showed that States Parties including France, Denmark, Slovakia, South Africa, and Spain have indicated transit is prohibited. Canada, Norway, Germany, and Japan indicate that this is permitted.

Statements made by governments during this reporting period have increased the number of States Parties prohibiting the transit of antipersonnel mines with Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Guinea, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, and Switzerland added to the list. Namibia has said that the Angolan army is "prohibited from transiting weapons like mines through Namibia."<sup>28</sup>

### ***Claymore-Type Mines***

A "Claymore mine" is a generic term for a round or rectangular directional fragmentation munition that can function either in a command-detonated or victim-activated mode. They are mostly mounted above ground level and are designed to have antipersonnel effects. However, some of the larger variants of this type can be used to damage light vehicles. When operated in the command-detonated mode, they do not meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine in the Mine Ban Treaty. However, use of Claymore-type mines with a tripwire as an initiating device is prohibited. States Parties have not adopted a common practice regarding reporting of stockpiles of Claymore-type mines and what measures they have taken to ensure that the mines are not configured to function in a victim-activated mode.

Claymore-type mines have been found in or cleared in demining operations in at least 33 mine-affected countries and regions: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Cambodia, Chad, Chechnya, Chile, Colombian, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), Rwanda, Thailand, Vietnam, Western Sahara, Yugoslavia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.<sup>21</sup>

A total of 14 States Parties are known to have decided to retain operational stocks of Claymore-type mines. These countries include: Australia, Austria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Hungary, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Honduras and Thailand have reversed their initial position of destroying their Claymore mines and have apparently chosen to retain them.

Representatives of several of these States Parties have made statements to *Landmine Monitor* confirming that measures have been taken to insure that their Claymore mines cannot be used in the victim-activated mode or that they have destroyed the tripwire assemblies and mechanical fuzes. These include Austria, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, and the

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<sup>28</sup> "Army not breaking landmine treaty," *IRIN*, 9 January 2001, citing MOD spokesman Frans Nghitila.

<sup>21</sup> *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, and *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*. Original sources cited in respective country entries. All entries were also cross-checked with sources such as *Jane's Mine and Mine Clearance, 2000-2001*, pp. 658-665, *Minefacts*, Version 1.2 - a CD-ROM distributed jointly by the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense, and all United Nations Mine Action Service, *Mine Action Assessment Mission Reports* conducted between 1998-2000.

United Kingdom. Norway made a detailed presentation at the December 2000 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction of the steps it has taken ensure that its Claymore mines are permanently modified to operate only in a command-activated mode. No country has reported on modification measures in their annual transparency measures reports required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

A total of nine States Parties have signaled their intention to destroy their stocks of Claymore-type mines, aside from those retained under Article 3 for training or research purposes, or to not retain any Claymore-type mines: Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Croatia, Ecuador, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Peru. The Philippines destroyed all of its Claymore mines, but is now considering re-obtaining them.

No indication has been received from the following States Parties that are known to have at one time produced, imported, or stockpiled Claymore-type mines on their interpretation of this issue: El Salvador, France, Germany, Italy, Malaysia, Moldova, Mozambique, Romania, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.

### ***Transparency Reporting (Article 7)***

As of 1 August 2001, the UN had received initial transparency measures reports from 64 States Parties. A total of 37 States Parties are late submitting initial reports. One signatory, Cameroon, submitted its report even though it has yet to officially ratify the convention. The overall rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports is 63%.

At the December 2000 and May 2001 meetings of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, the ICBL outlined a number of overall concerns regarding Article 7 reporting:

*Late Reporting* -- 37 countries are late in submitting their initial transparency measures report. These governments have thus far failed to fulfill a treaty obligation. Article 7 reporting is not optional; 180 days after entry-into-force is a legal deadline, not a target date. Timely reporting is also an important indicator of a government's commitment to the eradication of antipersonnel mines. It is important that governments meet the obligations of the treaty, so as to build confidence in their intention and ability to meet other vital obligations. Article 7 reporting is also crucial because it can provide a wealth of information that will be useful to mine action practitioners.

The ICBL appreciates that the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation has highlighted this problem and has sought ways to remedy it. States Parties and non-governmental organizations should make every effort to ascertain why a government is late, should provide strong encouragement to report as soon as possible, and most importantly, should provide any possible assistance in completing the report (consistent with Article 6 of the convention). Those in need of assistance and those willing to provide it should make known precisely what type of assistance (technical, translation, etc.) is needed and available, respectively.

Two important initiatives are underway on this matter. Belgium has taken the lead in coordinating an Article 7 Contact Group to encourage and facilitate reporting, and the NGO VERTIC has, in cooperation with the ICBL and ICRC, developed an Article 7 Reporting Handbook, which will be presented at the Third Meeting of States Parties. The ICBL urges governments to support these initiatives in all ways possible.

*Need for Reporting on Victim Assistance, Use of Form J* -- The ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance has noted that victim assistance reporting is conspicuously missing in treaty obligations. In order to give victim assistance proper attention, States Parties should report on their activities in this regard, utilizing the new voluntary Form J for Article 7 reports. For Article 7 reports due by 30 April 2001, 11 States Parties used Form J: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.

*Lack of Reporting on Foreign Stocks* -- A State Party is required to report on mines "owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control." States Parties should report on

the US stockpiles in order to be consistent with at least the spirit if not the letter of the convention. Yet, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom did not even mention the existence of US antipersonnel mine stocks in their Article 7 reports. Norway acknowledged that “[t]here are pre-stocked US mines on Norwegian territory,” but “[d]ue to previously concluded agreements, information on pre-stocked military materiel is not available for reporting.” Qatar is late submitting its initial Article 7 report.

*Lack of Reporting on Prohibited Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices* -- According to the definitions in the treaty, antivehicle mines with sensitive fusing mechanisms (such as tilt rods or tripwires) and AVMs equipped with antihandling devices which explode from an unintentional act of a person – that is to say, AVMs that function like antipersonnel mines -- are banned by the treaty. Thus, prohibited AVMs with overly sensitive fuses or overly sensitive AHDs should be included in Article 7 reporting, including types and numbers possessed, modified and destroyed. Yet, none of the governments that have submitted Article 7 reports have given any details on prohibited antivehicle mines captured by the treaty, even though several governments have destroyed or modified such mines.

*Lack of Reporting on Claymore-type Mines* -- Claymore mines are legal under the Mine Ban Treaty as long as they are command detonated, and not victim-actuated (used with a tripwire). States Parties that retain Claymores must use them in command-detonated mode only. Transparency is necessary on Claymore mines, too. States Parties should take the technical steps and modifications necessary to ensure command detonation only, and should report on those measures. Yet, very few of the governments that have submitted Article 7 reports have given any details on stockpiles of Claymore mines and no State Party has reported on the efforts or modifications undertaken to make these mines compliant under the treaty.

*Need for Expanded Article 3 Reporting* -- Article 3 reporting on mines retained for mine clearance training and development should not only include types and quantities and institutions authorized to retain (as currently delineated in the Article 7), but should be expanded to include the specific anticipated purpose and then actual use of any retained mines.

### ***National Implementation Measures (Article 9)***

Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty (“National Implementation Measures”) states “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty. However, only 28 of the 118 countries that have ratified or acceded to the treaty have passed domestic laws implementing the treaty.

A total of 10 States Parties have passed domestic implementing legislation since entry-into-force, including six in this reporting period (since May 2000): Bulgaria, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe. They join Cambodia, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, and Monaco, which passed implementing legislation after entry-into-force on 1 March 1999.

The following 18 States Parties report that they enacted implementation legislation prior to 1 March 1999 or that legislation became effective on that day: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Some countries have deemed existing domestic law as sufficient to implement the treaty. These laws mainly cover civilian possession of armaments and explosives. Included among these are Andorra, Denmark, Ireland, Jordan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Namibia, Netherlands, Peru, and Slovenia.

Another seven States Parties indicate that the legislation used for ratification is sufficient because international treaties become self-executing in those countries: Mexico, Portugal, Rwanda, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Yemen.

A total of 24 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation or other measures are underway. This group of States Parties includes: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Croatia, Kiribati, Holy See, Iceland, Malawi, Mauritania, Moldova, the Netherlands, Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.

In a total of 50 States Parties, nearly 43% of all States Parties, Landmine Monitor is unaware of any steps underway to enact domestic legislation implementing the Mine Ban Treaty.

Some governments have indicated that they do not believe an implementation law is required, because they have never possessed antipersonnel mines and are not mine-affected, thus, no special action is necessary to fulfill the terms of the treaty.

The ICBL is concerned, however, about the need for all states to pass legislation that would impose penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and would provide for full implementation of all aspects of the convention.

The ICRC, in cooperation with the ICBL and the government of Belgium, has produced an "Information Kit on the Development of National Legislation to Implement the Convention of the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines." This document will be of great use to States Parties in helping them to fulfill their obligations under Article 9.

## **HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION**

Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) was developed as a response to the concern about the impact of landmines on people and communities. HMA works to minimize that impact – both as a threat to life and limb and as an impediment to post-conflict reconstruction and development. HMA activities include survey and assessment; marking, mapping and clearing of mines; mine awareness; and quality assurance.<sup>22</sup> HMA practitioners prefer to not focus on the number of mines removed and square meters of land cleared as the sole – or even most meaningful – measure of progress, as such figures often give little real feel for the impact of mine action on communities.

HMA is not only about removing mines, but also involves a focus on the civilians living with mines. HMA programs emphasize priority setting based on civilian needs, with humanitarian development as a final goal. In the year 2000, there was increased attention to the development aspect of mine action through studies by the UN and NGOs; there were also more assessments of mined areas, and more evaluations of clearance operations. The result has been an improvement of the techniques necessary to address the humanitarian imperative and to make mine action operations more cost-efficient.

Another significant measure of progress is the conclusion of the groundbreaking Landmine Impact Survey in Yemen in July 2000; the Yemeni government is already receiving funding from various countries to help develop a national mine action plan.

The information in this section is based upon data collected by Landmine Monitor researchers for *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*; various UN documents and reports; information from mine action agencies; media reports; and findings from *Landmine Monitor Reports 1999* and *2000*.

### **Landmine Problem**

Landmine Monitor finds that 90 countries in the world are affected by landmines or unexploded ordnance (UXO). In the past year, Bulgaria has completed clearance of its landmines and thus been removed from the affected list; Slovenia has clarified its status as mine-free and also been removed from the affected list. New mine laying in FYR Macedonia and Uzbekistan

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<sup>22</sup> More broadly, the five pillars of mine action include mine survey/marketing/clearance; mine awareness; mine victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and mine ban advocacy.

has resulted in their being classified as mine-affected. Also, a new survey carried out in El Salvador, which had previously declared itself mine-free, has identified 53 mine and UXO affected sites in that country.<sup>23</sup>

### Landmine/UXO Problem in the World Today

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe/ Central Asia	Middle East/ North Africa
Angola	Chile	Afghanistan	Albania	Algeria
Burundi	Colombia	Bangladesh	Armenia	Egypt
Chad	Costa Rica	Burma	Azerbaijan	Iran
Congo-Brazz.	Cuba	Cambodia	Belarus	Iraq
DR Congo	Ecuador	China	Bosnia & Herz.	Israel
Djibouti	El Salvador	India	Croatia	Jordan
Eritrea	Guatemala	North Korea	Cyprus	Kuwait
Ethiopia	Honduras	South Korea	Czech Republic	Lebanon
Guinea-Bissau	Nicaragua	Laos	Denmark	Libya
Kenya	Peru	Mongolia	Estonia	Morocco
Liberia	<i>Falkland /Malvinas</i>	Nepal	Georgia	Oman
Malawi		Pakistan	Greece	Syria
Mauritania		Philippines	Kyrgyzstan	Tunisia
Mozambique		Sri Lanka	Latvia	Yemen
Namibia		Thailand	Lithuania	<i>Golan Heights</i>
Niger		Vietnam	FYR Macedonia	<i>Northern Iraq</i>
Rwanda		<i>Taiwan</i>	Moldova	<i>Palestine</i>
Senegal			Poland	<i>Western Sahara</i>
Sierra Leone			Russia	
Somalia			Tajikistan	
Sudan			Turkey	
Swaziland			Ukraine	
Tanzania			Uzbekistan	
Uganda			Yugoslavia	
Zambia			<i>Abkhazia</i>	
Zimbabwe			<i>Chechnya</i>	
<i>Somaliland</i>			<i>Kosovo</i>	
			<i>Nagorno- Karabakh</i>	

In addition to these countries, Landmine Monitor also monitors and reports on eleven regions because of their mine-affected status: Abkhazia, Chechnya, Falkland/Malvinas, Golan Heights, northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Taiwan and Western Sahara.

### Impact Survey and Assessment

From country to country, there is a huge difference in the levels of contamination and in how mines affect development. The recognition that different countries are affected in different ways and degrees helps guide the appropriate response in terms of HMA. In order to evaluate the

<sup>23</sup> Poland, which has a serious UXO and mine problem left over from World War II, was inadvertently left off of last year's list of affected countries.

urgency of need for humanitarian mine action operations, it is important to determine the degree to which mines represent a problem in each mine-affected country.

One way of measuring the need for humanitarian mine action is through a Landmine Impact Survey, a method for assessing a country's landmine problem, which has been developed by the Survey Working Group. Through systematic gathering of information to gauge the social and economic impact that landmines have on communities, the survey will lead to a prioritization of community needs and help inform the allocation of mine action resources. Additionally, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) undertakes assessment missions in various countries to evaluate the scope and impact of landmines, and to recommend appropriate responses.

In total, 30 countries as well as Abkhazia and Kosovo have undergone landmine assessments and/or surveys since 1997. These assessments have included missions by UNMAS and other concerned UN agencies and departments, surveys conducted by NGOs and local agencies, and Landmine Impact Surveys conducted by the Survey Action Center (SAC).

Landmine Impact Surveys have been completed in Yemen (reported in *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*), Thailand, Chad and Mozambique. In Yemen, SAC subcontracted Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA, Afghanistan) to implement the survey. In Thailand, SAC subcontracted Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) to implement the survey in cooperation with the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC). In Chad, SAC subcontracted Handicap International (HI) to implement the survey. In Mozambique, the Canadian government directly funded the Canadian International Demining Corps to conduct the survey. In Kosovo, SAC conducted a modified Landmine Impact Survey.

In Afghanistan, SAC, MCPA, the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan, Cranfield University's Mine Action Management Program and the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining have begun work on a Landmine Impact Survey. In Nicaragua, the OAS has begun introducing the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) in order to collect information on mine-affected areas, and SAC is in the process of conducting a landmine impact analysis, in cooperation with the Organization of American States. SAC and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation are conducting a Landmine Impact Survey of Vietnam.

In countries such as Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon and Somalia, advance survey missions have been conducted and in these countries there are plans to follow up with Landmine Impact Surveys in near future. The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has conducted an assessment mission to Uganda. In Western Sahara there is a plan for a level one survey conducted jointly by NPA and Medico International. Also in Ethiopia and Eritrea there are discussions of undertaking Landmine Impact Surveys. Additionally, HI and SAC are exploring involvement in Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.

UNMAS is, among other things, responsible for assessments and monitoring of the global landmine threat. In 2000/2001 UNMAS has carried out assessment or fact-finding missions to Belarus, Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia/Abkhazia, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Zambia. As a natural follow-up after assessment missions, level one surveys are planned for the countries to identify the location and impact of mines and mine suspected areas.

Some countries remain in conflict, making assessments difficult if not impossible. For example: in Angola three provinces are partly without access due to the security situation; Chechnya continues to experience intense fighting, making assessment impossible; in Colombia, guerrilla groups control significant territory, and continue to use antipersonnel mines extensively; in Burma there is little reliable information on mines planted or land affected because of the conflict situation in the country.

### **Mine Clearance**

In mine-affected countries, there may be a variety of responses to the problem, or a combination of responses, including humanitarian mine clearance, clearance by military or civil

defense forces, as well as commercially-oriented operations. In some cases one can also find civilian clearance, which presents a significant risk for the individual, but many times is the result of basic survival needs. This is especially the case in Cambodia where civilian clearing is widespread.

The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) have been developed to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, by establishing principles and, in some cases, by defining international requirements and specifications. NGOs involved in mine clearance have commonly been in the forefront of developing a comprehensive understanding of demining, including, for example, the use of the term “mine action” opposed to mine clearance, involving affected populations in decision-making and intended civilian use of cleared land, as formulated in the NGO-created “Bad Honnef Guidelines.” Various forms of impact assessments are increasingly valued as useful tools for analyzing community needs in order to set priorities for clearance as well as for post-demining evaluation.

In some countries the military conducts mine clearance with military objectives in mind, or clears minor areas with little impact on civilians. However, in other countries, the military carries out clearance operations based on national strategic goals and with positive impact on the civilians in the country. UN policy on the military role is:

“To ensure its neutrality, the United Nations has determined that training or support for mine action will not, in principle, be provided to the militaries of mine-contaminated countries in such circumstances. However, the United Nations is prepared to support Government mine action programmes which include collaborative arrangements with the militaries when such arrangements are clearly defined and when the overall responsibility for coordinating mine action and setting priorities for mine action rests with the national/local civilian authorities.”<sup>24</sup>

In Thailand, the army has cooperated constructively and positively with NPA and is undertaking clearance based on results of the Landmine Impact Survey. In Latin America, the military conducts mine clearance with coordination and supervision from the OAS AIMCA program and with training and certification from the Inter-American Defense Board Mission for Mine Clearance in Central America (MARMINCA).

During 2000 and early 2001, mine clearance operations were carried out in 76 countries and regions: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Burma Myanmar, Cambodia, Chad, Chechnya, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, DR Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India, northern Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Laos, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nagorno-Karabakh, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Somaliland, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Swaziland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Western Sahara, Yemen, FR Yugoslavia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

This number includes all kinds of clearance – landmine clearance, clearance of UXO, sporadic clearance, clearance for military purposes. Compared with last year’s Landmine Monitor reporting, there are three more countries that have reported some kind of clearance, including the DR Congo, where Handicap International (Belgium) started a mine clearance program in March 2001, Guinea-Bissau, and Kyrgyzstan.

Humanitarian Mine Action is clearance for humanitarian needs; civilians are the beneficiaries of the clearance programs. Such HMA operations can be undertaken by NGOs, as in Afghanistan, or by the army as in Thailand, or through a UN agency in support of national capacities, most commonly, by UNDP and UNOPS. UNOPS serves as an executing agency for both UNMAS and UNDP, operating today in 13 countries. One example is Azerbaijan where

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<sup>24</sup> “United Nations Mine Action and The Use of the Military,” at:  
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/military.html>.

UNDP is financing the Azerbaijan Mine Action Program, together with the government. In northern Iraq/Iraqi Kurdistan UNOPS has managed the Iraq Mine Action Program since 1997.

In 2000 and early 2001, 34 countries and regions have reported some kind of HMA program, including Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Costa Rica, Croatia, DR Congo, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, northern Iraq, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Moldova, Mozambique, Nagorno-Karabakh, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Somaliland, Sudan, Thailand, Vietnam, and Yemen.

This is a decrease in the number of HMA programs reported last year and there are various reasons for this. Sri Lanka had a UN Mine Action program, however, it was suspended in April 2000 and then shut down the following month, due to conflict. In Zimbabwe, there are now mainly commercial operations underway. In Taiwan, mine clearance is currently going primarily for commercial needs.

Some results of the clearance operations in major humanitarian clearance programs are given below, as an indicator of land released for post-demining use. Although the number of items cleared and disposed gives very little evidence of the qualitative results of HMA, it is an indication of the level of contamination and also important data for the technical planning and requirements of mine clearance operations.

Afghanistan: A total of 24 million square meters of mined and suspected mined land were cleared in 2000 and in addition some 80 million square meters of former battle areas were cleared of UXO and other ammunition. A total of 13,542 antipersonnel mines, 636 antitank mines, and 298,828 UXO were destroyed.

Cambodia: Some 32 million square meters of land containing 22,613 AT mines, 856 AP mines, and 61,589 various kinds of UXO were cleared from previously suspected and confirmed contaminated lands, now providing among other things, additional safe land for cultivation which in Cambodia is a scarce resource.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: In BiH, 1.7 million square meters were declared to be mine-free, and 635 AP mines, 48 AT mines, and 511 UXO were destroyed. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina has many high-density minefields, one major problem is the low-density minefields suspected to contain randomly-laid "nuisance" mines. Unfortunately, these areas also have to be cleared, whether they are found to contain mines or not.

Croatia: In 2000, the military and civil defense together with national commercial companies under the supervision, coordination and tendering of the Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) cleared 9.8 million square meters of 1,173 antipersonnel mines, 710 antitank mines and 789 UXO.

Mozambique: In 2000, the area of land cleared was 5 million square meters, including over 317 kilometers of road. A total of 6,679 mines and 993 UXO were cleared and destroyed.

Angola: In 2000, INAROE reported that 1,335 antipersonnel mines, fifty-one antitank mines and 75,017 UXOs were destroyed.

Kosovo: In Kosovo the planned clearance activities for 2000 were exceeded. In 2000, 19.4 million square meters of land were cleared, including 10,713 AP mines, 3,920 AT mines, 3,729 cluster bomblets (CBUs), and 9,643 UXO. UNMACC plans to complete clearance of all known minefields and surface CBU by the end of 2001.

### **Coordination of Mine Action and Transparency**

A national body responsible for mine action and related issues is a prerequisite for coordination of mine action. An increasing number of countries are developing Mine Action Centers (MACs), either within a military framework or with varying degrees of civilian input. In 35 of the mine-affected countries and regions today, one can find some body responsible for coordination and implementation of mine action programs: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Costa Rica, Croatia, Djibouti

(inaugurated in 2001), Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Jordan, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somaliland, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zambia.

In all but five of these the body has a civilian structure and represents a mine action center under some social or civilian ministries. In Estonia, Namibia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Zambia, one can find military or a combined military/governmental body responsible for mine clearance.

In the mine-affected countries and regions where there are no coordinating bodies, this may imply either that there is no clearance going on in the country or that clearance is conducted by the military whenever there is a need for such an operation. In the Americas region, the main institution for humanitarian demining operations is the OAS through its AMICA program for coordinating operations, with assistance from the IADB MARMINCA mission for training and certification activities. In Vietnam, a plan for creating an agency has yet not been approved by the government. In the DR Congo, UNMAS has recommended the establishment of a Mine Action Cell as a part of the headquarters of MONUC (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo).

The degree to which civilian-structured centers are purely civilian with priorities based on civilian and humanitarian needs is not clear, and there remains a lack of transparency within some bodies – both related to the prioritization process and impact assessments post-clearance. A precondition for a mine action center based on humanitarian needs should be that the center has a civilian structure and that the priorities for clearance are based on humanitarian and development-oriented needs for people at large whether at a national macro level or in line with community-based approaches.

A national Mine Action Center is often supported through UNDP, which has been active in supporting mine action centers based on the concept of local capacity building. In 2000, UNDP reported being involved in such work in 15 countries and regions, including Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Somalia/Somaliland, Thailand, and Yemen. In Angola, UNDP had to close down its support program in August 2000 due to lack of funding. UNDP is responsible for the development phase of the MAC after the cessation of a conflict or transition from the emergency phase and normalization is taking place with transformation to more development-oriented environments. During such emergencies or in peacekeeping environments, UNMAS has primary responsibility for the initiation and support of mine action activities, often in partnership with other relevant agencies and departments. Examples of this include Kosovo and Eritrea, where the mine action centers are under UNMAS auspices, and staffed by UNOPS.

### **Mine Action Planning and Priority Setting**

Mine-affected countries and regions with a formalized mine action plan with priorities developed and coordinated by mine action centers, or indications of the on-going development of such mine action plans, include: Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, South Korea, Kosovo, Laos, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Thailand, Ukraine, and Yemen.

- In Yemen, the National Demining Commission developed a strategic national plan and associated computer planning tool with a Survey Utilization Team consisting of SAC, MCPA, and Cranfield University's MAMP;
- In Thailand, TMAC will develop a five-year Plan on Humanitarian Mine Action, based on the results from the Impact Survey carried out during 2000/2001;
- In Afghanistan, mine action plans are prepared by UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (MACA) and five UN Regional Mine Action Centers (RMAC) with input from all mine action NGOs and in consultation with UN agencies;

- In Laos, UXO Lao is responsible for the national mine action program;
- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Mine Action Centers report that clearance is prioritized in relation to the return of refugees and IDPs, and to support reconstruction of housing and related activities for economic sustainability, such as the expansion of agricultural and grazing lands, infrastructure and common areas.

### **Post-clearance Development and Land Use**

There is still a great need for more and improved information on post-clearance use of land. The lack of significant data is largely due to the fact that it is a relatively new field within mine action. However, as it is related to priorities for clearance, and the allocation and efficient use of mine action resources, the need for such information continues to grow. The procedures for post-demining assessments should ideally lie within the mandate of mine action centers. Such procedures should contribute to determining clearance conducted by NGOs and other agencies, but should be developed and elaborated by all concerned parties, including beneficiaries, operators, national MACs and donors in order to obtain transparency regarding both the use of resources and appropriate post-clearance land use.

Priorities for clearance can be decisive in what happens to areas after they have been cleared. There is a need for transparent procedures for both prioritization and for ensuring that cleared land is handed over to those stated as the intended beneficiaries of HMA. Areas should be assessed both before and after clearance in order to determine if clearance has met the HMA objectives of improving living conditions and ensuring positive development in mined-affected areas. Some examples of post-clearance evaluation activities follow.

In May 2001, UNDP and GICHD published “A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action.” The study focuses on the humanitarian imperative in mine action, emphasizing that “all potential useful outputs of mine action” should be considered, and not just the number of square meters cleared or mines and UXO destroyed.<sup>25</sup> With case studies from Kosovo, Laos and Mozambique, the report gives examples of three different settings in which clearance operations take place – the emergency, transition and development phases. The objective of the report was to “identify social and economic analytical tools by which mine action programs can be more effectively planned, managed and evaluated.”<sup>26</sup>

In Afghanistan, a study was conducted in order to measure the social and economic impact of mines and mine action. This study reported substantial economic benefits due to clearance in several areas. Afghanistan is also one of few countries to date conducting post-clearance survey in areas demined measuring both the social and the economic impact of clearance operations.

In Namibia, there are no procedures to ensure that cleared land improves the situation for those most in need. However, according to Namibia-based US Ambassador Jeffrey Bader, the local communities will benefit from clearance, and the demining project in Namibia has provided 1 million square meters of land for civilian use.

In Azerbaijan, there are reports of how civilians benefit from clearance operations. In the Fusili area covering about 40% of the country, 55,000 inhabitants returned to the district after clearance took place. Houses have been rebuilt, schools opened, and many of the district’s roads reported demined as well as rebuilt.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are still no clear procedures in order to ensure that cleared land benefits intended target groups, but according to the two entity MACs and the BiH MAC, it will generally be the municipality who will decide how to allocate the cleared areas and also be responsible for priorities.

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<sup>25</sup> “A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action,” UNDP and GICHD, Geneva, 2001, p. 3.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

In Cambodia, a study on the land cleared by CMAP shows that, in general, land has been distributed to those needing it the most. HMA priority setting is linked to methods for property claims and the establishment of landownership at the municipal as well as regional level. After clearance there has been a significantly increased sense of security as well as the ability for people to cultivate the land. The Land Use Planning Unit was created to coordinate different actors in the process of land use planning at the district level. Those involved include the provincial departments of Rural Development, demining agencies, district governors, the military, police, and NGOs.

### **Research and Development**

Research and development (R&D) programs are also a central part of the mine action initiatives. In order to eradicate the landmine problem there is a need for continued improvement of techniques, methods and procedures for mine clearance operations.

At the Second Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, it was recommended that measures should be taken in order to enhance the testing and evaluation of mine clearance equipment. On 17 July 2000, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the European Commission, Canada, the United States, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden in order to establish an International Test and Evaluation Program (ITEP). The objectives of ITEP are to promote the development of new technologies for humanitarian demining and to share information among different actors.

Belgium is involved in several projects related to mine clearance technology. In 2000, its support for R&D on new mine detection and clearance technologies amounted to US\$1,275,697. One of the projects that came to an end in 2000 was the Airborne Minefield Detection Pilot Project coordinated by the European Commission, several EU states and other organizations. The results were not satisfactory and the project was criticized by many, both in terms of financial costs and feasibility for mine detection. Another project in Belgium is "PARADISE," focusing on tools for demining based on satellite images. There are plans for evaluation missions of the project in Mozambique and Laos.

Denmark is another country involved in a number of research and development programs. Apart from chairing the Inter-Nordic working group for mine clearance equipment, and participating in the NATO engineer working party, the main Danish initiative is the Nordic Demining Research Forum.

In Croatia, CROMAC has several projects involving research and development. A site has been established for testing new methods of mine detection. The project, financed by the European Commission and managed by CROMAC's deputy director, has tested 29 metal detectors. CROMAC also ran tests on several demining machines in 2000, including the Guzzler demining machine, Oracle, Hydrema-Weimar, a MFV-1000 flail machine, and the KMMCS-Kerber machine. The testing of the MV-3 machine – a three-ton remotely controlled flail – began in December and was to be completed by the end of January 2001.

In Cambodia several demining techniques have been tested and used in demining operations. Demining machines such as the Finnish flailing machines (SISU RA-14 DS) and the APS Command Vehicle (SISU XA-180), as well as the locally produced Tempest machine have been used in various areas with different results, also with increasing expectations for mechanically-run demining operations. Cambodia receives funding and technical assistance for the different test projects from the UNDP Trust Fund, Finland, Japan, and the Swedish Armed Forces, among others.

South Africa is becoming a leader in the mine clearance equipment field and continues to be involved in several R&D projects, with Mechem as the major mine action technology company. Mechem is also involved in several joint research programs with the US government, including comparative testing of the Mechem Explosive and Drug Detection System (MEDDS)

and the “Fido” detection system. A closely related vapor detecting system is the REST, also originating from the MEDDS, which is currently used by NPA in Angola.

### **The Intersessional Standing Committee for Mine Clearance and Related Technologies**

The Standing Committee for Mine Clearance and Related Technologies met in December 2000 and May 2001 in Geneva, Switzerland. The Co-Chairs were Netherlands and Peru while Germany and Yemen acted as Co-Rapporteurs. The main themes have been the completion of the International Mine Action Standards developed by UNMAS; how to improve measures of impact and benefit of mine clearance operations; the coordination and planning of operations; and technologies for mine action.

Several outcomes from previous discussions were presented at the meeting in May 2001. These included the Information Management System for Mine Action currently used in thirteen mine action programs around the world. Moreover, the UNDP’s “Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action” was presented with brief contributions from UNDP, the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), and the Survey Action Center. Under the agenda item on coordination, planning and prioritization at the May 2001 meeting, presentations were concentrated around the IMAS and the initial findings of *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*.

### **Funding for Mine Clearance**

There are still many difficulties in tracking mine action funding numbers, but according to available information, *Landmine Monitor* estimates that mine action funding in 2000 totaled about US\$224 million, compared to about \$205 million in 1999. This continues the upward trend since 1993. *Landmine Monitor* estimates that since 1993, a total of more than \$1 billion has been spent on global mine action.

Still, in 2000, a number of mine action programs experienced serious problems, even crises, in funding. A key problem is a lack of long-term commitments from the donor countries.

- Afghanistan experienced a decrease in funding from \$21.9 million in 1999 to \$16.9 million in 2000. A severe shortage of funds in 2000 led to the laying off of a number of clearance teams.
- In Angola, some mine clearance organizations have struggled with reduced funding, erratic funding and/or donor reluctance to commit long-term in Angola. A number of organizations had to suspend programs in 2000 or 2001 due to lack of funding.
- Funding shortfalls in 2000 and 2001 have put the existence of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center at risk. Short-term funding was announced in April that will maintain the MAC structure until September 2001.
- In Cambodia, nearly all demining operations were suspended in October 2000 due to funding problems.

Some positive developments in mine action funding are reflected in Lebanon where the United Arab Emirates pledged US\$50 million for demining and reconstruction in South Lebanon, and in Kosovo, which received US\$33 million in mine action funding in 2000.

## **LANDMINE/UXO CASUALTIES AND SURVIVOR ASSISTANCE**

### **New Victims in 2000-2001**

Although progress has been made since the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to claim new victims.<sup>27</sup> In 2000 and through May

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<sup>27</sup> For the purposes of *Landmine Monitor* research casualties include victims of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, UXO, and in some instances improvised explosive devices that function as AP mines.

2001, Landmine Monitor finds that there were new landmine/UXO victims in 73 countries.<sup>28</sup> Landmine Monitor also registered mine casualties in nine regions it monitors because of their significant landmine/UXO problems.<sup>29</sup> In calendar year 2000, new victims were registered in 70 countries and eight regions. In 2001, additional casualties were recorded in Cuba, Ecuador, Indonesia and the Golan Heights. The sources of data included official databases, government records, hospital records, media reports, surveys/assessments, and interviews.

Landmine Monitor has identified approximately 8,000 new landmine/UXO casualties in calendar year 2000. However, this number is far from the actual total of new mine victims. This figure does not include the thousands of casualties that are believed to go unreported as victims are killed or injured in remote areas away from any form of assistance or means of communication. There is no reliable reporting in some heavily-affected countries; for example, the 8,000 figure does not include casualties in Burma (which *Landmine Monitor Report 2000* estimated could be some 1,500 per year), or in Vietnam (where the government estimates more than 100,000 mine/UXO casualties since the war's end).

While it is impossible to arrive at a precise total, it would seem certain that the number of new mine victims is now on the order of 15,000 to 20,000 per year, an encouraging decline from the long-standing and widely used estimate of 26,000 per year.

From January 2000 to the end of May 2001, landmine/UXO casualties were reported in:

<b>Landmine and UXO Casualties In 2000-2001</b>				
<b>Africa</b>	<b>Americas</b>	<b>Asia-Pacific</b>	<b>Europe/ Central Asia</b>	<b>Middle East/ North Africa</b>
Angola	Bolivia	Afghanistan	Albania	Algeria
Burundi	Chile	Bangladesh	Armenia	Egypt
Chad	Colombia	Burma (Myanmar)	Azerbaijan	Iran
DR Congo	Cuba	Cambodia	Belarus*	Iraq
Djibouti	Ecuador	China	Belgium*	Israel
Eritrea	El Salvador	India	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Jordan
Ethiopia	Nicaragua	Indonesia	Croatia	Kuwait
Guinea-Bissau	Peru	Korea, RO	Estonia	Lebanon
Kenya		Laos	Georgia	Morocco
Liberia		Mongolia*	Greece	Yemen
Malawi		Nepal	Kyrgyzstan	<i>Golan Heights</i>
Mauritania		Pakistan	Latvia*	<i>Northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan)</i>
Mozambique		Philippines	Macedonia	<i>Palestine</i>
Namibia		Sri Lanka	Russia	<i>Western Sahara</i>
Rwanda		Thailand	Tajikistan	
Senegal		Vietnam	Turkey	
Somalia			Ukraine	

From the information available in many countries it is not always possible to determine with certainty the type of weapon that caused the incident.

<sup>28</sup> In the 2000/2001 period, Landmine Monitor researchers definitively recorded new mine/UXO casualties in 71 countries; in another two countries, casualties were not formally reported, but evidence points to the strong likelihood of new victims, based on the scope of the landmine problem and reports of victims in earlier years.

<sup>29</sup> These include Abkhazia, Chechnya, Golan Heights, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), Palestine, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

Sudan			Uzbekistan	
Uganda			Yugoslavia, FR	
Zimbabwe			Abkhazia	
Somaliland			Chechnya	
			Kosovo	
			Nagorno-Karabakh	

\* Casualties identified as being caused by UXO only

### Scale of the Problem

Complete data on landmine/UXO casualties is difficult to obtain, particularly in countries experiencing ongoing conflict or with limited communication systems. To address this problem, in several mine-affected countries databases have been set up to systematically collect information on mine victims. In others, NGOs are carrying out surveys to assess the extent of the problem.

In 2000-2001, as shown in the chart, mine/UXO accidents are still occurring in every region of the world: in 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in 19 countries in Europe and Central Asia, in 16 countries in Asia and the Pacific, in 10 countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and in 8 countries in the Americas. While ongoing conflict is a major problem in several mine-affected countries, Landmine Monitor has found that a majority (45) of the 73 countries that suffered new mine/UXO casualties in 2000-2001 had not experienced any active armed conflict during the research period. In many cases, the conflict had ended years or even decades ago.

Although in many instances Landmine Monitor considers the casualty figures to be incomplete, a sampling of the findings from the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* country reports follows. It should be noted these findings are for calendar year 2000, unless otherwise stated, and that some include casualties only for certain regions of a country.

- In Angola, 840 casualties were recorded;
- In Bosnia -Herzegovina, 92 casualties were recorded;
- In Chad, approximately 300 casualties were reported over the past 24 months;
- In Colombia, 83 casualties were reported;
- In the Democratic Republic of Congo, 189 casualties have been reported since 1997;
- In Eritrea, 49 casualties were reported in May and June 2000;
- In Georgia, 51 casualties were reported between January and June 2001;
- In Lebanon, 113 casualties were recorded;
- In Namibia, 139 casualties were reported;
- In Somalia, 147 casualties were reported in just two central regions;
- In Somaliland, 107 casualties were recorded;
- In Sudan, more than 321 casualties were reported between September 1999 and March 2001;
- In Tajikistan, 58 casualties were reported between August 2000 and early May 2001;
- In Thailand, 350 casualties were identified in the Level One Survey over the past 24 months;
- In Uganda, 602 casualties were identified between 1991 and March 2001.

Several countries reported mine/UXO casualties in 2000 and 2001 that had not done so in 1999: Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, Indonesia, Malawi, and Uzbekistan. Only in the cases of Indonesia (Aceh) and Uzbekistan were the new mine/UXO casualties the result of new instances of conflict.

Several countries were dropped from Landmine Monitor's previous casualty list, due to lack of tangible evidence to indicate new victims, although these countries remain mine-affected:

Cyprus, North Korea, Moldova, Niger, Oman, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia. It should be noted that although Tanzania has recorded no new casualties in 2000-2001, the country does provide assistance to mine survivors coming over the border from Burundi.

In some of the heavily-affected countries and regions, notably those with established mine casualty databases, it appears that the casualty rate is declining, in some cases quite substantially:

- In Afghanistan, an average of 88 casualties per month were recorded in 2000, compared to 130 per month in 1999; although it should be noted that MAPA still estimates a true casualty rate of between 150 and 300 per month;
- In Albania, 35 casualties were recorded in 2000, down from 191 in 1999;
- In Cambodia, 802 casualties were recorded in 2000, down from 1,049 in 1999;
- In Croatia, 22 casualties were recorded in 2000, down from 51 in 1999;
- In Kosovo, 95 casualties were recorded in 2000, down from 342 registered between 16 June (end of conflict) and 31 December 1999;
- In Nagorno-Karabakh, 15 casualties were recorded in 2000, down from 30 in 1999.

In a number of mine-affected countries and regions the casualty rate appeared to increase in 2000-2001. In some countries the increase is due to new or expanded conflict, or the movement of refugees and IDPs: Colombia, Chechnya, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Namibia, and Tajikistan. In other countries the increase appears to be a result of improved data collection, for example, Armenia, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

In 2000/2001, landmine/UXO casualties also include nationals coming from mine-free countries, or other mine-affected countries, killed or injured while abroad engaged in military or demining operations, peacekeeping, tourism, or other activities. These countries include Bhutan, Canada, France, Honduras, Macedonia, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

In addition to the new casualties registered in 2000-2001, Landmine Monitor has previously identified more than 30 other countries with an incidence of landmine survivors from previous years. In other words, countries with no new landmine casualties in 2000-2001, but which nevertheless have landmine survivors from prior years that still require assistance. Consequently, more than half the countries in the world are affected to some extent by the landmine problem and the issue of survivors.

Regardless of the difficulties in obtaining complete data, based on the information gathered for *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, two points are clear:

- landmines continue to pose a significant, lasting and non-discriminatory threat; and
- the majority of new mine victims are civilians.

### **Landmine Victims: Needs and Assistance**

The principal actors in victim assistance generally agree that victim assistance includes the following components:<sup>30</sup>

Pre-hospital Care (first aid and management of injuries): Healthcare and community workers in mine-affected areas should be trained in emergency first aid to respond effectively to landmine and other traumatic injuries.

Hospital Care (medical care, surgery, pain management): Medical facilities should have medical care and supplies that meet basic standards.

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<sup>30</sup> For further information see *Guidelines for the Care and Rehabilitation of Survivors*, ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance. See also *Providing assistance to landmine victims: A collection of guidelines, best practices and methodologies*, compiled by the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness, May 2001.

Rehabilitation (physiotherapy, prosthetic appliances and assistive devices, psychological support): Rehabilitative services should produce devices that are safe, durable, and can be maintained and repaired locally. Community-based peer support groups can offer cost-effective psychological, social and other benefits.

Social and Economic Reintegration (associations, skills and vocational training, income generating projects, sports): Assistance programs must work to improve the economic status of the disabled population in mine-affected communities through education, economic development and community infrastructure and creation of employment opportunities.

Disability Policy and Practice (education and public awareness and disability laws): National legislation should promote effective treatment, care and protection for all disabled citizens, including landmine survivors.

Health and Social Welfare Surveillance and Research capacities (data collection, processing, analysis, and reporting).

### **Survivor/Victim Assistance**

The Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance promotes a comprehensive, integrated approach to victim assistance that rests on a three-tiered definition of a landmine victim. This means that a victim includes directly affected individuals, their families, and mine-affected communities. Consequently, victim assistance is viewed as a wide range of activities that benefit individuals, families and communities.

However, throughout the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* the term *Survivor Assistance* is used in the country reports to describe activities directed at landmine victims. The focus of the research for this report is on the individual directly affected by a mine accident. The use of the term *survivor* is intended to emphasize this distinction.

### **Capacities of Affected States to Provide Assistance to Landmine Victims**

A detailed analysis of States' efforts and capacities to adequately address the needs of landmine victims, and the disabled in general, is beyond the scope of the research undertaken for this report.<sup>31</sup> In the *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, details on the availability of the various components of survivor assistance in mine-affected countries were presented.<sup>32</sup> Little has changed in the provision of services during this reporting period. Nevertheless, from the research collected some general observations can be made.

- It is believed that many mine casualties die before reaching medical assistance;
- In many of the countries reporting new casualties, the assistance provided to mine victims is inadequate to meet their needs;
- Most services are located in urban centers whereas the majority of mine survivors can be found in rural areas where the concentration of mine pollution is greatest;
- The majority of resources continue to be directed toward medical and physical rehabilitation;
- In the majority of countries with mine survivors the demand for new and replacement prostheses exceeds the available supply;
- Generally, the availability of assistance in psychological support and socio-economic reintegration is limited or non-existent;
- International Organizations, international and local NGOs, and UN agencies continue to play a key role in the delivery of services to mine survivors;

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<sup>31</sup> A more detailed study on this important area is compiled by Handicap International. The second edition of the report, entitled *Landmine Victim Assistance: World Report 2001*, due for release in December 2001 examines a wide range of indicators to determine a state's capacity to adequately address the needs of the disabled, including landmine victims.

<sup>32</sup> For details see *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 27-31.

- Generally, the care afforded to civilian mine casualties is not as comprehensive as that available to military casualties;
- The economic situation of many mine-affected countries is an obstacle to the provision of adequate assistance to landmine survivors;
- On-going conflict, and the consequent security concerns, in some mine-affected countries is severely hampering the ability of the government and international agencies to provide adequate assistance to landmine survivors; and
- The development of programs that address the needs of landmine survivors, and the disabled population in general, is being hampered by the practice of many donors to only fund individual programs for a limited period of time. A commitment to long-term funding is needed to ensure sustainability and the building of local capacities to carry-on the programs.

### **Sample of Regional Developments and Key Findings**

#### **Global**

- In 2000, the ICRC provided prostheses to 9,882 landmine amputees.<sup>33</sup>
- Form J, the voluntary victim assistance reporting attachment to the Article 7 Report was submitted by eleven governments up to July 2001: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Sweden, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.

#### **Africa**

- In Angola, national authorities have adopted a new five-year plan for physical rehabilitation.
- In Mozambique, the recently created Council for Action on Disability will work closely with NGOs and international agencies to build capacity internally and move toward long-term sustainability of programs for the disabled.
- In Uganda, a new disability policy has been put in place.

#### **Americas**

- In Colombia, the government has launched a new Program for Mine Accident Prevention and Victim Assistance.
- In Guatemala, the Center for International Rehabilitation is designing a specific victim assistance and rehabilitation program that will be replicated throughout the country in coordination with the Ministry of Health.
- In Nicaragua, the government, through the CND and together with NGOs and international organizations, is in the process of developing a national policy on victim assistance that will take into account rehabilitation and economic reintegration.

#### **Asia-Pacific**

- In Afghanistan, due to a budget shortfall in 2000, UNOPS/CDAP had to reduce its community rehabilitation program from 64 to 46 districts.
- In Cambodia, the Disability Action Council, together with affiliated members and relevant government ministries, issued the Cambodian Plan of Action, which provides an orientation strategy for the disability and rehabilitation sector.
- In China, the CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report included for the first time a section on Rehabilitation and Relief of Civilians Accidentally Injured by Landmines.

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<sup>33</sup> ICRC Annual Report 2000, p. 20.

### **Europe/Central Asia**

- In Albania, an agreement was signed between the Albanian Mine Action Center and the Slovenian International Trust Fund to provide forty mine survivors with prostheses up to June 2001.
- In Armenia, in October 2000 the Yerevan Prosthetic and Orthotic Center stopped providing medical assistance due to a lack of funding. Operations were resumed in February 2001.
- In Azerbaijan, the Victim Assistance component of the National Mine Action Plan, budgeted to cost \$150,000, has not been implemented due to the absence of donor funding.
- In Chechnya, UNICEF with the support of a local NGO, Voice of the Mountains, is developing a database on mine casualties. Women and children were reported as suffering 34 percent of all landmine and UXO injuries, which account for 67 percent of all casualties related to hostilities.
- In Georgia, the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs is developing a special program for the care and rehabilitation of the disabled.
- In Ukraine, the government fulfilled its budget obligations and financed the activities of the orthopedic centers in full. A series of state decrees relating to the disabled, including mine victims, have been accepted.

### **Middle East/North Africa**

- In Algeria, the Ministry of National Solidarity and Handicap International signed a partnership agreement to establish a program to provide assistance to the disabled.
- In Egypt, the Minister of Social Affairs signed a year 2000 budget for \$27,000 for the compensation of mine/UXO victims.
- In Iraq, the ICRC reports that an estimated 3,000 patients per year receive ICRC prostheses, of whom over 50 percent are mine survivors.
- In Lebanon, the Ministry of Health stopped providing prosthetic services due to a lack of funding. In May 2000, a new disability law was passed by the Parliament.
- In Yemen, the Ministry of Insurance, Social Affairs, and Labor (MOISA) and the Ministry of Public Health, in partnership with Handicap International (Belgium) established a rehabilitation center in Aden. MOISA has reorganized its community based rehabilitation program to be more responsive to the needs of landmine survivors.

### **Addressing the Needs of Survivors**

Added to the number of new casualties each year are the survivors from previous years, estimated in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999* to number 300,000. Consequently, the number of survivors requiring assistance continues to grow every year. In many mine-affected countries, the assistance provided to mine survivors remains inadequate to meet their needs.

In contrast to mine clearance activities, which potentially have an end point, the needs of landmine survivors are long-term. A landmine survivor will require ongoing medical and rehabilitation services, and services assisting in socio-economic reintegration and psychological support. For amputees, prostheses will require repair and replacement. To ensure sustainability, assistance to landmine survivors should be viewed as a part of a country's overall public health and social services system. Landmine survivors should not be viewed as a group separate from other war victims or persons with disabilities. In providing resources to support programs that address the needs of landmine survivors, the international community is in effect assisting to build the infrastructure that will benefit all people with disabilities in a mine-affected country. Ideally, victim assistance programs should be open to all persons with disabilities, but with clear benefits and explicit inclusion of landmine victims. It is essential that support from the international community focuses on local capacity-building and that each element of victim

assistance be seen as a step towards the complete rehabilitation of survivors, and other persons with disabilities, into the wider community.

### States and Victim Assistance

The Mine Ban Treaty requires, in Article 6.3, that “Each State in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs.”

As with the number of new victims, precise, comprehensive and comparable figures for victim assistance funding are difficult to obtain as some governments do not provide specific amounts for victim assistance, but rather consider victim assistance as an integrated part of humanitarian mine action. In other instances, some countries, for example the United Kingdom, do not specify amounts for victim assistance although assistance is provided through bilateral development cooperation. Another problem is differences in reporting periods (fiscal years) in donor countries. In addition, many victim assistance programs are carried out by NGOs who receive funding from private donors. Therefore, information provided by Landmine Monitor should not be taken as fully representative of the total global funding for victim assistance programs in a given year.

From information provided in country reports, donors to mine victim assistance in 2000-2001 included:<sup>34</sup>

Australia	\$1.88 million
Austria	\$233,105
Belgium	\$716,172
Canada	\$1.34 million
Finland	\$147,000
France	\$213,980
Germany	\$1 million
Ireland	\$341,743
Italy	\$1.32 million
Japan	\$1.14 million
Netherlands	\$2.41 million
New Zealand	\$93,842
Norway	\$4.48 million
United States of America	up to \$11 million

Member countries of the European Union also contribute to EU mine action programs. The EU contributed to victim assistance programs in 2000 through various departments, including the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO). In 2000, 20% percent of overall contributions from the European Commission and the Member States was allocated to Victim Assistance programs.<sup>35</sup>

In 2000, 11 countries, the European Union, and 12 organizations and companies contributed about \$29 million to the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining and Victim Assistance. (See Slovenia country report). However, only \$1.4 million went to victim assistance programs, well below the ITF's target of 15 percent. The fund has reportedly been unable to attract donors to support victim assistance.

The ICRC Special Appeal for Mine Action, which focuses on mine awareness and victim assistance continued to attract donors including South Africa and Sweden. It should be noted that

<sup>34</sup> All amounts are expressed in US dollars.

<sup>35</sup> Email from Veronica Borghini, Assistant to Daniella Dicorrado, Chair of the Mine Action Coordination Group, European Commission External Relations Directorate General (Directorate CFSP Security Policy), to Annalisa Formiconi, Handicap International (Belgium), 26 July 2001.

in some cases amounts listed above against specific countries include a component of funding to the ICRC Special Appeal.

As more donor countries complete the voluntary Form J attachment to the Article 7 report, it is envisaged that it will be possible to provide a clearer picture of victim assistance programs and the funding available.

### **The Intersessional Standing Committee**

The Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness (SC-VA) continued its work in 2000-2001. Since September 2000 the SC-VA has been co-chaired by Japan and Nicaragua, having taken over this role from Mexico and Switzerland. The co-rapporteurs are Canada and Honduras (who will become co-chairs in September 2001).

Building on previous outcomes, important work was accomplished during two intersessional meetings, held in December 2000 and May 2001, in Geneva, Switzerland. The meetings continued in what has been described as a "spirit of practical cooperation, inclusivity and collegiality." Both meetings were also well attended by numerous international and non-governmental organizations, including the ICBL. The meetings continued with six main themes: raising the voices of landmine survivors; linking resources with needs; implementing lessons learned relating to coordination of victim assistance; guidelines, information dissemination and information management; social and economic reintegration; and mine awareness.

At the May 2001 meeting, participants were introduced to eight landmine survivors from the Americas who are involved in the first phase of the "raising the voices" initiative. The "survivor advocates" will be trained to enhance their capacity to represent, organize and advocate on behalf of landmine survivors and other disabled persons in their home countries, and to actively participate in SC-VA meetings and other meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty process.

The SC-VA was successful in encouraging States Parties to accept, and complete, the new, voluntary Article 7 Form J for reporting on victim assistance activities and other matters. Discussions have continued on the need to further develop and use the various indicators available in order to obtain a more comprehensive view on the level of need as it pertains to victim assistance. The Co-Chairs encouraged the ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance and other relevant actors to pursue their work in this area. The challenges faced in providing adequate victim assistance were also discussed. The first Portfolio of Victim Assistance Programs, another SC-VA initiative, listing a selection of victim assistance projects worldwide was released in September 2000. A second edition is due for release in September 2001.

The need for coordination of victim assistance at a national level was reiterated. At least two studies will be undertaken in 2001 to address this issue. The GICHD, in cooperation with UNMAS, is undertaking a study on the role of mine action in assistance to mine and UXO victims. The results of the study are due for release in the last quarter of 2001. The second study involves a workshop organized by Handicap International in Southeast Asia in November 2001. The workshop's main objective is to exchange views on the methods used to meet the challenges defined in country action plans.

Following a commitment made in December 2000, the Co-Chairs released a compilation of guidelines entitled *Providing assistance to landmine victims: A collection of guidelines, best practices and methodologies*. The text will also be available in French and Spanish by the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001.

The focus of discussions on social and economic reintegration centered on vocational and psycho-social rehabilitation. In terms of vocational rehabilitation states and relevant organizations were encouraged to work toward reducing vulnerability and promoting self-reliance.

The SC received an update from international organizations and NGOs concerning the development of preventive education efforts in mine-affected countries. The need for more time

to discuss mine awareness within the Standing Committee framework was raised. It was reiterated that the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies would be a more appropriate forum in which to discuss mine awareness.

Finally, participants were reminded that the purpose of the SC-VA is to identify practical means of ensuring implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Co-Chairs encouraged all participants to consider mechanisms for ensuring that the profusion of information, advice and suggestions presented to the SC-VA are converted into concrete actions that benefit landmine victims.

## **MINE AWARENESS**

The term mine awareness (or mine-risk education as it is otherwise known) is used to describe programs that seek to reduce deaths and injuries from landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) through information, education and dialogue with at-risk communities. The primary objective of mine awareness is to promote safe (or safer) behavior among communities living or working amid mine and UXO contamination. In this, it should be distinguished from campaigns designed to raise general public awareness of the impact of mines and UXO and the consequent plight of affected communities (although such information and advocacy campaigns may overlap with mine awareness, and even sometimes serve a double function).

In this Landmine Monitor reporting period, substantial resources have been committed to mine awareness programs in Kosovo and south Lebanon; elsewhere a number of programs have reported difficulty in obtaining funding. New programs have been initiated in Burundi and Kisangani in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Additional activities have been carried out in Eritrea and Ethiopia, following the signature of the peace agreement, and in Georgia. Handicap International is conducting an assessment of its program tools in six countries. UNICEF has announced the development of mine awareness standards and accompanying guidelines for monitoring and evaluation.

### **Key Actors**

As with the previous reporting period, the principal mine awareness actors internationally have been UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Handicap International (HI) Belgium and France, the International Save the Children Alliance, and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). In Central America, the Organization of American States (OAS) has been active in a number of affected countries. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation have implemented programs in Kosovo, which has also seen the emergence of relatively new mine awareness actors, such as the Association for Aid and Relief-Japan, Caritas, Danish Church Aid, HMD Response, INTERSOS, Islamic Relief Worldwide, and the Mines Awareness Trust.<sup>36</sup> HALO Trust, previously unenthusiastic about mine awareness, has worked in conjunction with a Japanese NGO that carried out awareness and community liaison activities. The International Protection Force, KFOR, has also conducted mine awareness in schools in a "soldier to child" program.

UNICEF reports that it is "currently to varying degrees undertaking, supporting or planning mine action programs, mostly mine awareness education and advocacy, in 28 countries: Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos), Lebanon, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Russian Federation (North Caucasus), Panama, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Syria (Golan Heights), Sudan,

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<sup>36</sup> See "Case Study of Kosovo," Appendix 1, *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action*, (Geneva: UN Development Program and Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, March 2001), pp. 106-107 and 114-115.

Tajikistan, Thailand and Uzbekistan. In 2001, UNICEF has for the first time deployed staff directly to a UN and national mine action program, in Eritrea and Ethiopia respectively.<sup>37</sup>

HI-France has implemented or supported mine-risk education (MRE) in seven countries: Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (through a local NGO, APM), Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau (through a local NGO, Andes), Mozambique, Senegal, and Thailand. The program in Ethiopia closed on 1 June after objectives were reached.<sup>38</sup> HI-Belgium has been implementing mine awareness programs in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kisangani).<sup>39</sup>

In 2000, working directly or through National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies, the ICRC conducted mine awareness programs in Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Lebanon, Nicaragua, the northern Caucasus region of the Russian Federation (including Chechnya), and the regions of Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, data collection began in Iraq and on the Tajikistan/Uzbekistan border to determine whether there is a need for mine/UXO-awareness programs. New mine awareness programs were started in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Lebanon, the Russian Federation (Chechnya), and the region of Kosovo.<sup>40</sup>

### Regional Summaries of Mine Awareness Programs

During the reporting period, attention and funding has concentrated on programs in southern Lebanon and especially Kosovo where more than 20 organizations and bodies have carried out mine awareness during the past two years.<sup>41</sup> Other organizations, for example HI-Belgium, have complained about lack of funding in other contexts for their field programs.<sup>42</sup>

**In Africa**, programs have been conducted in Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Djibouti (including for refugees from Somaliland), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Somaliland,<sup>43</sup> Sudan (including in the south), and Uganda. A UNICEF needs assessment in Chad in July 2000 recommended the establishment of an integrated community liaison and UXO disposal initiative in the east of the country, but to date no activities have yet been implemented, reportedly because of funding difficulties.<sup>44</sup>

In 1999, UNICEF commissioned an in-depth evaluation of its mine awareness program in Huila and Uige provinces of Angola; the evaluation was jointly funded by UNICEF, CIET and Canadian DFAIT. Although the findings were broadly positive, the evaluation report noted that students who had received mine awareness under the program were less likely than other children to stay out of a known mined area, to recognize high-risk sites, and to tell their family members what to do if one encounters a mine. Changes to the mine awareness program as a result included the adaptation of messages to encourage behavior change rather than providing information on merely the dangers of mines, the development of a simple monitoring tool, and the development of information and materials in local languages.<sup>45</sup>

In March 2001, in the DRC, HI Belgium launched a six-month mine action program to prepare, coordinate and implement a clearance and mine awareness program in the Kisangani

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<sup>37</sup> UNICEF contribution to Landmine Monitor—*Appendices*, undated but received 13 July 2001.

<sup>38</sup> Information provided by Hugues Laurence, MRE Coordination Officer, HI, Lyon.

<sup>39</sup> Information provided by Stan Brabant and Véronique Royen, HI, Brussels, June 2001.

<sup>40</sup> ICRC contribution to Landmine Monitor—*Appendices*, 1 June 2001.

<sup>41</sup> For further information on mine awareness in Kosovo see “An Analytical Review of the State of Mine Awareness,” in the appendices to this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

<sup>42</sup> Information provided in email from Stan Brabant, Head, Mines Unit, HI-Belgium, 24 July 2001.

<sup>43</sup> See Lionel Dyck and Bob Macpherson, “An Outline for Mine Awareness Action,” *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 4.3, Fall 2000, pp. 24-28.

<sup>44</sup> Information provided by UNICEF, 10 May 2001.

<sup>45</sup> Aparna Swaminatham *et al.*, “Angola Mine Awareness Evaluation: Summary,” UNICEF, DFAIT and CIET, 31 July 2000. See the report on Angola in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

area. In Uganda, mine awareness programs in Gulu and the neighboring districts were suspended in October 2000 due to the Ebola outbreak in the area. Mine awareness activities covering northern and western Uganda were resumed in April after the area was declared free of the disease.

In Mozambique, HI has been temporarily given back responsibility for coordinating mine awareness from the National Institute for Demining, which lacks the capacity and resources to do it. In collaboration with the Ministry of Education, mine awareness education was introduced into the national curriculum and from 2001, it is being taught in schools. In Malawi, there may be a need for mine awareness targeting civilians living along the border with Mozambique.

**In the Americas**, mine awareness programs have been carried out in Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and, to a limited extent, in Peru. In Colombia, a government-funded pilot project on mine awareness and victim assistance is being implemented in three of the most mine-affected departments in the country between June and December 2001. It aims to establish a database on mine casualties and mine-affected communities and to start building local mine action capacity, including the implementation of mine awareness programs for at-risk communities.

The Nicaraguan Red Cross, supported by UNICEF and ICRC, continues with its "child to child" mine awareness program in communities along the northern border with Honduras. The program is discarding the use of the notorious Superman and Wonder Woman comics.<sup>46</sup> In April 2001, the Organization of American States and UNICEF jointly convened a workshop of all actors working in the area of prevention in mine action to coordinate messages and approaches in mine awareness in Nicaragua.

**In Asia**, significant mine awareness programs have continued in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, and Sri Lanka, and smaller scale activities have been conducted in Thailand and Vietnam.

The mine awareness education program in Afghanistan currently consists of 150 mine awareness trainers and approximately 2,000 community volunteers. Each NGO implements its awareness activities using a number of different approaches to presenting a core set of information. In the year 2000, more than one million civilians reportedly received mine awareness education in various parts of the country.

In Cambodia, mine awareness is undergoing a major shift in focus, following a lead from MAG. The emphasis is now shifting to community liaison, in which information and education activities about the danger of mines take a back seat. This new approach reflects the already high level of awareness among the civilian population and the recognition that economic and other survival pressures will not be solved by the mere provision of information. In Laos, a small-scale evaluation of mine awareness commissioned by UNICEF was carried out in August 2000.

**In Europe**, mine awareness programs have been implemented in Abkhazia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Russian Federation (Chechnya and Ingushetia).

In Azerbaijan, UNICEF had made a public statement in May 2000 about its intention to conduct a mine awareness program, but no work was subsequently undertaken through December 2000. In February 2001, UNICEF was reported to have announced that it was beginning a new mine awareness program designed for 800 teachers, 500 health officials, and 200 representatives of public organizations, and that the program would be carried out jointly with the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA). On 8 February 2001, the Azerbaijan Campaign to

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<sup>46</sup> Letter by Esperanza de Morales, President of the Nicaragua Red Cross, to Landmine Monitor, 12 January 2001. See ICRC, "ICRC mine/UXO awareness programs worldwide," at <[www.icrc.org/irceng.nsf](http://www.icrc.org/irceng.nsf)>, updated 20 April 2001. Information contained in the report on Nicaragua in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

Ban Landmines and other public organizations sent an open letter to UNICEF and ANAMA expressing their concerns about the awareness program.<sup>47</sup>

In Albania, in June 2000, an assessment mission was carried out jointly by the ICRC and a mine clearance NGO to determine the extent of the mine/UXO problem in the three most contaminated districts.<sup>48</sup> Through contacts with the relevant authorities in Tirana, the ICRC has helped the NGO raise funds for setting up demining programs directly linked to the Albanian Red Cross/ICRC mine awareness programs so as to respond to the needs of affected communities.<sup>49</sup> The community-based mine awareness program is also closely linked to programs providing assistance for mine victims. The ICRC has organized transportation for mine victims from northern Albania to the rehabilitation center in Tirana and has arranged for the center to fit amputees with prostheses.<sup>50</sup>

In Croatia, following the receipt of funds from Canada, the GICHD has been requested by the Croatian Mine Action Center to conduct an evaluation in September 2001 to look at the state of mine awareness.<sup>51</sup> As a result of the recent fighting in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the ICRC conducted a needs assessment in June 2001 in order to assess the extent of the UXO problem. A UXO awareness program is reportedly being developed by the ICRC in collaboration with the Macedonian Red Cross.<sup>52</sup>

In Kosovo, after the early proliferation of mine awareness programs, the UN Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) reinforced its coordinating role to include accreditation of mine awareness organizations working in Kosovo. In 2000, it became a MACC requirement that mine awareness be included as an element of all clearance tasks, on the basis that awareness has a role before, during and after clearance. This role is fulfilled by "Mine Action Support Teams."<sup>53</sup> All mine awareness organizations were already required to meet specific accreditation standards prior to project implementation. The MACC monitors mine awareness programs and maintains a database that helps investigation of new casualties and future planning, and feeds into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Mine Awareness Module.

In Central Asia, in June-July 2001, the GICHD conducted a mine awareness and advocacy assessment mission on behalf of the UNICEF Area Office in Almaty. The assessment covered three countries—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—but as of going to press the findings and recommendations of the mission were not publicly available. The ICRC was planning to conduct a mine awareness needs assessment in Tajikistan in summer 2001 using expertise from its Moscow delegation.

**In the Middle East and North Africa**, programs have been implemented in Iran (in Kurdistan province), Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria (including the Golan Heights) and Yemen. In Lebanon, following Israel's withdrawal from the south, a number of actors including Hezbollah, the ICRC, the Landmines Resource Center, the Lebanese Red Cross, Rādda Barnen, UNESCO and UNICEF have conducted mine awareness activities, including emergency interventions. In Libya, it is reported that the authorities have provided mine awareness training that may include training in mine clearance.

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<sup>47</sup> Information contained in the report on Azerbaijan in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

<sup>48</sup> Laurence Desvignes, "The International Committee of the Red Cross Mine/UXO Awareness Programs," *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 4.3, Fall 2000, p. 7.

<sup>49</sup> See "ICRC mine/UXO awareness programs worldwide," available at: <[www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf](http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf)>, accessed on 19 July 2001.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Information provided by Eric Filippino, Head, Socio-Economic Study Group, GICHD, 15 July 2001.

<sup>52</sup> Information provided by the ICRC, 11 July 2001; see report on FYROM in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

<sup>53</sup> For further details see "An Analytical Review of the State of Mine Awareness," in the appendices to this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

In Egypt, mine awareness activities by the Landmine Struggle Center, the sole NGO conducting mine awareness education in affected areas, have been curtailed due to lack of funds. The ICRC has started collecting data on mine and UXO casualties in southern Iraq as a preliminary step toward defining an appropriate mine awareness strategy. In 2000, the ICRC held discussions with the local authorities and the Iraqi Red Crescent on the object of the data collection, on future plans for mine awareness activities and in an effort to reach an agreement with the government and the next step was to be an in-depth needs assessment, scheduled for July 2001. In the Western Sahara, a mine awareness education program conducted by NPA ended in May 2000. According to the UN Peace Plan, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will be responsible for providing mine awareness prior to the planned repatriation of Sahrawi refugees.

### **International Developments**

As part of the ongoing process of professionalization of mine awareness, a number of significant developments have taken place internationally, many led by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN focal point for mine awareness education. In September 2000, following the adoption by the UN of the International Guidelines on Mine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness Education,<sup>54</sup> UNICEF presented "preview" copies of two UN Mine Awareness Training Modules to the Second Meeting of States Parties. The training modules, which were funded by the United States Department of State, each comprise a trainers' guide and resource manual. One module focuses on Mine Awareness Program Managers, who have overall responsibility for planning and implementing mine awareness activities in a given context. The second is devoted to the training of "Community Facilitators"—the individuals who will actually be conducting mine awareness activities at the community level.

In May 2001, however, the UNICEF Global Focal Point for Landmines said that the use of the modules had been suspended, on the basis that there had been insufficient participation in their development.<sup>55</sup> UNICEF subsequently declared that the modules were used to train trainers in North Caucasus in September 2000 but "are now being reviewed as part of the development of the International Standards for Landmine and UXO Awareness/Risk Reduction Education."<sup>56</sup> At the same time, UNICEF stated that it would "coordinate the development of a series of simple step-by-step manuals on different aspects of mine awareness/risk reduction education, drawing on actual examples from mine awareness agencies and practitioners."<sup>57</sup> It is not clear how these "how to" manuals relate to the existing resource manuals included in the training modules.

In addition, UNICEF, which is in the process of reviewing its mine action strategy,<sup>58</sup> has announced its intention to develop *Guidelines for the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of Mine Awareness Programs* and *International Standards for Landmine and UXO Awareness/Risk Reduction Education Programs*.<sup>59</sup> The Standards, which will be elaborated within the context of

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<sup>54</sup> The International Guidelines were formally presented to the international community at the First Meeting of States Parties in May 1999.

<sup>55</sup> Remarks during the UNICEF/UNMAS User Focus Group on Mine Awareness, Geneva, 10 May 2001.

<sup>56</sup> UNICEF contribution to Landmine Monitor—*Appendices*, undated, but received 13 July 2001.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> UNICEF has stated that in 2001 it has "embarked on a consultative process with other mine action stakeholders in order to further define its role and to develop a mine action strategy. The consultation is due to be completed by the [end] of 2001, and will complement the UN interagency mine action strategy, emergency preparedness and response plan, as well as UNICEF's own work in health, education and child protection, particularly in emergencies." UNICEF contribution to Landmine Monitor—*Appendices*, undated but received 13 July 2001.

<sup>59</sup> UNICEF contribution to Landmine Monitor—*Appendices*, undated but received 13 July 2001. See also *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 39-40.

the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS),<sup>60</sup> will replace the existing UN Guidelines and the Monitoring and Evaluation Guidelines will become Technical Notes to the Standards.<sup>61</sup> UNICEF declared its intention to set up a working group to guide the process of standard development; a first meeting was tentatively planned to take place in Geneva toward the end of August 2001.<sup>62</sup>

The UN Mine Action Service, in cooperation with UNICEF, commissioned CARE to prepare a Landmine and UXO Safety Handbook, and an accompanying video and training module. These will be used to provide security briefings in affected countries to UN staff, peacekeepers and NGOs about the dangers of landmines and UXO.

Handicap International has also been active in promoting the development of mine awareness, notably through the publication of its Mine Risk Education (MRE) Guide 2001. The Guide, which is “to be considered as an accompanying tool, covering a broad spectrum of MRE project functions and activities[,] ... represents a distillation of Handicap International (France & Belgium) experience in implementing this type of educational program over a period of nearly a decade in seven countries around the world.”<sup>63</sup> The Guide is divided into four sections—“Preliminary” (exploratory mission), “Setting up human and technical resources” (partnerships, local personnel recruitment, training, and messages), “Deployment” (communication, data collection, monitoring, and data base), and “Extensions” (capacity building, assessment, and capitalization).

On 7 March 2001, at the ICBL General Meeting, a four-year plan for the Mine Awareness Sub-Group (of the ICBL Mine Action Working Group) was adopted with the following objectives: to promote improvements in the quality of mine awareness programs; to advocate for and maintain higher profile of mine awareness in Standing Committee meetings and Meetings of States Parties and mine action community in general; to advocate and provide guidance to the international community as to where/what and how mine awareness is needed; and to advocate and encourage development of more programs and improved sustainability of programs.<sup>64</sup>

The Sub-Group’s agenda for the first year has been: to improve cooperation between ICBL agencies, UNICEF, UNMAS, ICRC, and try to come up with a joint approach at the Third Meeting of States Parties; to encourage clarification of respective mandates and activities (UNICEF, ICRC and GICHD in particular); to gather, synthesize and present working group members’ inputs in different fora; to launch a Code of Conduct on the sharing of mine awareness tools, and follow it up; to serve as an alert system for all ICBL mine awareness agencies; and to improve the sharing of information (Aden Workshop, lessons learned, resource center database).

### ***The Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Process***

To date, the MBT intersessional Standing Committee (SC) meetings have played a relatively low-key role in the development of mine awareness, which is grouped with victim assistance as it is in Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty. A proposal has been put forward to move mine awareness to the SC on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies;<sup>65</sup> the Third Meeting of States Parties will decide whether or not to approve this. The ICBL Mine Awareness Sub-Group has expressed a wish for more time to be accorded in the SC meetings to discussing mine

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<sup>60</sup> Remarks during the UNICEF/UNMAS User Focus Group on Mine Awareness, Geneva, 10 May 2001.

<sup>61</sup> UNICEF contribution to Landmine Monitor—*Appendices*, undated but received 13 July 2001.

<sup>62</sup> Email from Polly Brennan, UNICEF Global Focal Point for Landmines, 11 July 2001.

<sup>63</sup> Letter from Bill Howell and Hugues Laurence, HI, Lyons, 20 July 2001.

<sup>64</sup> See <[www.icbl.org](http://www.icbl.org)> for further information about the ICBL Mine Awareness Sub-Group.

<sup>65</sup> Report of the Meeting of the Meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness, 7-8 May 2001, Geneva, para. 24.

awareness;<sup>66</sup> the co-chairs and co-rapporteurs of the respective SC will have to decide how to proceed. During the May 2001 SC meetings, UNICEF organized a first interagency mine awareness user focus group (UFG) under UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) auspices. The originally stated objectives of the UFG were to “provide a mechanism for inter-agency cooperation, in order to support the development of: better quality mine awareness/risk reduction programs; greater capacity to respond to mine awareness/risk reduction needs, especially in emergencies; models of mine action in which all components are integrated, mutually reinforcing, and sustainable; links between mine action and other sectors of humanitarian and development work.”<sup>67</sup> It was planned to convene the second meeting of the group, subsequently renamed the Mine Awareness Working Group and convened as a subcommittee of the Steering Committee on Mine Action, in Managua around the Third Meeting of States Parties.<sup>68</sup>

### *The Use of Media in Mine Awareness*

Increasing attention has been paid in 2000-2001 to the use of media, tools and materials in mine awareness. These are often the backbone of any program, despite doubts as to their pedagogic effectiveness and cost efficiency. In November 2000, with a view to addressing these wider strategic issues, the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) initiated a study of the use of media and materials in mine awareness programs, focusing on three countries/contexts—Cambodia, Kosovo, and Nicaragua. It is expected that the study, which is funded by the US Department of State, will be published by the end of 2001.

On 19-22 February 2001, Rädna Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) organized in Aden, Yemen, an International Workshop on the Design of Materials, Resources and Other Media in Mine Awareness Programs (the Aden Workshop). The Aden Workshop, which was attended by 35 participants from 20 countries, sought to discuss the design of all forms of media (that is, all tools and resources, and not only mass media) used in mine awareness programs. Through a combination of presentations, working groups and plenary discussions, the workshop sought to exchange experiences, draw together lessons learned and identify unmet needs, with a view to strengthening the effectiveness of future programming.<sup>69</sup>

A summary report of the workshop identified 14 key lessons, including that community participation in mine awareness is essential to the effectiveness and the sustainability of the program; adaptation of materials from one context to another is not recommended; field-testing of resources, tools, media and materials is essential prior to their widespread dissemination; and an effective improvement in mine awareness programs demands greater coordination and operational support internationally and locally.<sup>70</sup>

HI informed the Aden Workshop of progress in its ongoing in-house evaluation of mine risk education tools from its programs in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Senegal. The evaluation is looking at whether the tools managed to create a sustainable educative dynamic within the community, and considers the appropriateness of the messages and the conduit for their transmission. Methodology is based on interviews and an analytical workshop. The results are due to be published before the end of 2001.<sup>71</sup>

HI also indicated its intention to pursue the adoption of a code of conduct on ethics on “how to share tools,” out of a concern about the misappropriation of awareness or educational

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Draft Terms of Reference for Mine Awareness User Focus Group, attached to email from Polly Brennan, UNICEF Global Focal Point for Landmines, 11 April 2001.

<sup>68</sup> Email from Polly Brennan, UNICEF Global Focal Point for Landmines, 11 July 2001.

<sup>69</sup> Summary Report of the International Workshop on the Design of Materials, Resources and Other Media in Mine Awareness Programs, Rädna Barnen, Beirut, May 2001.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid..

<sup>71</sup> Presentation by Hugues Laurence, MRE Coordination Officer, HI, Lyons, to the Aden Workshop, 19 February 2001.

materials.<sup>72</sup> A draft code of conduct, circulated in April 2001, laid down five conditions for an organization to share the concept of its mine awareness tools with another organization:

1. The tool is transferable and will be used in a strategy adapted and respectful of its original function;
2. The organization interested in all or part of the tool makes a written request to the “parent organization;”
3. The organization, which borrows all or part of the tool, clearly quotes the source on the new material;
4. The organization, which borrows all or part of the tool, undertakes to send one specimen of the new tool to the “holder organization” headquarters; and
5. The organization which borrows all or part of the tool, undertakes to re-field test the tool in the new context and provides a copy of the results to the parent organization.

## MINE ACTION FUNDING

Landmine Monitor has identified more than US\$1 billion in mine action spending in the past decade. For 2000, Landmine Monitor has identified \$224 million allocated for mine action.

However, this is far from a complete global total for mine action spending to date and in 2000. Left out of these totals is mine action funding from the European Community, which has averaged about €30 million (approx. \$27 million) per year in recent years, including €29.8 million in 2000 and €30.4 million in 1999; EC funding is not included in order to avoid double counting because it appears in some cases donors reported donations to the European Union as part of their domestic mine action spending. Also, where known, Landmine Monitor has not included funds for research and development into demining technologies and equipment in these totals, instead listing R&D funding separately. The totals also do not include in-kind (as opposed to cash) contributions from some donors. Victim assistance is included where possible, but for some major donors landmine victim assistance funding cannot be separated out from other non-landmine-specific programs.

These statistics indicate an increase in global mine action funding from about \$205 million in 1999 to \$224 million in 2000. Substantial increases were registered by the United States (\$16.5 million), Denmark (\$6.4 million) and the Netherlands (\$5.3 million), as well as Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Mine action funding fell for some major donors, such as Italy, Canada and Sweden.

### Mine Action Funding in 2000: \$224 million

1. USA	\$79.6 million
2. UK	\$21.5 million
3. Norway	\$19.2 million
4. Germany	\$14.5 million
5. Netherlands	\$14.2 million
6. Denmark	\$13.4 million
7. Canada	\$11.9 million
8. Japan	\$11.9 million
9. Switzerland	\$8.5 million
10. Sweden	\$7.9 million
11. Australia	\$6.8 million

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid, 22 February 2001.

12. Finland	\$4 million
13. Belgium	\$2.5 million
14. Italy	\$2 million
15. Austria	\$1.9 million
16. France	\$1.2 million
17. Spain	\$0.9 million
18. Others	\$2.0 million

#### **Mine Action Funding Reported To Date: \$1.025 billion**

1. USA	\$303.5 million
2. Norway	\$107.5 million
3. UK	\$78.7 million
4. Sweden	\$71.5 million
5. Germany	\$68.3 million
6. Japan	\$63.8 million
7. Denmark	\$58.1 million
8. Netherlands	\$53.3 million
9. Canada	\$51.9 million
10. Australia	\$36.7 million
11. Italy	\$31.7 million
12. Switzerland	\$31.2 million
13. Finland	\$23.4 million
14. France	\$14.1 million
15. Belgium	\$9.9 million
16. Austria	\$7.1 million
17. Ireland	\$4.6 million
18. Spain	\$3.5 million
19. Others	\$6.0 million

#### **Major Mine Action Donors**

All figures are in US dollars. Unless otherwise noted, figures include victim assistance funding. Where known, figures do not include funds for research and development, or contributions to the European Union. In some cases, falling exchange rates against the US dollar make comparisons with previous years more unfavorable than when computed in national currencies.

#### **UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -- \$303.5 million**

2000	\$79.6 million
1999	\$63.1 million
1998	\$44.9 million
1997	\$30.8 million
1996	\$29.8 million
1995	\$29.2 million
1994	\$15.9 million
1993	\$10.2 million

- Figures do not include landmine victim assistance funding; however, funding for war victims programs totaled an additional \$11 million in FY2000.
- R&D totaled an additional \$18 million in FY2000, and \$63.6 million from FY1995-1999.

**NORWAY -- \$107.5 million**

2000	\$19.2 million
1999	\$21.7 million
1998	\$20.8 million
1997	\$16.7 million
1996	\$13.5 million
1995	\$11.6 million
1994	\$4.0 million

- Norway funds a number of demining and mine action R&D programs, but the precise dollar amount is not known.

**UNITED KINGDOM -- \$78.7 million**

2000-2001	\$21.5 million
1999-2000	\$19.5 million
1998-1999	\$6.5 million
1997-1998	\$6.6 million
1996	\$6.3 million
1995	\$6.9 million
1994	\$6.3 million
1993	\$5.1 million

- Figures do not include victim assistance funding.
- R&D totaled an additional \$1.43 million in 2000-2001, and \$2 million from 1997-98 to 1999-2000.

**SWEDEN -- \$71.5 million**

2000	\$7.9 million
1999	\$11.5 million
1998	\$16.6 million
1997	\$11.9 million
1996	\$10.4 million
1995	\$5.1 million
1994	\$2.6 million
1990-93	\$5.5 million

- Figures do not include victim assistance funding.
- Sweden has devoted considerable additional funds to R&D, totaling more than \$24 million since 1994; no figure for 2000 is available.

**GERMANY -- \$68.3 million**

2000	\$14.5 million
1999	\$11.4 million
1998	\$10.1 million
1997	\$4.9 million
1996	\$7.9 million
1995	\$0.8 million
1994	\$0.5 million
1993	\$0.3 million

- Germany has devoted considerable additional funds to R&D, totaling more than \$6 million since 1993; no figure for 2000 is available.

**JAPAN -- \$63.8 million**

2000	\$11.9 million
1999	\$13.2 million
1998	\$8.7 million

- Prior to 1998, Japan contributed approximately \$30 million to mine action.
- In December 2000, Japan announced a new commitment to provide 500 million yen (approximately \$4.76 million) for demining technology R&D.

#### **DENMARK -- \$58.1 million**

2000	\$13.4 million
1999	\$7 million
1998	\$6.2 million
1997	\$5.4 million
1996	\$8 million
1995	\$2.3 million
1994	\$2.0 million
1993	\$1.7 million
1992	\$1.9 million

- Figures for 1992-1995 do not include bilateral contributions.
- Denmark funds a number of R&D programs, including the Nordic Demining Research Forum, but the precise dollar amount is not known.

#### **THE NETHERLANDS -- \$53.3 million**

2000	\$14.2 million
1999	\$8.9 million
1998	\$9.3 million
1997	\$10.2 million
1996	\$10.7 million

- Figures include some but not all victim assistance funding.
- Figures prior to 1996 are not available.

#### **CANADA -- \$51.9 million**

2000	\$11.9 million
1999	\$15.2 million
1998	\$9.5 million
1997	\$3.0 million
1996	\$4.0 million
1995	\$1.5 million
1994	\$2.9 million
1993	\$2.2 million
1989	\$1.7 million

- R&D totaled an additional \$2.7 million in 2000, and \$2.7 million in 1998-1999.

#### **AUSTRALIA -- \$36.7 million**

2000-2001	\$6.8 million
1999-2000	\$8 million
1998-1999	\$7 million
1997-1998	\$5.9 million
1996-1997	\$4.5 million
1995-1996	\$4.5 million

- Australia has contributed \$1.79 million to the “Bushmaster” mine detection R&D project.

**SWITZERLAND -- \$31.2 million**

2000	\$8.5 million
1999	\$5.8 million
1998	Unknown
1997	\$4.0 million
1996	\$2.6 million
1995	\$4.1 million
1994	\$3.5 million
1993	\$2.7 million

**ITALY -- \$31 million**

2000	\$2 million
1999	\$6.5 million
1998	\$12 million

- Italy contributed 18 billion lire (\$10.5 million) from 1995-1997.

**FINLAND -- \$23.4 million**

2000	\$4 million
1999	\$5 million
1998	\$6.6 million
1997	\$4.5 million
1996	\$1.3 million
1995	\$0.7 million
1991-94	\$1.3 million

**FRANCE -- \$14.1 million**

2000	\$1.2 million
1999	\$0.9 million
1995-1998	\$12 million

- Figures include some but not all victim assistance funding.
- France contributed about \$33.9 million in mine action funding through the European Union from 1995-2000, including \$5.6 million in 2000.
- France has devoted considerable additional funds to R&D, totaling more than \$13 million since 1993; no figure for 2000 is available.

**BELGIUM -- \$9.9 million**

2000	\$2.5 million
1999	\$2.3 million
1994-1998	\$5.1 million

- R&D totaled an additional \$1.3 million in 2000, and \$4 million through 1999.

**AUSTRIA -- \$7.1 million**

2000	\$1.9 million
1999	\$0.95 million
1994-1998	\$4.2 million

**IRELAND -- \$4.6 million**

2000	\$0.6 million
1999	\$1.4 million
1994-1998	\$2.6 million

**SPAIN -- \$3.5 million**

2000	\$0.9 million
1999	\$0.7 million
1998	\$0.8 million
1997	\$0.9 million
1996	\$0.1 million
1995	\$0.1 million

Among other countries contributing to mine action funding are Slovenia (\$1.8 million from 1998-2000), Luxembourg (\$1.4 million from 1998-2000), Iceland (\$1 million from 1997-2000), and South Korea (\$760,000 from 1998-2000).

**Major Mine Action Recipients**

Accurate, complete, and comparable figures for major mine action recipients are even more elusive than those for major mine action donors. Only partial funding information for 2000 is available from the UNMAS Mine Action Investment (MAI) Database, as many major donors have not entered data records for 2000.

The biggest mine action funding recipients, cumulatively, are Afghanistan, Mozambique, Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo (in just two years), Angola, northern Iraq, and Laos. In 2000, the top recipients were Kosovo, Cambodia, northern Iraq, Mozambique, and Afghanistan.

Despite the fact that global mine action funding increased in 2000, a number of mine action programs experienced serious problems, even crises, in funding. A key problem is a lack of long-term commitments from the donor countries.

- In Afghanistan, a severe shortage of funds in 2000 led to the laying off of a number of clearance teams.
- In Angola, some mine clearance organizations have struggled with reduced funding, erratic funding and/or donor reluctance to commit long-term in Angola. A number of organizations had to suspend programs in 2000 or 2001 due to lack of funding.
- Funding shortfalls in 2000 and 2001 have put the existence of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center at risk. Short-term funding was announced in April that will maintain the MAC structure until September 2001.
- In Cambodia, nearly all demining operations were suspended in October 2000 due to funding problems.

***Afghanistan***

Funding for the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA), totaled \$172.8 million from 1991 to 2000. The total of \$17 million in 2000 was a substantial decrease from \$22 million in 1999. There were 12 identified donors in 2000, compared to 15 in 1999. MAPA funding includes demining and mine awareness but not victim assistance.

***Mozambique***

It is estimated that mine action funding for Mozambique totaled about \$145 million from 1993 to 2000, including approximately \$17 million in 2000. Ten donors allocated \$6.6 million to the National Demining Institute in 2000 and at least another \$10.5 million was provided to mine clearance organizations. This appears to be a substantial increase from 1999 when donors

reported to the UN Mine Action Investment Database a total of \$11.4 million in funding for Mozambique.

### ***Cambodia***

Total funding for mine action in Cambodia is estimated to exceed \$125 million since 1994, including about \$25 million in 2000. In 2000, 11 donors contributed about \$9.2 million to the UNDP Trust Fund for Cambodia. In addition, 14 donors reported to Landmine Monitor some \$16 million provided directly to CMAC, to other mine action organizations in Cambodia, and to the global UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance. Despite the October crisis in funding, the 2000 total of \$25 million is an increase from the \$23 million identified for 1999.

### ***Bosnia and Herzegovina***

Mine action funding for Bosnia and Herzegovina is estimated at \$92 million from 1995 to 2000, by fourteen donors and the World Bank. Funding for 2000 is estimated at about \$15 million, including \$11.1 million from the Slovenia International Trust Fund, about \$2 million from the UNDP Trust Fund, and about \$2 million from donors bilaterally. The MAI Database reported \$22.5 million in funding in 1999.

### ***Kosovo***

Mine action funding for Kosovo totaled about \$58 million in 1999 and 2000. The MAI database reports \$25 million in funding from 11 donors in 1999, and Landmine Monitor country reports identify about \$33 million in funding from 12 donors in 2000.

### ***Angola***

It is estimated that mine action funding for Angola totaled about \$56 million from 1993 to 2000. According to information provided to Landmine Monitor by donors and mine action organizations, funding in 2000 totaled approximately \$13 million. This would constitute a decrease from about \$14.7 million reported to the MAI Database in 1999.

### ***Northern Iraq***

It is estimated that funding for mine action in northern Iraq totaled about \$50 million from 1993 to 2000, including about \$23 million in 2000. The Iraq Mine Action Program, under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, is funded entirely through the UN Oil for Food Program, which started in 1997. The MAP expended approximately \$20 million in 2000. Two key mine action NGOs, Mines Advisory Group and Norwegian People's Aid, receive funds apart from the UN program, totaling about \$3 million in 2000.

### ***Laos***

Mine action funding for Laos totaled an estimated \$35 million from 1994 to 2000. The MAI Database reports funding for Laos of \$26.1 million from 1994-1999, including \$7 million in 1999. Landmine Monitor country reports identify \$8.6 million in funding for 2000.

### ***Central America -- Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua***

Funding for the Organization of American States Assistance Program for Demining in Central America, which involves mine and UXO clearance in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, totaled \$19.6 million from 1993 to 2000. In 2000 the budget for the OAS regional program was \$7.6 million, an increase from \$6 million in 1999.

### ***Croatia***

Croatia has allocated considerable domestic financial resources to demining operations, and has received some international support. In 2000, Croatia allocated \$25.3 million for mine

action and received some \$6 million from foreign donors. In 1999, mine action spending totaled \$24.4 million, with \$2.6 million received from foreign donors. The MAI Database lists \$8.5 million contributed from 1994-2000 by nine donors.

#### Developments in some other mine action recipients:

- *Albania* received approximately \$1.2 million, primarily from the US and ITF as well as Germany, for mine clearance.
- The Landmine Impact Survey in *Chad* has received \$1.54 million from the UK, US, and the United Nations Foundation.
- Several countries have contributed to the mine clearance program in *Ecuador* with both monetary and in-kind contributions including Brazil, Canada, Japan, Spain, and the US. In March 2001, Peru and the Organization of American States signed an agreement to support integrated mine action in the country.
- A trust fund has been established for mine clearance in the western desert in *Egypt*.
- *Estonia* received \$2.2 million in assistance from the US in 2000 for training and equipment.
- Between May 2000 and February 2001, funding, including in-kind contributions, totaling some \$6 million for mine action in *Lebanon* was provided by Canada, EU, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Ukraine, UK and the US. The United Arab Emirates has pledged \$50 million for demining and reconstruction in South Lebanon.
- Canada and the US have provided funding for mine clearance in *Peru*. In May 2001, Peru and the Organization of American States signed an agreement to support integrated mine action in the country.
- The Landmine Impact Survey in *Thailand* has received \$1.655 million from Australia, Canada, Finland, Norway, UK, US, and the United Nations Foundation.
- The US announced its intention to provide \$1.4 million for the Landmine Impact Survey in *Vietnam*. Other donors to mine action programs in Vietnam include Australia, Denmark, Germany, Japan, and several private foundations.
- The Landmine Impact Survey for *Yemen* cost of \$1.65 million with funding provided by Canada, Japan, Germany, the United States, and the United Nations Foundation. Yemen has also received funding commitments from a number of new donors, most significantly Saudi Arabia, which pledged \$3 million over the next three years.

UNMAS reports that the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, since it was established in 1994, has received contributions from forty-two donor governments, the European Union, and individuals. Disbursements have been made to programs in nineteen countries.

1994	\$300,000
1995	\$16.3 million
1996	\$11.6 million
1997	\$8.1 million
1998	\$11.1 million
1999	\$11.9 million
2000	\$ 7.34 million

## REGIONAL OVERVIEWS

### AFRICA

### **Mine Ban Policy**

Of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 35 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. This is an increase of eight countries since publication of the *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*. The countries that ratified or acceded to the treaty in this reporting period are, in chronological order: Gabon, Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Congo-Brazzaville (accession), Cape Verde, and Guinea-Bissau.

Another seven countries have signed but not yet ratified the Mine Ban Treaty: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia, São Tomé e Príncipe, and Sudan. Three of those report that domestic steps are completed, or nearly completed, for ratification: Angola, Cameroon, and São Tomé e Príncipe.

Six countries in the region remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty: Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Nigeria, and Somalia. The DR Congo reports that domestic procedures for accession have been completed.

Three States Parties have passed domestic legislation implementing the Mine Ban Treaty, all in this reporting period: Mali, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe. Eleven other countries indicate that implementation legislation is in the process of being enacted. Landmine Monitor is unaware of any steps underway to enact domestic implementation legislation in: Benin, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.

Compliance with the requirement to submit Article 7 transparency measures reports has improved in the last year. Benin, Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe have submitted their initial Article 7 reports, and in some cases the required annual updates. Botswana, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Seychelles, Togo, and Uganda have not yet submitted their initial reports, some of which were due in August 1999.

No country from the Africa region voted against or abstained in voting for UN General Assembly Resolution 55/33V in support of the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2000. Three non-signatories voted in favor of the resolution: Comoros, Eritrea and Nigeria. Twenty-one of the 108 governments participating in the Second Meeting of States Parties in Geneva were from Africa. Since the Second Meeting, Zimbabwe has served as co-chair of the Intersessional Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. Participation in the intersessional meetings by African states increased recently due to increased sponsorship efforts. African governments that attended at least one Standing Committee meeting were Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, and Zambia.

In November 2000, Djibouti hosted a conference on landmines for the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden states. In February 2001, Mali hosted the Bamako Seminar on the Universalization and Implementation of the Ottawa Convention in Africa, attended by 45 African governments.

### **Use**

In this Landmine Monitor reporting period, since May 2000, there were confirmed new uses of antipersonnel mines, or credible allegations of new use, in at least eight conflicts: (1) in Angola by both government forces and UNITA rebels (with use by both in Namibia as well); (2) in Burundi by rebel and/or government forces; (3) in the Democratic Republic of Congo by government and rebel forces; (4) in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict by both sides; (5) in Senegal by MFDC rebels; (6) in Somalia by various factions; (7) in Sudan by government and SPLA/M rebels; and (8) in Uganda by LRA rebels.

Landmine Monitor received reports that indicate a strong possibility of use of antipersonnel mines by Ugandan forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo in June 2000.

Uganda became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in August 1999. The Ugandan government has denied that it used antipersonnel mines in the DRC. There have also been serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Rwandan forces in the DRC in June 2000. Rwanda was a Mine Ban Treaty signatory at the time; it became a State Party on 1 December 2000. Rwanda denies any use of antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Treaty signatory Angola has acknowledged continued use of antipersonnel mines. There are strong indications that two other signatories used antipersonnel mines: Ethiopia (until the end of its border conflict with Eritrea in June 2000), and Sudan (ongoing use against SPLA/M and other rebel forces). Both governments deny any use of antipersonnel mines. Eritrea for the first time admitted to use of antipersonnel mines during its border conflict with Ethiopia from May 1998 to June 2000.

In Burundi, which is a treaty signatory, antipersonnel mines have continued to be used, and there have been allegations of use by both government and rebel forces, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to establish responsibility for the mine use. In August 2000, the government of Burundi, for the first time known to Landmine Monitor, accused rebel forces of using antipersonnel mines. This came in response to Landmine Monitor's report of serious allegations of use by the Burundi army. The government has subsequently frequently accused rebels of planting mines.

In February 2001 the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo for the first time known to Landmine Monitor denied current or past use of antipersonnel mines.

### **Production and Transfer**

Landmine Monitor received new allegations regarding production of antipersonnel mines in Uganda, but is not in a position to confirm or deny these allegations. Uganda denies any new production.

The use of antipersonnel mines in the region has raised concerns about illicit cross-border transfers of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to document specific cases.

### **Stockpiling and Destruction**

Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Togo, and Zambia have stated to Landmine Monitor that they have only small stockpiles of antipersonnel mines for training, but have not provided the exact number of mines in stock. Burkina Faso, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Senegal have confirmed that they do not possess antipersonnel mines. Burundi revealed that its stockpile numbers less than 15,000 antipersonnel mines. Cameroon declared a stockpile of 500 antipersonnel mines for training purposes. Congo-Brazzaville indicates that its stockpile may number as much as 700,000-900,000 antipersonnel mines. Mauritania has decided to retain 5,918 antipersonnel mines for training purposes. Mozambique's initial Article 7 report revealed the size of its stockpile for the first time: 37,818. Sierra Leone acknowledged a stockpile of approximately 900 antipersonnel mines. Tanzania is the only State Party yet to reveal whether or not it maintains any stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but it is assumed to do so. In addition to those States Parties, those believed to have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines include Mine Ban Treaty non-signatories Central African Republic, DR Congo, Eritrea, Nigeria and Somalia; and treaty signatories Angola, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

Zimbabwe completed the destruction of its stockpile in November 2000. Mauritania reports that it destroyed its stockpile of approximately 5,000 antipersonnel mines over the course of the past three years. Mali, Namibia, and South Africa previously destroyed their stockpiles. The eight States Parties in Africa that have not begun the destruction process include: Chad, Djibouti, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zambia. Three of these have only been States Parties a short time including Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia.

### **Mine Action Funding**

In 2000, it is estimated that mine action funding for Mozambique totaled about \$17 million, an increase from 1999. Funding for Angola in 2000 is estimated at \$13 million, a decrease from 1999. Others receiving mine action funding included Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia/Somaliland, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Mine action in the region is primarily funded by the European Commission, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.

### **Landmine Problem**

In the region, twenty-six countries, plus Somaliland, are mine-affected. These countries include: Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Djibouti, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Landmine Impact Surveys were completed in Chad and Mozambique. In Somalia, an advance survey mission was conducted. The UK-based Mines Advisory Group has conducted an assessment mission to Uganda. The initial findings of the Mozambique Landmine Impact Survey were released in June 2001. It found that all ten provinces and 123 out of 128 districts in Mozambique are mine-affected. The survey identified 1,374 suspected mined areas, covering an estimated 562 square kilometers.

In 2000/2001 UNMAS carried out assessment or fact-finding missions to Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Zambia.

### **Mine Clearance**

Mine clearance is taking place in sixteen countries or areas, including Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somaliland, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, with smaller-scale activities in Djibouti, Mauritania, Uganda, and Zambia.

During 2000 and early 2001, mine clearance operations were carried out in the following countries and regions in Africa: Angola, Chad, DR Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Somaliland, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

In 2000, the area of land cleared in Mozambique was 5 million square meters, including over 317 kilometers of road. A total of 6,679 mines and 993 UXO were cleared and destroyed. In 2000, 1,335 antipersonnel mines, 51 antitank mines, and 75,017 UXO were cleared and destroyed in Angola. The NGO HUMAID in Guinea-Bissau began demining operations in January 2000, and by early 2001, 1.4 million square meters and 202 kilometers of roads had been cleared. In Mauritania, 27 minefields had been identified, and some 3,200 antipersonnel mines and 2,300 unexploded shells destroyed. Mine clearance operations resumed in Rwanda in June 2000 and by January 2001, 2,966 mines and UXO were removed and 11,337 square meters of land were cleared for resettlement. In Southern Sudan, between September 1997 and March 2001 clearance teams have removed 2,816 antipersonnel mines, 411 antitank mines, and 88,019 UXO, recovering 2,972,024 square meters of land, along with 676 miles of road.

With French support, Benin is establishing a regional demining training center open to other African countries, which should become operational in mid-2002. In February 2001, a National Mine Action Center was inaugurated in Djibouti.

### **Mine Awareness**

Mine awareness programs have been conducted in Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Somaliland, Sudan (including in the south), and Uganda. In March 2001, in the DRC, HI

Belgium launched a six-month mine action program to prepare, coordinate and implement a clearance and mine awareness program in the Kisangani area.

### **Mine Casualties**

Twenty countries, and Somaliland, in Africa reported mine or UXO victims in this reporting period. Malawi is the only one to have reported casualties that had not done so in 1999. Several countries were dropped from Landmine Monitor's previous casualty list, due to lack of tangible evidence to indicate new victims, although these countries remain mine-affected: Niger, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia. It should be noted that although Tanzania has recorded no new casualties in 2000-2001, the country does provide assistance to mine survivors coming over the border from Burundi. Specific, but admittedly incomplete, totals include:

- In Angola, 840 casualties were recorded for 2000;
- In Chad, approximately 300 casualties were reported over the past 24 months;
- In Eritrea, 49 casualties were reported in May and June 2000;
- In Ethiopia, there were 170 new casualties in just the Tigray region in 2000.
- In Namibia, 139 casualties were reported in 2000;
- In Senegal, the number of new casualties decreased slightly to 57 in 2000.
- In Somalia, 147 casualties were reported in just two central regions in 2000;
- In Somaliland, 107 casualties were recorded in 2000;
- In Sudan, more than 321 casualties were reported between September 1999 and March 2001.

### **Survivor Assistance**

In Angola, national authorities have adopted a new five-year plan for physical rehabilitation. In Mozambique, the recently created Council for Action on Disability will work closely with NGOs and international agencies to build capacity internally and move toward long-term sustainability of programs for the disabled. In Uganda, a new disability policy has been put in place.

## **AMERICAS**

### **Mine Ban Policy**

Twenty-nine of the 35 countries in the Americas region are State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. In this reporting period, since May 2000, there have been four ratifications: the Dominican Republic (30 June 2000), Colombia (6 September 2000), Uruguay (7 June 2001), and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (1 August 2001). There are four remaining signatories that have not ratified: Chile, Guyana, Haiti and Suriname. Chile is in the final stages of the ratification process. Cuba and the United States remain the only two countries in the region that have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

Trinidad and Tobago enacted national implementation legislation in this reporting period, joining Canada, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Brazil and Costa Rica are in the process of enacting national legislation. México has said that independent legislation is not necessary because international treaties are incorporated in domestic law.

Ten States Parties in the region have not yet submitted an initial Article 7 transparency report: the Bahamas, Barbados, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Panamá, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.

Nineteen countries in the region attended the Second Meeting of State Parties in Geneva in September 2000. Chile, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay participated as observers. At the meeting, governments welcomed Nicaragua's offer to host the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua in September 2001. Since the Second Meeting, Nicaragua

has served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, with Canada and Honduras as co-rapporteurs of that committee. Perú has served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance. Nineteen countries in the region attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in December 2000 and May 2001 in Geneva, including Cuba and the United States.

Thirty-two countries in the region voted in support of pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly resolution 55/33V in November 2000. Dominica was absent. Cuba and United States of America were among the 22 governments globally that abstained.

Countries of the region continue to support OAS pro-ban resolutions. In June 2001, member states supported the OAS resolution on mine action in Ecuador and Perú, the resolution on supporting the OAS AICMA program in Central America, and the resolution in support of the Western Hemisphere becoming a landmine-free zone.

In October 2000, 28 countries in the region issued the "Declaration of Manaus," during the Fourth Defense Ministerial Conference of the Americas in Manaus, Brazil. Under point 11 the Declaration called for "greater participation in effective implementation of the Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines and on their destruction." Signatories Chile, Guyana, Haiti and Suriname, as well as non-signatory the United States participated in the Manaus Conference.

From 6-8 November 2000, Argentina co-hosted with Canada the Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction in the Americas, with the cooperation of the OAS. The seminar concluded with the "Managua Challenge." This calls for all remaining signatories from the region to complete ratification in time for the Third Meeting of States Parties. It also calls on all States Parties to submit their Article 7 reports by this date, and calls on all States Parties to arrive in Managua with their stockpiled mines completely destroyed.

At the July 2001 Summit of the Andean Community, representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Perú, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela issued a declaration called "Basis for a Project on Creating a Peace Zone and Promoting South American Cooperation," which under its third point called for "completing the process towards establishing South America as an area free of antipersonnel landmines."

### **Use**

Colombia remains the only country in the region where there is evidence that landmines are currently being used. The guerrilla groups FARC-EP and UC-ELN, as well as AUC paramilitaries, continued to use antipersonnel mines, apparently on an increased basis in 2000 and 2001.

### **Production and Transfer**

It is believed that Cuba continues to produce antipersonnel mines. Cuba states that it does not export antipersonnel mines, but has not yet adopted a formal export moratorium.

The United States has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1996, but will not announce a moratorium or ban on production. The US is considering production of certain landmine "alternatives" that would be prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Colombia continues to produce a Claymore-type directional fragmentation mine (permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty in command-detonated mode). Colombian guerrilla groups produce homemade antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and other improvised explosive devices.

### **Stockpiling and Destruction**

Thirteen countries in the region have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Nicaragua, Perú, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Nations have revealed a great deal of new information about their stockpiles. With the submission of their first Article 7 reports, it is now known that Argentina has a stockpile of 89,170 antipersonnel mines and Brazil has a stockpile of 34,562 antipersonnel mines. Chile stated that its Army has a stockpile of 25,000 antipersonnel mines. Colombia stated that its Armed Forces have a stockpile of 18,294 antipersonnel mines. The Armed Forces of El Salvador told Landmine Monitor that El Salvador has a stockpile of 5,657 antipersonnel mines; previously El Salvador had reported that it had destroyed its mines. Uruguay reported to Landmine Monitor that it has a stockpile of 1,918 AP mines. Landmine Monitor estimates that Guyana has 20,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

Venezuela has now said that it has a "small" stockpile for training purposes, but the size and composition of the stockpile remains unknown. Suriname is one of the only countries in the world where it is not known whether a stockpile exists.

The number of antipersonnel mines retained for training and development purposes in some countries of the region are the highest of any States Parties. Brazil intends to retain 16,550 antipersonnel mines, the most of any State Party. Ecuador reports that it will retain 16,000 mines, the second highest number of any State Party. Argentina reported that it will retain 13,025 mines, up from the 3,049 initially reported, and the fourth highest of any State Party. Perú reports that it will reduce the number of antipersonnel mines retained for training and development from 9,526 to 5,578.

Honduras destroyed its stockpile of 7,441 antipersonnel mines on 2 November 2000. Perú destroyed 117,506 antipersonnel mines from March 2000 through July 2001. Nicaragua destroyed 70,000 antipersonnel mine in seven separate destructions from April 1999 to June 2001; it reports it will complete stockpile destruction by December 2002. Argentina destroyed 200 antipersonnel mines in November 2000; it reports that large-scale stockpile destruction will commence in the second half of 2001 and will take 11 months. The Chilean Navy destroyed 2,000 antipersonnel mines in November 2000, but the government has not released a plan to destroy remaining stockpiles. Uruguay has destroyed 242 stockpiled AP mines since May 2000.

No stockpile destruction has been carried out to date in Colombia. Ecuador reported that 101,458 antipersonnel mines had been destroyed up to March 2000, but Landmine Monitor is unaware of further stockpile destruction as of July 2001. El Salvador reported to Landmine Monitor that stockpile destruction was to begin in January 2000 and end in July 2003, but no destruction had been reported as of July 2001.

### **Landmine Problem**

Ten countries in the region are known to be mine-affected: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Perú; as well as the disputed Malvinas/Falkland Islands.

According to the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, at least 168 of Colombia's 1,092 municipalities in 27 of the country's 32 departments are mine-affected. The reported number of landmines laid in Chile varies considerably from one million to 250,000 depending on the source. The Chilean Army reportedly has 293 minefields, located in two Regions in the north and one Region in the south, potentially affecting 17 municipalities. Ecuador has estimated the number of mines on its side of the border with Perú to be in excess of 90,000. Although El Salvador had previously declared itself mine-free, the International Demining Group (UK NGO) and its partner organization CORDES have identified 53 mine and UXO-affected sites in four departments. Nicaragua reports that as of April 2001 there were 70,769 mines still in the ground in 369 areas along the northern border with Honduras and in 39 sites inside the country. Nicaragua also reports that its southern border with Costa Rica was declared mine-free in April 2001. Perú estimates that 120,000 antipersonnel mines are laid in its territory along the border with Ecuador.

### **Mine Action Funding**

From the Americas the biggest contributors to mine action globally are the United States and Canada. The United States contributed approximately \$97.6 million in mine action funding during fiscal year 2000, the highest amount contributed by the USA since it began providing assistance in 1993. The Canadian government contributed CDN\$21.8 million (US\$14.6 million) in fiscal year 2000-2001.

The OAS coordinates and supervises the Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (PADCA), with the technical support of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). PADCA is active in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras. In 2000, the annual budget for the OAS regional program in Central America was \$7.6 million, financed by Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the US and the UK. Between June 2000 and May 2001 financial contributions totalled approximately \$6 million. According to the OAS, Italy and the Russian Federation have joined the donors group in 2001, while Switzerland is no longer listed.

OAS support for country programs in Perú and Ecuador are pilot projects with a two-year timeline requiring just over \$2 million per year per country.

### **Mine Clearance**

Humanitarian mine clearance activities are underway in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Perú.

Mine clearance in Nicaragua is scheduled for completion by December 2004. As of April 2001, Nicaragua reported that a total of 64,874 emplaced landmines had been destroyed, and 2.1 million square meters of land cleared. In El Salvador, the International Demining Group is scheduled to implement in late 2001 a six-month pilot project that includes mine clearance. In Honduras, mine clearance operations began the final phase in Choluteca department, and clearance operations are scheduled for completion by September 2001. In Costa Rica, according to current plans, mine clearance operations are expected to be completed in July 2002. In Guatemala, clearance of UXO in the northern areas of El Quiché department was completed in March 2001, and clearance of all 13 departments considered high risk is scheduled for completion by 2004.

Ecuador reports that between July 2000 and March 2001, 2,889 mine were cleared and destroyed. Perú reports that from March 2000 to March 2001, 14,737 mines were destroyed in mine clearance operations around infrastructure and electricity towers.

The third and final verification stage of clearance of USA minefields around Guantánamo Bay in Cuba was completed in May 2000. In July 2001, the UK and Argentine Foreign Ministers agreed that an Exchange of Notes on a demining feasibility study for the disputed Malvinas/Falkland Islands should take place.

### **Mine Awareness**

There are mine awareness activities in Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panamá, and Perú.

In Nicaragua, the use of Superman and Wonder Woman comics was discontinued after much criticism. In Colombia, a pilot project in 16 municipalities is being implemented between July 2001 and January 2002. In Ecuador, some limited mine awareness education has been carried out by the military's psychological operations branch in Loja and El Oro, with the assistance of local schools. Perú reports that between March 2000 and March 2001 Army personnel carried out bilingual mine awareness campaigns in cooperation with the local population in the north of the country.

**Mine Casualties**

In 2000/2001, new landmine/UXO casualties were reported in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Perú. Colombia has by far the greatest number of new landmine/UXO casualties. According to the Colombian Campaign Against Landmines, there were 23 killed and 60 injured from landmines in 2000; from January through July 2001, a total of 138 mine casualties were reported. In Nicaragua, in 2000 and up until June 2001, there were 23 mine casualties, involving twelve civilians and eleven military. In El Salvador, 25 mine/UXO casualties were reported in 2000. Perú reports that there were six mine incidents involving seven casualties in the Army and National Police during 2000.

**Survivor Assistance**

Governmental assistance to landmine and UXO survivors in the Americas is generally of poor quality. For the most part, there are limited resources available to military and police personnel, but resources for civilian victims are inadequate or non-existing. A marked urban bias in health care resource allocation compounds the problems.

In Colombia, the government launched in May 2001 a program for mine accident prevention and victim assistance in 20 municipalities. In Ecuador, the Association of Disabled Veterans "Upper Cenepa" was created within the Ministry of Defence, and disabled veterans were trained in computer programming.

A number of NGOs and international organizations contribute to survivor assistance efforts in the region. In Colombia, Bogotá-based CIREC Foundation produces approximately 500 prostheses and 3,000 orthoses each year. In El Salvador, a number of NGOs are involved in victim assistance, including PODES, which as of May 2001 had assisted 1,416 people. In Honduras, Handicap International Belgium is assisting the Ministry of Health set up the first prosthetic and orthotic workshop in the capital.

The Canada/PAHO/México tripartite victim assistance project in Central America continues in Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador.

**ASIA-PACIFIC****Mine Ban Policy**

Fifteen of the thirty-nine countries in the Asia-Pacific region are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. In this reporting period (since May 2000), four nations became States Parties. Bangladesh and Maldives ratified, on 6 and 7 September respectively, becoming the first countries in South Asia to do so. Nauru acceded on 7 August and Kiribati acceded on 7 September. Other States Parties in the region include: Australia, Cambodia, Fiji, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Niue, the Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Thailand.

Another five countries have signed, but not yet ratified the treaty: Brunei, Cook Islands, Indonesia, Marshall Islands and Vanuatu. Cook Islands reported that it is in the process of completing the domestic process necessary for ratification.

Nineteen states remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty, the largest number of non-signatories in any region of the world. This group includes some major antipersonnel mine producers and stockpilers, such as China, India and Pakistan, and some highly mine-affected countries such as Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.

Of the 15 States Parties, five have enacted domestic implementing legislation. In Malaysia implementing legislation entered into force in June 2000; Australia, Cambodia, Japan, and New Zealand had enacted implementing legislation in previous years. Bangladesh and Kiribati reported that steps to enact legislation are underway. The Philippines is expected to draft domestic implementing legislation later in 2001.

Eight States Parties have submitted their initial Article 7 transparency measures report (Australia, Cambodia, Fiji, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Niue, and Thailand); all but Fiji,

Malaysia, and Niue submitted annual updates. The Philippines submitted a very brief report that did not meet all of the reporting requirements detailed in Article 7. Samoa and Solomon Islands have not submitted their initial reports due in August 1999 and December 1999, respectively. Initial Article 7 reports are due on 28 August 2001 from Bangladesh, Kiribati and Maldives, and on 31 July 2001 from Nauru.

Sixteen countries in the region attended the Second Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2001, including seven non-signatories: Afghanistan, Bhutan, China, Nepal, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. Since then, Japan has served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, Malaysia as co-chair of the SC on Stockpile Destruction, Australia as co-rapporteur of the SC on Stockpile Destruction and Thailand as co-rapporteur of the SC on General Status and Operation of the Convention.

Twenty-three states from the region voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly Resolution 55/33V in November 2000, including non-signatories Bhutan, Mongolia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Tonga. Among the 22 countries abstaining, eight were from the Asia-Pacific: China, India, Marshall Islands (a treaty signatory), Micronesia, Burma, Pakistan, North Korea and Vietnam. Other countries from the region were either absent or unable to vote.

## Use

Antipersonnel landmines have continued to be used in six conflicts during the reporting period. Government forces and at least eleven ethnic groups in Burma (Myanmar) continue to lay landmines. Bangladesh and Thailand have accused Myanmar forces of laying mines illegally across their borders. In Nepal, there are now serious indicators that government police forces are using antipersonnel mines against Maoist rebels; the rebels are increasingly using homemade mines. In Sri Lanka, both the government forces and rebel LTTE are using antipersonnel mines in the on-going conflict. In the Philippines, three rebels groups (Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Abu Sayyat and the New People's Army) used antipersonnel mines or improvised explosive devices. The opposition Northern Alliance in Afghanistan continued to use antipersonnel mines. Militants in Kashmir repeatedly use improvised explosive devices, which function as antipersonnel landmines. In addition to these six conflicts, since March 2001 it appears that rebels in Aceh, Indonesia, have used homemade mines to target vehicles.

## Production and Transfer

Eight of the 14 current producers globally are from the Asia-Pacific region: Burma (Myanmar), China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore and Vietnam.

Pursuant to their obligations under CCW Amended Protocol II, India and Pakistan stated that they ceased the production of non-detectable mines on 1 January 1997. It appears Pakistan is engaged in new production of both hand-emplaced detectable mines and remotely delivered mines that meet CCW Amended Protocol II standards. India has designed for production a detectable version of its hand-emplaced, non-metallic M14 mine.

The South Korean Ministry of Defense reported that 7,000 KM18A1 Claymore-type mines were produced in 2000. Singapore has confirmed that it continues to produce antipersonnel mines. Australia revealed that it produced antipersonnel mines in the past, but stopped production in the early 1980s.

Rebels groups and non-state actors are believed to produce homemade antipersonnel mines in Burma, Kashmir, Nepal, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.

There was no evidence of any antipersonnel mine exports or imports in the Asia/Pacific region. India, Pakistan and Singapore have a moratorium in place. China has a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are incompatible with CCW Amended Protocol II. Vietnam made a declaratory statement that it has never exported and will never export mines.

**Stockpiling and Destruction**

Some of the biggest mine stockpiles globally are in the Asia-Pacific region: China (110 million), Pakistan (6 million), India (4-5 million) and the Republic of Korea (2 million). Other countries holding stockpiles include non-signatories Burma (Myanmar), North Korea, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Vietnam; signatories Brunei and Indonesia; and States Parties Bangladesh, Japan and Thailand.

Malaysia destroyed its entire stockpile of 94,721 mines in January 2001 and decided not to retain any live antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes. Japan had destroyed 223,508 antipersonnel mines as of the end of February 2001. Thailand destroyed an additional 69,346 antipersonnel mines since January 2001. Australia destroyed an additional 6,460 antipersonnel mines that were "inadvertently omitted" from a previous inventory. Australia has decreased the number of mines retained from 10,000 to 7,845. Thailand will retain 5,000 antipersonnel mines instead of 15,600.

**Landmine Problem**

In the region, sixteen countries and Taiwan are mine- and UXO-affected. In Afghanistan, the total contaminated land is estimated at 724 million square meters. Cambodia is estimated to have 3,600 mined areas. In Laos, 15 out of 18 provinces are affected by UXO and landmines. The Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines reports that 37 districts are mine-affected, including eight highly affected. In Sri Lanka, the northern and eastern regions are severely affected; the escalation of the conflict is likely to have significantly increased the amount of contaminated land.

In Thailand, a national Landmine Impact Survey was completed, indicating that 27 provinces with total population of 503,682 were mine-contaminated. Most affected communities are located along the Cambodian border. Landmine Impact Surveys are underway in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Vietnam.

**Mine Action Funding**

The major mine action donors from the region are Japan and Australia. In 2000, Japan provided US\$11.9 million for mine action, a decrease from the previous year. After three years, Japan has contributed about 41% of its five-year 10 billion yen target for mine action. Australia committed or spent approximately US\$6.8 million (A\$12.9 million) in the 2000/2001 fiscal year, an increase from A\$11.9 million in fiscal 1999/2000.

In 2000, mine action funding totaled about US\$25.2 million in Cambodia, \$17 million in Afghanistan, and \$8.6 million in Laos. Funding problems in 2000 caused temporary suspension of most clearance operations in Cambodia and lay-offs of some clearance teams in Afghanistan.

**Mine Clearance**

In Cambodia, 32 million square meters were cleared in 2000. A total 23,469 landmines and 61,589 UXO were destroyed. A new regulatory authority, the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority was established. In Afghanistan, mine clearance organizations cleared more than 24 million square meters of mined area and about 80 million square meters of former battle areas. A total of 13,542 antipersonnel mines, 636 antitank mines, and 298,828 UXO were destroyed during these clearance operations.

A total of 7.4 million square meters of land were cleared in Laos, including 80,538 explosive war remnants and 751 landmines. In Vietnam, the government has carried out clearance activity related to construction of the new Ho Chi Minh national highway, and clearance by non-governmental organizations has expanded. In Thailand, between July 2000-June 2001, the total number of mines/UXO removed was 934 mines, and 1,269 UXO. In South Korea, from June 2000 to February 2001, the army cleared 5,900 landmines. North Korea and

South Korea agreed to build a transportation linkage across the Demilitarized Zone, requiring extensive mine clearance, but in March 2001 the program was suspended.

### **Mine Awareness**

Mine awareness programs have continued in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, and Sri Lanka, and smaller scale activities have been conducted in Pakistan, Thailand, and Vietnam.

In Afghanistan, more than one million civilians reportedly received mine awareness education in various parts of the country. In 2000, the Cambodia Mine Action Center had 12 mine awareness teams that provided 1,305 courses in 903 villages. A total of 627,244 people were reached. In Pakistan the NGO Human Survival and Development launched the first mine awareness program in August 2000; as of December 2000, it had reached 24,076 people in about 147 villages of the Bajaur Agency.

### **Mine/UXO Casualties**

Casualties were recorded in 16 countries in the Asia-Pacific: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Landmine casualties continued to decline in Afghanistan and Cambodia. In Afghanistan, an average of 88 casualties per month were recorded in 2000, compared to 130 per month in 1999. In Cambodia, 802 casualties were recorded in 2000, a decrease of 24% from the previous year.

In India, officials reported 844 civilian casualties to mines and IEDs in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 2000. In Laos, 103 mine/UXO casualties were recorded. In 2000, the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines collected data on 182 mine and IED casualties. In Thailand, the Landmine Impact Survey identified 350 casualties over the previous 24 months. There were significant mine casualties in Burma (Myanmar), Sri Lanka, and Vietnam as well, but concrete statistics are not available.

### **Survivor Assistance**

Little has changed in the reported provision of services since *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*. In seven out of sixteen countries reporting casualties survivor assistance was described as inadequate. Twelve countries reported services in Physical Rehabilitation and Prosthetics while only six reported socio-economic and psychological support services. Pre-hospital care remains problematic in the region with many victims dying before reaching medical assistance. NGOs continue to play an important role in the delivery of services in all the countries reporting casualties.

In Cambodia, the Disability Action Council, together with affiliated members and relevant government ministries, issued the Cambodian Plan of Action, which provides an orientation strategy for the disability and rehabilitation sector. In Afghanistan, due to a budget shortfall in 2000, UNOPS/CDAP had to reduce its community rehabilitation program from 64 to 46 districts. China reported for the first time on Rehabilitation and Relief of Civilians Accidentally Injured by Landmines.

## **EUROPE/CENTRAL ASIA**

### **Mine Ban Policy**

Thirty-five of the 53 countries in Europe/Central Asia are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, including three who ratified in this reporting period: Moldova (8 September 2000), Romania (30 November 2000), and Malta (7 May 2001).

Five countries have signed but not ratified: Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. There are thirteen non-signatories in the region: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia,

Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Latvia, Russia, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and FR Yugoslavia.

Some developments during the reporting period are encouraging. The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey announced that they will join the treaty and will deposit their instruments of ratification and accession, respectively, at the same time. Cyprus has announced its intention to ratify soon. FR Yugoslavia has announced its intention to accede to the treaty. Belarus stated publicly on several occasions that the only impediment to joining the Mine Ban Treaty is its need for international financial and technical assistance for destruction of millions of stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Finland reiterated its goal of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in 2006.

Seven non-signatories in the region voted for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/33V in November 2000 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, including Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, and Turkey. However, of the 22 abstentions, five were in the region, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Uzbekistan.

Of the States Parties, 27 have submitted their initial Article 7 transparency reports as required under the Mine Ban Treaty. Five are late in submitting initial reports, including Albania, Iceland, San Marino, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

Fifteen States Parties have enacted domestic implementation legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. A number of other states indicate that the treaty has been incorporated into domestic law, or that existing law is adequate, and new, separate legislation is not needed: Andorra, Denmark, Ireland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Other states report that legislative preparations are underway: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Holy See, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Portugal. The legislative position in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is unclear.

Since the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000, six States Parties in this region have served on the intersessional Standing Committees of the Mine Ban Treaty: Belgium (co-chair General Status), Croatia (co-rapporteur Stockpile Destruction), Germany (co-rapporteur Mine Clearance), the Netherlands (co-chair Mine Clearance), Norway (co-rapporteur General Status), and the Slovak Republic (co-chair Stockpile Destruction).

## Use

In the period since the release of the *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, the most extensive use of antipersonnel mines in the region has been in Chechnya, where both Russian forces and Chechen fighters have continued to use mines, albeit at a lesser level than during the height of the conflict in late 1999 and early 2000.

There were a number of cases of new instances of antipersonnel mine use, or serious allegations of new use, in the region. These include: Russian forces have laid antipersonnel mines on the Chechen stretch of the Russian-Georgian border, and have laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan on the Tajik-Afghan border; Uzbekistan has laid antipersonnel mines on its borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (both governments have accused Uzbekistan of emplacing mines across the border in their territory); Kyrgyz forces reportedly mined the border with Tajikistan in summer and fall 2000, then subsequently cleared the mines; since ethnic Albanian insurgents began fighting the FYR Macedonia government in March 2001, at least six antivehicle mine incidents have been reported and there have been several reported seizures of antipersonnel mines being smuggled from Kosovo; in southern Serbia, bordering Kosovo, irregular ethnic Albanian forces have used antivehicle mines, and allegedly antipersonnel mines, too.

Armed non-state actors are reported to have used mines in four countries in the region: Georgia (in Abkhazia); FYR Macedonia; Russia (in Chechnya); and FR Yugoslavia (in and near Kosovo).

### ***Joint Operations***

The ICBL has expressed concern about the possibility of States Parties participating in joint military operations with a non-State Party that uses antipersonnel landmines, notably the United States in the NATO context. In this reporting period, several governments in this region have provided new or updated information on the issue of joint operations, including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. These recent statements show a variety of interpretations of the issue, but indicate that many States Parties consider participation in joint operations where antipersonnel mines are used as not compatible with treaty obligations.

### **Production and Transfer**

Landmine Monitor has decided to remove Turkey and FR Yugoslavia from its list of producers of antipersonnel mines. Turkey has, for the first time, provided Landmine Monitor with a written statement indicating that it has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1996, and has said that it does not intend to produce them. Turkey's Foreign Minister announced in April 2001 that Turkey was starting the process of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. FR Yugoslavia has also provided a written statement saying that it has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1992. While Landmine Monitor has received some contrary information in the past, this statement, combined with the decision of the new government to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty, justifies removal from the list of producers.

Russia is the sole remaining producer in the region, although it stated in December 2000 that it is decommissioning facilities for production of antipersonnel blast mines. Officials have said Russia is increasingly focusing efforts on research and development of landmine alternatives, rather than new antipersonnel mine production.

Landmine Monitor research did not find evidence of antipersonnel mine exports or imports by any country in the region.

### **Stockpiling and Destruction**

Italy, with 3 million antipersonnel mines, and Albania, with 1.6 million, have the biggest stockpiles of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties; however, these numbers are outdated, as destruction programs are underway in both these countries. Italy had destroyed, as of March 2001, 4,086,057 antipersonnel mines. A NATO-sponsored stockpile destruction program is in-place in Albania. Romania for the first time reported that its stockpile totals 1,076,629 antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Treaty signatory Ukraine has revised its stockpile estimate to 6.35 million, down from earlier estimates of 10.1 million; still, this is thought to be the fourth largest stockpile in the world. Ukraine and Canada signed a framework agreement for destruction of PMN mines, and discussions are underway with NATO on a PMN destruction project. Other signatories in the region with large stockpiles are likely to be Poland and Greece. Neither has been willing to reveal information about their mine stocks.

Landmine Monitor estimates that Russia has some 60-70 million antipersonnel mines, more than any country except China. Belarus revealed for the first time the size of its AP mine stockpile: 4.5 million. Other non-signatories in the region believed to have large stockpiles are Finland, Turkey, and FR Yugoslavia. Georgia is reportedly conducting an inventory of its antipersonnel mine stockpile. According to one newspaper report, Kazakhstan possesses 800,000 to one million antipersonnel mines; this is the only known public estimate of Kazakhstan's antipersonnel mine stockpile.

In this reporting period, four States Parties in the region completed destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles: the Czech Republic in June 2001, Bulgaria in December 2000, Spain in November 2000, and the Slovak Republic in September 2000. Eleven others previously

completed destruction: Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Additionally, seven States Parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles: Albania, Croatia, Italy, Moldova, Netherlands, Slovenia, and Sweden. Sweden, as of April 2001, has destroyed 2,335,069 antipersonnel mines since entry-into-force of the Mine Ban Treaty, and there were 24,200 antipersonnel mines still in stockpile. Slovenia destroyed nearly 20,000 antipersonnel mines as of May 2001; plans call for destruction of remaining mines by the end of 2001.

Five States Parties have not begun the destruction process: FYR Macedonia, Portugal, Romania, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Romania has only been a State Party for a short time.

The problems associated with the destruction of PFM-1 and PFM-1S antipersonnel mines was the subject of an international meeting in Budapest co-hosted by Hungary and Canada. The following countries are thought to stockpile this type of antipersonnel mine: Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.

With regard to mines retained for training and development, the highest number will be kept by Sweden, with 11,120, and Italy, with 8,000. After the ICBL raised concerns about excessive numbers retained, several countries have decided to decrease the number: Bulgaria from 10,446 to 4,000; Croatia from 17,500 to 7,000, Denmark from 4,991 to 2,106, Slovakia from 7,000 to 1,500; and Spain from 10,000 to 4,000. Slovenia confirmed that it will reduce the number of antipersonnel mines retained from 7,000 to 1,500 after 2003.

#### ***Stockpiling and Transit of Foreign Antipersonnel Mines***

The United States stores antipersonnel mines in Norway (123,000 antipersonnel mines), Germany (112,000), United Kingdom at Diego Garcia (10,000), Greece (1,100) and Turkey (1,100). Germany and the United Kingdom do not consider the US mine stockpiles to be under their jurisdiction or control, and thus not subject to the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty or their national implementation measures. Norway, through a bilateral agreement with the US, has stipulated the mines must be removed by 1 March 2003, which is the deadline for Norway to comply with its Mine Ban Treaty Article 4 obligation for destruction of antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction and control.

The United States has also discussed with a number of treaty States Parties the permissibility of the US transiting mines through their territory. Research published in previous editions of *Landmine Monitor* showed that States Parties in this region, including France, Denmark, Slovakia, and Spain have indicated transit is prohibited. Norway and Germany indicated that this is permitted. During this reporting period, the number of States Parties indicating that transit would not be allowed has increased, with Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal and Switzerland added to the list.

#### ***Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices***

A key issue of concern to the ICBL is that of antivehicle mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes which cause them to function as antipersonnel mines, and thus are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. The ICRC hosted a technical experts meeting on the issue on 13-14 March 2001 in Geneva, which was attended by fifteen countries, including nine States Parties from this region (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom) and one non-signatory (Finland). During the reporting period, officials of a number of States Parties in this region made policy statements on this matter, including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In the Belgian Parliament, legislation banning antihandling devices, or interpreting existing law to ban them, has been proposed and studied. In Germany, some Parliamentarians and government officials are considering options to ban or regulate use of antivehicle mines.

### **Landmine Problem**

Of 53 countries in Europe and Central Asia, 23 are mine-affected, as well as the regions of Abkhazia, Chechnya, Kosovo, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Last year, Bulgaria and Slovenia were reported as mine-affected, but are now considered mine-free. Uzbekistan is now listed as mine-affected due to its mining of its borders with both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. FYR Macedonia is also now considered mine-affected, due to use of mines in the conflict with Albanian insurgents during 2001; casualties have been reported, but the extent of mining has not been determined.

Of the 23 affected states in this region, eight are States Parties (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, and Tajikistan) and four are signatories (Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, and Ukraine). Eleven mine-affected countries in the region have not yet joined the treaty (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Russia, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Yugoslavia). In some cases, there is considerable contamination with unexploded ordnance (UXO) as well as mines.

The most serious problems are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Yugoslavia (including Kosovo), Chechnya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Bosnia and Herzegovina has recorded a total of 18,145 minefields. In Croatia, there are an estimated 4,000 square kilometers of mined or suspected mined areas. In Kosovo, a total of 620 minefields have been identified. Yugoslavia laid an estimated 50,000 mines. NATO bombing left as many as 30,000 unexploded cluster munitions which function like antipersonnel mines. Albanian officials state that the entire Albania-Kosovo border is affected by antipersonnel and antitank mines laid by Serbian forces. Nagorno-Karabakh reports that thirty percent of the territory's agricultural lands are not being used because of the danger of mines. In Abkhazia, HALO Trust completed a minefield survey and estimated over 18.3 square kilometers of land were potentially mine-threatened.

World War II mines and UXO still require clearance in Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine and Russia. Other countries, such as the Czech Republic, have mine/UXO problems from munition dumps left by the former Soviet Union.

In Kosovo, a modified Landmine Impact Survey has been conducted. Advance survey missions have been conducted in Azerbaijan and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with plans for Landmine Impact Surveys in the future. In 2000 and 2001, the UN has carried out assessment or fact-finding missions in Belarus and Georgia/Abkhazia.

### **Mine Action Funding**

Thirteen of the top seventeen mine action donors in 2000 are from this region, led by the United Kingdom (\$21.5 million), Norway (\$19.2 million), Germany (\$14.5 million), the Netherlands (\$14.2 million) and Denmark (\$13.4 million). In 2000, notable increases in mine action funding were recorded in Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Mine action funding fell substantially in Italy and Sweden.

In Europe, research and development (R&D) programs are also a central part of mine action initiatives. On 17 July 2000, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the European Commission, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and the United States, in order to establish an International Test and Evaluation Program (ITEP) to promote the development of new technologies for humanitarian demining. These countries, as well as France, Germany, Norway, Denmark, and Croatia are devoting considerable resources to R&D.

The major recipients of mine action funding in the region are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Croatia. Mine action funding for Kosovo in 2000 totaled about \$33 million, more than any other location in the world. Bosnia and Herzegovina received about \$15 million, a significant decrease from the previous year; funding shortfalls in 2000 and 2001 put the existence of the Mine Action Center at risk. Croatia has provided the vast majority of funding for mine

action there, but foreign donors provided some \$6 million in 2000. Estonia received \$2.2 million from the US in 2000 for demining training and equipment.

### **Mine Clearance**

During 2000 and early 2001, mine clearance operations of some sort (including sporadic clearance and clearance for military purposes) could be found in: Abkhazia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Chechnya, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Georgia, Greece, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, Poland, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia. Compared with last year's Landmine Monitor reporting, additional countries with clearance operations are Kyrgyzstan and FYR Macedonia.

In 2000 and early 2001, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Moldova had humanitarian mine action programs underway, as did Abkhazia, Kosovo, and Nagorno-Karabakh. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 2000, 1.7 million square meters of land were declared to be mine-free. In Croatia, 9.8 million square meters of land were cleared, and in Kosovo, 19.4 million square meters were cleared, including destruction of 10,713 AP mines, 3,920 AT mines, 3,729 cluster bomblets and 9,643 UXO. The UN Mine Action Coordination Centre plans to complete clearance of all known minefields and surface CBU by the end of 2001.

### **Mine Awareness**

Mine awareness programs have been implemented in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, and the Russian Federation (Chechnya and Ingushetia), as well as Abkhazia, Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh. In Albania, in June 2000, an assessment mission was carried out jointly by the ICRC and a mine clearance NGO to determine the extent of the mine/UXO problem in the three most contaminated districts. As a result of the recent fighting in FYR Macedonia, the ICRC conducted a needs assessment in June 2001 in order to assess the extent of the UXO problem. In Kosovo, after the early proliferation of mine awareness programs, the UN Mine Action Coordination Center required accreditation of mine awareness organizations and also required that mine awareness be included as an element of all clearance tasks. In June and July 2001, the GICHD conducted a mine awareness and advocacy assessment mission on behalf of UNICEF to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

### **Mine Casualties**

In 2000-2001, mine/UXO accidents occurred in 19 countries in Europe and Central Asia. In Albania, 35 casualties were recorded in 2000, down from 191 in 1999. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 92 casualties were recorded in 2000. In Croatia, 22 casualties were recorded in 2000, down from 51 in 1999. In Georgia, 51 casualties were reported between January and June 2001. In Kosovo, 95 casualties were recorded in 2000, down from 342 registered between 16 June (end of conflict) and 31 December 1999. In Nagorno-Karabakh, 15 casualties were recorded in 2000, down from 30 in 1999. In Tajikistan, mine injuries appeared to be on the rise with 58 casualties reported between August 2000 and early May 2001.

In 2000/2001, landmine/UXO casualties also include nationals coming from mine-free countries, or other mine-affected countries, killed or injured while abroad engaged in military or demining operations, peacekeeping, tourism, or other activities. These countries include France, FYR Macedonia, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Belgium and Uzbekistan reported mine/UXO casualties in 2000 and 2001, but not in 1999. Cyprus and Moldova reported no new casualties in 2000 or 2001, although these countries remain mine-affected.

### **Survivor Assistance**

Among the notable developments with respect to survivor assistance in this region are: in Albania, an agreement was signed between the Albanian Mine Action Center and the Slovenian International Trust Fund to provide forty mine survivors with prostheses up to June 2001; in Armenia, in October 2000 the Yerevan Prosthetic and Orthotic Center stopped providing medical assistance due to a lack of funding, but operations were resumed in February 2001; in Azerbaijan, the Victim Assistance component of the National Mine Action Plan, budgeted to cost \$150,000, has not been implemented due to the absence of donor funding; in Chechnya, UNICEF with the support of a local NGO, Voice of the Mountains, is developing a database on mine casualties; women and children were reported as suffering 34 percent of all landmine and UXO injuries; in Georgia, the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs is developing a special program for the care and rehabilitation of the disabled; and in Ukraine, the government fulfilled its budget obligations and financed the activities of the orthopedic centers in full; a series of state decrees relating to the disabled, including mine victims, have been accepted.

Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden utilized the new Article 7 Form J, aimed mainly at voluntary victim assistance reporting.

## **MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA**

### **Mine Ban Policy**

Four of the eighteen countries of the Middle East/North Africa region are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty: Jordan, Qatar, Tunisia, and Yemen. Algeria, a treaty signatory, announced in May 2001 that it had completed the ratification process, but it has yet to deposit its official instruments with the United Nations in New York.

Thirteen states in the region have not acceded to the treaty: Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and United Arab Emirates.

Israel and Jordan provided their consent to be bound by Amended Protocol II of CCW in 2000. They are the only countries in the region to do so.

Tunisia provided its initial Article 7 transparency measures report in July 2000. Jordan and Yemen submitted their annual updates as required. Qatar is late in submitting its initial report, which was due by 27 September 1999.

Delegations from Algeria, Jordan, Qatar, and Tunisia attended the Second Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2000. Yemen did not attend. Seven non-States Parties attended as observers: Iraq, Israel, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

While no country in the region has enacted domestic implementation legislation, Tunisia has said that preparations are underway and Yemen is considering additional steps beyond its ratification legislation.

All States Parties and the one signatory in the region voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 55/33V in November 2000, calling for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. In addition, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates voted in favor of this resolution, as they did in 1999, despite having not joined the treaty. Among the 22 governments abstaining on the vote were Egypt, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, and Syria.

Countries from the region that attended at least one meeting of the Intersessional Standing Committees were Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Yemen.

### **Use**

Israel acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines in South Lebanon prior to its withdrawal from the area in May 2000, and provided minefield maps to the United Nations. It appears that

Israel has continued to use antipersonnel mines in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, allegedly without proper fencing and marking as required by CCW Amended Protocol II, which entered into force for Israel on 30 April 2001. When asked about the allegation, Israel replied that it “fulfills its obligations to the fullest extent, and strongly rejects allegations to the contrary.” There have been allegations of mine use by Palestinians as well.

### **Production and Transfer**

*Landmine Monitor Report 2000* identified three current antipersonnel mine producers (Egypt, Iran, and Iraq) and one past producer (Israel) in the region. Egyptian officials have stated several times since 1997 that Egypt no longer produces antipersonnel mines. However, this position has not been issued in writing as a formal policy statement, despite numerous requests from Landmine Monitor and the ICBL. Thus, Landmine Monitor continues to count Egypt as a mine producer.

Israel has a formal moratorium on antipersonnel mine exports in place through 2003. Egyptian and Iranian officials have publicly stated that their countries no longer export antipersonnel mines, but Egypt has not given official written confirmation of this. Iran has been accused of exporting mines to several nations in recent years, but no concrete evidence has been found. Iraq is the only nation in the world known to have exported antipersonnel mines in the past that has not at least announced a halt to exports. In September 2000, an Iraqi diplomat said to Landmine Monitor, “How can we export landmines? We only export oil for food.”

### **Stockpiling and Destruction**

Some previously unknown details of stockpiles in the region have emerged in this reporting period. Tunisia declared a stockpile of 17,575 antipersonnel mines in its initial Mine Ban Treaty transparency measures report. Qatar has confirmed to Landmine Monitor that it has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but has not provided details. Oman also revealed for the first time that it has a “limited” stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes. No other state in the region has divulged details about the total number of antipersonnel mines in its stockpile. It is likely that Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Syria have the biggest stocks of antipersonnel mines in the region.

States Parties have begun to destroy their stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. Jordan destroyed an additional 16,000 antipersonnel mines since May 2000. Yemen destroyed an additional 4,286 antipersonnel mines in February 2001 and has indicated that if funding is forthcoming, it can destroy its entire stockpile within a year. The deadlines for States Parties to destroy their stockpiles are: Yemen (1 March 2003); Qatar (1 April 2003); Jordan (1 May 2003); Tunisia (1 January 2004).

Three States Parties will retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes: Tunisia (5,000); Yemen (4,000); Jordan (1,000). Qatar’s plans are not known. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia combined host a total of nearly 80,000 antipersonnel mines for the United States as part of pre-positioned ammunition stocks. Qatar would neither confirm nor deny Landmine Monitor’s report of the presence of US antipersonnel mines.

### **Landmine Problem**

Mines and UXO from the World War II period and from more recent conflicts are encountered in 14 of the 18 countries of the region, all except Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Mines and UXO also affect the Golan Heights, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and the Western Sahara. Estimates of the total number of mines emplaced in the region vary greatly.

In Yemen, the Landmine Impact Survey was completed in July 2000 and the Yemeni government approved a five-year Strategic Mine Action Plan based on the survey data in

February 2001. The Survey identified 592 affected villages and 1,078 mine sites covering 923 million square meters of land, affecting 828,000 Yemeni civilians.

In Lebanon, the National Demining Office has identified 1,388 mined areas, including 553 in South Lebanon. A nationwide Landmine Impact Survey was due to start in 2001.

Tunisia declared in its initial Article 7 report that there are five mined areas in the country, containing 3,526 antipersonnel mines and 1,530 antivehicle mines laid in 1976 and 1980.

In August 2000, the UK-based Mines Advisory Group completed an assessment of mined areas around the village of Husan in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

### **Mine Action Funding**

This year marked the first in which significant inter-regional mine action funding was announced. In March 2001 the United Arab Emirates announced its intention to donate \$50 million to help redevelop South Lebanon, which includes funding for mine clearance. In May 2001, Saudi Arabia announced it would provide \$3 million over the next three years for mine action in Yemen.

Funding for mine action in northern Iraq totaled some \$23 million in 2000, including \$20 million for the Mine Action Program under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, funded entirely through the UN Oil for Food Program.

Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, and most recently Oman receive mine action funding, training, and equipment from the United States. Other donor governments including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom provide mine action assistance and funding in the region.

Egypt's National Committee to Supervise Mine Clearance met for the first time in June 2000 and subsequently established a trust fund for mine clearance in the western desert.

No country in the region contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action in either 1999 or 2000.

### **Mine Clearance**

The major humanitarian mine clearance program in the region is in northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan). From 1997 to mid-2001 over 7 million square meters of land were cleared, with over 70 percent of that land cleared during 2000 and 2001. In addition, in 2000, the Mines Advisory Group cleared fourteen minefields, and declared safe 702,111 square meters of land. Norwegian People's Aid cleared seven minefields and a total of 449,778 square meters of land.

In 2000, 447 antivehicle mines and 4,897 UXO were cleared from an area of land covering 666,445 square meters in Yemen. According to information provided in Jordan's most recent Article 7 report, 37,997 antipersonnel mines (and 82,929 mines of all types) have been cleared and that the total land area cleared is 50 million square meters. A National Demining and Rehabilitation Committee has been formed in Jordan.

From October 1999 to April 2001, the Lebanese Army cleared 23,293 antipersonnel mines, 4,905 antitank mines and numerous other UXO. The Lebanese Army cleared 672,415 square meters of land in 2000 and 154,772 square meters up to April 2001. According to Iranian officials, in the year 2000, more than 880,000 mines and UXO, and 300 million square meters of land, were cleared. Since 1988, over 7,500 million square meters of mined land and 9 million mines and UXO have been cleared in Iran. In Kuwait, it is estimated that some 250 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were cleared in the year 2000.

Other affected states where mine clearance occurs, sometimes systematically and sometimes sporadically, are Egypt, Israel, Libya, Morocco, and Oman. Mine clearance is carried out by the armed forces in most countries in the region.

**Mine Awareness**

Programs have been implemented in Iran (in Kurdistan province), Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria (including the Golan Heights), and Yemen. In Lebanon, following Israel's withdrawal from the south, a number of actors including Hezbollah, the ICRC, the Landmines Resource Center, the Lebanese Red Cross, Rädä Barnen, UNESCO and UNICEF have conducted mine awareness activities, including emergency interventions. At least 57 mine awareness education events were conducted in Lebanon between May and December 2000.

In Libya, it is reported that the authorities have provided mine awareness training that may include training in mine clearance. In Egypt, mine awareness activities by the Landmine Struggle Center, the sole NGO conducting mine awareness education in affected areas, have been curtailed due to lack of funds. The ICRC has started collecting data on mine and UXO casualties in southern Iraq as a preliminary step toward defining an appropriate mine awareness strategy. In 2000, the ICRC held discussions with the local authorities and the Iraqi Red Crescent on the object of the data collection, on future plans for mine awareness activities and in an effort to reach an agreement with the government and the next step was to be an in-depth needs assessment, scheduled for July 2001. In the Western Sahara, a mine awareness education program conducted by NPA ended in May 2000. According to the UN Peace Plan, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will be responsible for providing mine awareness prior to the planned repatriation of Sahrawi refugees.

In cooperation with Syrian authorities, UN peacekeeping forces in the Golan Heights have initiated a program to identify and mark all mined areas in their area of operations. A mine awareness component is included in the Syrian Ministry of Health's "Safe Gardens Project," initiated in August 2000. The Defense for Children International/Palestine Section's mine awareness campaign continued, as more than 70 mine awareness sessions took place in 2000. DCI/PS, in cooperation with the Palestinian National Security Forces, also erected a fence and put warning signs around the Qabatia minefield.

On 19-22 February 2001, Rädä Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) organized in Aden, Yemen, an International Workshop on the Design of Materials, Resources, and Other Media in Mine Awareness Programs

**Mine Casualties**

In 2000, there were new victims of mines in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen. There were also mine incidents in areas such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Golan Heights, Western Sahara, and northern Iraq.

According to the UN, known UXO and mine explosions caused an average of 56 casualties per month in 2000 and 31 per month in 2001 in northern Iraq. In Yemen, there were at least twelve mine casualties in 2000, and three mine incidents by mid-2001. Since the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000, 132 mine casualties have been recorded. There were 12 new mine/UXO victims reported in Egypt in 2000. The Medical Engineering Research Center estimates that there are about 300 mine and UXO casualties in Iran every year. In Kuwait, there were at least 44 recorded and reported mine casualties between March 2000 and February 2001. A new mine victim database has been established which shows there have been more than 1,500 civilian mine/UXO victims in Kuwait since August 1990.

**Survivor Assistance**

The availability of services to mine victims and survivors varies greatly across the region. In Algeria, the Ministry of National Solidarity and Handicap International signed a partnership agreement to establish a program to assist the disabled. In Egypt, the Minister of Social Affairs signed a year 2000 budget for \$27,000 for the compensation of mine/UXO victims. In Iraq, the ICRC reports that an estimated 3,000 patients per year receive ICRC prostheses, of whom over 50

percent are mine survivors. In Lebanon, the Ministry of Health stopped providing prosthetic services due to a lack of funding. In May 2000, a new disability law was passed by the Parliament. In Yemen, the Ministry of Insurance, Social Affairs, and Labor (MOISA) and the Ministry of Public Health, in partnership with Handicap International (Belgium) established a rehabilitation center in Aden. MOISA has reorganized its community based rehabilitation program to be more responsive to the needs of landmine survivors.

18 September 1997

**CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION****Preamble**

The States Parties,

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

**Article 1**  
*General obligations*

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
  - a) To use anti-personnel mines;
  - b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
  - c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

**Article 2**  
*Definitions*

1. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

**Article 3**  
*Exceptions*

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

**Article 4**  
*Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines*

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

**Article 5**  
*Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas*

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
  - a) The duration of the proposed extension;
  - b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
    - (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;

- (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
    - (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
  - c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
  - d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

## **Article 6**

### *International cooperation and assistance*

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.
2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.
7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
  - a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
  - b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
  - c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
  - d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
  - e) Assistance to mine victims;
  - f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

### **Article 7**

#### *Transparency measures*

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:
  - a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
  - b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
  - c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
  - d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
  - e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
  - f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;

- g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
  - h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
  - i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

### **Article 8**

#### *Facilitation and clarification of compliance*

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.
7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall

enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.
12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.
13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.
14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:
  - a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
  - b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
  - c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.
16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.
17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.
18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.
19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the

- matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.
20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

### **Article 9**

#### *National implementation measures*

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

### **Article 10**

#### *Settlement of disputes*

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

### **Article 11**

#### *Meetings of the States Parties*

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
  - a) The operation and status of this Convention;
  - b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
  - c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
  - d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
  - e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
  - f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

## **Article 12**

### *Review Conferences*

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
  - a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
  - b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
  - c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5;  
and
  - d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

## **Article 13**

### *Amendments*

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

#### **Article 14**

##### *Costs*

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

#### **Article 15**

##### *Signature*

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

#### **Article 16**

##### *Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession*

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

**Article 17**  
*Entry into force*

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

**Article 18**  
*Provisional application*

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

**Article 19**  
*Reservations*

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

**Article 20**  
*Duration and withdrawal*

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

**Article 21**  
*Depositary*

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

**Article 22**  
*Authentic texts*

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

## MINE BAN TREATY SIGNATORIES AND STATES PARTIES

### 1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (1997 MINE BAN TREATY)

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature, the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign it, rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a).

**As of 1 August 2001, 140 signatories/accession and 118 ratifications or accession (a)**

Albania 8 Sep 1998; 29 Feb 2000  
**Algeria 3 Dec 1997**  
Andorra 3 Dec 1997; 29 Jun 1998  
**Angola 4 Dec 1997**  
Antigua And Barbuda 3 Dec 1997; 3 May 1999  
Argentina 4 Dec 1997; 14 Sep 1999  
Australia 3 Dec 1997; 14 Jan 1999  
Austria 3 Dec 1997; 29 Jun 1998  
Bahamas 3 Dec 1997; 31 Jul 1998  
Bangladesh 7 May 1998; 6 Sep 2000  
Barbados 3 Dec 1997; 26 Jan 1999  
Belgium 3 Dec 1997; 4 Sep 1998  
Belize 27 Feb 1998; 23 Apr 1998  
Benin 3 Dec 1997; 25 Sep 1998  
Bolivia 3 Dec 1997; 9 Jun 1998  
Bosnia And Herzegovina 3 Dec 1997; 8 Sep 1998  
Botswana 3 Dec 1997; 1 Mar 2000  
Brazil 3 Dec 1997; 30 Apr 1999  
**Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 1997**  
Bulgaria 3 Dec 1997; 4 Sep 1998  
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 1997; 16 Sep 1998  
**Burundi 3 Dec 1997**  
Cambodia 3 Dec 1997; 28 July 1999  
**Cameroon 3 Dec 1997**  
Canada 3 Dec 1997; 3 Dec 1997  
Cape Verde 4 Dec 1997; 14 May 2001  
Chad 6 Jul 1998; 6 May 1999  
**Chile 3 Dec 1997**  
Colombia 3 Dec 1997; 6 Sep 2000  
Congo (Brazzaville) 4 May 2001 (A)  
Cook Islands 3 Dec 1997  
Costa Rica 3 Dec 1997; 17 Mar 1999  
Côte D'ivoire 3 Dec 1997; 30 June 2000  
Croatia 4 Dec 1997; 20 May 1998  
**Cyprus 4 Dec 1997**  
Czech Republic 3 Dec 1997; 26 Oct. 1999  
Denmark 4 Dec 1997; 8 Jun 1998  
Djibouti 3 Dec 1997; 18 May 1998  
Dominica 3 Dec 1997; 26 Mar 1999  
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 1997; 30 Jun 2000  
Ecuador 4 Dec 1997; 29 Apr 1999  
El Salvador 4 Dec 1997; 27 Jan 1999  
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 1998 (A)  
**Ethiopia 3 Dec 1997**  
Fiji 3 Dec 1997; 10 Jun 1998  
France 3 Dec 1997; 23 Jul 1998  
Gabon 3 Dec 1997; 8 Sept. 2000  
**Gambia 4 Dec 1997**  
Germany 3 Dec 1997; 23 Jul 1998  
Ghana 4 Dec 1997; 30 June 2000  
**Greece 3 Dec 1997**  
Grenada 3 Dec 1997; 19 Aug 1998  
Guatemala 3 Dec 1997; 26 Mar 1999  
Guinea 4 Dec 1997; 8 Oct 1998  
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 1997 ; 22 May 2001  
**Guyana 4 Dec 1997**  
**Haiti 3 Dec 1997**  
Holy See 4 Dec 1997; 17 Feb 1998  
Honduras 3 Dec 1997; 24 Sep 1998  
Hungary 3 Dec 1997; 6 Apr 1998  
Iceland 4 Dec 1997; 5 May 1999  
**Indonesia 4 Dec 1997**  
Ireland 3 Dec 1997; 3 Dec 1997  
Italy 3 Dec 1997; 23 Apr 1999  
Jamaica 3 Dec 1997; 17 Jul 1998  
Japan 3 Dec 1997; 30 Sep 1998  
Jordan 11 Aug 1998; 13 Nov 1998  
Kenya 5 Dec 1997; 23 Jan 2001  
Kiribati 7 September 2000 (A)

- Lesotho 4 Dec 1997; 2 Dec 1998  
Liberia 23 December 1999 (A)  
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 1997; 5 Oct 1999  
**Lithuania 26 Feb 1999**  
Luxembourg 4 Dec 1997; 14 Jun 1999  
Macedonia, Fyr 9 Sep 1998 (A)  
Madagascar 4 Dec 1997; 16 Sep 1999  
Maldives, 1 Oct 1998; 7 Sep 2000  
Malaysia 3 Dec 1997; 22 Apr 1999  
Malawi 4 Dec 1997; 13 Aug 1998  
Mali 3 Dec 1997; 2 Jun 1998  
Malta 4 Dec 1997; 7 May 2001  
**Marshall Islands 4 Dec 1997**  
Mauritania 3 Dec 1997; 21 Jul 2000  
Mauritius 3 Dec 1997; 3 Dec 1997  
México 3 Dec 1997; 9 Jun 1998  
Moldova, Republic Of 3 Dec 1997; 8 Sept. 2000  
Monaco 4 Dec 1997; 17 Nov 1998  
Mozambique 3 Dec 1997; 25 Aug 1998  
Namibia 3 Dec 1997; 21 Sep 1998  
Nauru 6 Aug 2000 (A)  
Netherlands 3 Dec 1997; 12 Apr 1999  
New Zealand 3 Dec 1997; 27 Jan 1999  
Nicaragua 4 Dec 1997; 30 Nov 1998  
Niger 4 Dec 1997; 23 Mar 1999  
Niue 3 Dec 1997; 15 Apr 1998  
Norway 3 Dec 1997; 9 Jul 1998  
Panamá 4 Dec 1997; 7 Oct 1998  
Paraguay 3 Dec 1997; 13 Nov 1998  
Perú 3 Dec 1997; 17 Jun 1998  
Philippines 3 Dec 1997; 15 Feb 2000  
**Poland 4 Dec 1997**  
Portugal 3 Dec 1997; 19 Feb 1999  
Qatar 4 Dec 1997; 13 Oct 1998  
Romania 3 Dec 1997; 30 Nov 2000  
Rwanda 3 Dec 1997; 13 June 2000  
St Kitts & Nevis 3 Dec 1997; 2 Dec 1998  
St Lucia 3 Dec 1997; 13 April 1999  
St Vincent & Grenadines 3 Dec 1997; 1 August 2001  
Samoa 3 Dec 1997; 23 Jul 1998  
San Marino 3 Dec 1997; 18 Mar 1998  
**São Tomé E Príncipe 30 Apr 1998**  
Senegal 3 Dec 1997; 24 Sep 1998  
Seychelles 4 Dec 1997; 2 Jun 2000  
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 1998; 25 April 2001  
Slovakia 3 Dec 1997; 25 Feb 1999  
Slovenia 3 Dec 1997; 27 Oct 1998  
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 1997; 26 Jan 1999  
South Africa 3 Dec 1997; 26 Jun 1998  
Spain 3 Dec 1997; 19 Jan 1999  
**Sudan 4 Dec 1997**  
**Suriname 4 Dec 1997**  
Swaziland 4 Dec 1997; 23 Dec 1998  
Sweden 4 Dec 1997; 30 Nov 1998  
Switzerland 3 Dec 1997; 24 Mar 1998  
Tajikistan 12 October 1999 (A)  
Thailand 3 Dec 1997; 27 Nov 1998  
Togo 4 Dec 1997; 9 Mar 2000  
Trinidad And Tobago 4 Dec 1997; 27 Apr 1998  
Tunisia 4 Dec 1997; 9 July 1999  
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 1997; 19 Jan 1998  
Uganda 3 Dec 1997; 25 Feb 1999  
**Ukraine 24 Feb 1999**  
United Kingdom 3 Dec 1997; 31 Jul 1998  
United Republic Of Tanzania 3 Dec 1997; 13 Nov 2000  
Uruguay 3 Dec 1997; 7 June 2001  
**Vanuatu 4 Dec 1997**  
Venezuela 3 Dec 1997; 14 Apr 1999  
Yemen 4 Dec 1997; 1 Sep 1998  
Zambia 12 Dec 1997; 23 Feb 2001  
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 1997; 18 Jun 1998
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